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Abstract 
 
Wordsworth’s Empiricist Poetic and its Influence in the Twentieth Century 
 
 
This thesis has two connected aims. Firstly, it claims that it is meaningful to describe Wordsworth’s 
aesthetic, and his beliefs about the subject-object relationship, as substantially empiricist. However, it 
is not claimed that Wordsworth is consistently empiricist in the way that a philosopher might aspire to 
be: indeed, there is a place to be found within this argument for the recognition of his 
transcendentalism. While it is granted that the word “empiricist” is not always used in the most 
rigorous philosophical sense, the influence of philosophical empiricism on Wordsworth naturally 
figures in the argument. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that the continued influence of Wordsworth 
in the twentieth century has to be understood primarily as the influence of his empiricist aesthetic. The 
thesis concludes by suggesting that there are wider possibilities for poetry than are encouraged by this 
aesthetic. The importance of undertaking this project does not lie only in objections to Wordsworth’s 
theory or practice, but arises also from a consideration of his continuing influence. 
 
Chapter One argues that on the basis of his poetry and criticism of the period 1787 to 1805, the 
description “The Empirical Wordsworth” is a meaningful one. This is established through an 
examination of Wordsworth’s writings, his sister’s journal entries, his correspondence, his poetry and 
contemporaneous literary reviews of The Prelude.  
 
Chapter Two, in order to demonstrate the antecedents of Wordsworth’s empiricist beliefs, is a study of 
his philosophical development from the influences of Hartley, Burke and Berkeley.  
 
Chapter Three examines the influence of Coleridge on Wordsworth. This is predominantly an 
empiricist one contrary to received notions of it being transcendentalist.  
 
Chapter Four reviews the reading of Wordsworth in the twentieth century. This has to be understood in 
terms of the reaction to Romanticism in the twentieth century.  
 
Finally, Chapter Five looks at twentieth-century poetry that largely avoids the empiricist influence of 
Wordsworth. It also introduces the concept of “Empirical Identifiers”: an analytic tool for literary 
criticism. 
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                                                 Introduction 
The stimulus behind this thesis lies in a question, namely: What is the value of a poem if it does not 
enable one to identify personally with it to the extent that (to paraphrase Keats): it becomes a wording 
of one’s own thoughts?1
Before that time the predominant philosophical idea in science was that of positivism, which was 
formulated by French philosopher Auguste Comte who, as Arthur I. Miller says in Einstein, Picasso, 
‘advocated progress toward a science cleansed of theology and metaphysics’.
 In other words, why should a person persist in reading a poem if it fails to 
prompt in their mind images and emotions that specifically are their own? This question, although 
seemingly naive, if treated seriously, leads to a much wider area of discussion: that of the relationship 
between the reader and the text. In academic circles, this debate is hardly new and has arguably been 
the main motivation behind the development of most forms of literary theory—from New Criticism to 
Post-structuralism. This literary discussion was indirectly influenced by ideas that were present in art 
during the first quarter of the twentieth century; ideas that in turn had been influenced by discoveries in 
science and technology during that period.  
2  In the 1880s, Ernst 
Mach expanded this concept by stating that ‘only phenomena reducible to sense perceptions (or 
laboratory data) could be considered physically real’.3  The resultant implication was that physical 
objects existed independently of the senses. However, this view began to be seriously challenged with 
the appearance of new technologies in science. New inventions such as the aeroplane, the motorcar, 
and wireless telegraphy were significant in changing people’s ideas about time and space.4 The 
discovery of X rays ‘seemed to render inside and outside ambiguous, the opaque became transparent 
and the distinction between two and three dimensions became blurred’.5  In mathematics, new 
geometries could be conceived of as more than three dimensional, with the implication of movement in 
time and space.6  
 5 
These new discoveries and their implications had ramifications that were becoming apparent outside 
of scientific discourse. In painting, the arrival of postimpressionism signalled a reaction against 
representation and naturalism.7 The pioneering cinematography of Edward Muybridge and Etienne-
Jules with their multiple images ‘permitted change with time to be portrayed either on successive 
frames of film or on a single frame, in addition to depicting different perspectives on serial frames’.8
The general line of argumentation among art historians is that the roots of cubism are in 
Paul Cézanne and primitive art. This view discounts completely how astounding 
developments in science, mathematics and technology contributed to the very definition of 
“avant-garde”. It has long been known that the roots of science were never really within 
science itself. Why then should the roots of the most influential art movement of the 
twentieth century lie totally within art? 
  
The new discoveries in science thus led to new ways of thinking about and practicing art. Miller writes: 
9
 
 
Artists who have proven to be influential in the art of the twentieth century were not operating in an 
intellectual and aesthetic vacuum but were actively engaged in discussing and learning about the 
scientific ideas surrounding them. For instance, Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon included ideas of 
four-dimensional space that were introduced to him by Maurice Princet, an insurance actuary in 
Picasso’s circle who had an interest in advanced mathematics. Picasso ‘listened to his discourses on 
non-Euclidian geometry and the fourth dimension, which Princet gleaned mostly from Poincaré’s 
widely read book La Science et l’hypothèse’.10 Princet’s discussions fascinated Picasso and 
significantly changed his thinking. Poincaré had proposed that the fourth dimension be understood as a 
sequence of scenes, however Picasso drastically modified this by representing ‘different views of a 
scene all at once, simultaneously’.11 This resulted in an ambiguous visual representation, which was 
probably one of Picasso’s objectives.12
Furthermore, the geometrical imagery underlying cubism (largely engendered by mathematics
 Indeed, the geometrical representation of spatial simultaneity 
that Cubism depended upon necessarily produced visual ambiguities.  
13) 
assisted Picasso in his goal ‘of seeking a representation based in conception rather than perception’.14 
This movement away from an empirical representation of phenomena marked a radical shift in the 
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aesthetic of visual art. This aesthetic is described by Thomas Vargish and Delo Mook in Inside 
Modernism: 
In Western art before Modernism the principal visual model for representing the world was 
that of optical similitude or perspective, […]. This model valorized the space of a single-
point perspective, […]. Such space is sometimes called “classical” by art historians and 
sometimes “realist” or “realistic”, […]. As the cubist and other modernist artists were fond 
of pointing out, […] single-point perspective was not realistic but actually “illusionist,” 
[…]. “Classical perspective” assumes a neutral, homogenous space in which objects exist 
independently […]. This model of spatial representation employs the same geometric 
principles as Newtonian space—it is also neutral, homogenous, and in all ways a suitable 
medium for Newton’s laws of motion, his mechanical worldview. The fundamental goal of 
the practitioners of linear perspective was the rendering of three-dimensional objects on a 
two-dimensional surface […]. An underlying premise in linear perspective is that light 
travels in straight lines. This premise is combined with the premisses of Euclidean 
geometry to formulate rules for the geometric construction of a perspective rendering of a 
scene as if observed through a window. […] This method of rendering perspective, 
premised on the validity of Euclidian geometry, may properly be termed “linear” […].15
 
 
Einstein’s criticisms of Euclidian geometry and further developments in the field of quantum 
mechanics helped confirm the validity of the new artistic outlook. As Miller says: 
Advances in atomic physics, dependent on methods Einstein pioneered for theory building 
as well as on his relativity theory, led to abstractions in visual imagery and a concomitant 
break with classical causality.16
 
 
He continues: 
A hallmark of classicism in art and science is a visual imagery abstracted from phenomena 
and objects we have experienced in the daily world. There is no such visual imagery in 
quantum mechanics or in highly abstract art. Artists and scientist had to seek it anew rather 
than extrapolate it from the everyday world. Just as it is pointless to stand in front of a 
Mondrian or Pollock, for instance, and ask what the painting is of, so it’s pointless to ask 
what the electron under quantum mechanics looks like.17
 
 
We can find echoes of this in Vargish and Mook’s Inside Modernism: 
 
Cubism does not pretend to represent the single possible visual conception from a given 
perspective. Instead each cubist painting proposes to engage the viewer in a specific 
conception of a contained visual reality—in what Herbert Read called ‘a construct of the 
visual imagination.’ A cubist work presents itself not as the only valid representation of a 
given reality, but as one legitimate representation of it. A cubist work of art does not say, 
‘If you stood here where I specify at the moment I dictate you would see exactly what you 
see represented in this picture.’ Only Realism gets that dogmatic. Instead the cubist work 
says, ‘I represent this plastic reality, this visual conception. My representation is 
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imaginative. It has a right, a right not to demand your passive agreement but to invite your 
imaginative participation.’18
 
 
The transmission of these artistic ideas into poetry was almost certainly due to Picasso’s close 
friend, the poet Guillaume Apollinaire. Apollinaire, as Eduardo Kac says,  
sought a Cubist approach to poetry. In certain poems he employed fragments of sounds and 
images among words scattered on the page to convey the perception of a given scene or 
moment from a variety of perspectives, paralleling the pictorial strategies of his friends 
Picasso and Braque. In other works he created compositions of concise visual rhythm and 
rarified semantical density.19
 
 
This practice also contributed to the narrative innovations that were being seen in modernist poetry. 
This is articulated by Alan Soldofsky in ‘Bifurcated Narratives in the Poetry of Robinson Jeffers, C. K. 
Williams, and Denis Johnson’: 
In the context of the defining narratives of high modernism—Hart Crane’s The Bridge, T. 
S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, Ezra Pound’s Cantos, and William Carlos Williams’s 
Paterson—poets experimented with narrative structure […]. These experimental narratives 
tended to be disjointed and […] influenced by cubism and other experimental forms of 
visual art, […].  In the case of Pound and Eliot, the deployment of narrative fragmentation 
and disintegration works as an organizing strategy, a method of cubist assemblage, 
particularly in The Cantos and The Waste Land, that compels the reader to construct an 
emotional coherence out of the text’s manifold discontinuities.20
 
 
This is particularly apparent in the first two lines of The Waste Land (‘April is the cruellest month, 
breeding / Lilacs out of the dead land’), which combines the perspectives of Geoffrey Chaucer and 
Walt Whitman. As is well known, “April” alludes to the opening lines of the Prologue of Chaucer’s 
The Canterbury Tales: 
Whan that Aprill, with his shoures soote  
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote  
And bathed every veyne in swich licour,  
Of which vertu engendred is the flour 21
 
 
                                                                      (1-4) 
 
“Lilacs” alludes to Whitman’s ‘When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom’d’—an elegy for Abraham 
Lincoln: 
When lilacs last in the door-yard bloom’d,    
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And the great star early droop’d in the western sky in the night,    
I mourn’d—and yet shall mourn with ever-returning spring.    
    
O ever-returning spring! trinity sure to me you bring;    
Lilac blooming perennial, and drooping star in the west,          
And thought of him I love. 
 
                                                                                            (1-6) 
 
Eliot has used merely two words, “April” and “Lilacs”, to present simultaneously the decay/renewal 
motifs that are held in tension in Chaucer and Whitman, two poets chronologically separated by 
centuries but here conjoined. This is only one example of many such that can be found in The Waste 
Land. Instead of subjecting thoughts to the logic of uninterrupted statement, Eliot’s “cubism” allows 
for a variety of perspectives that (as Kac is quoted above as saying in relation to Apollinaire) ‘convey 
the perception of a given scene or moment from a variety of perspectives’. 
As the twentieth century progressed, this poetic cubism made redundant the need for poetry to 
describe phenomena the way it once did and marked a diminishment in the expression via poetry of 
subjective mental states based upon a stable authorial persona. Instead, poetry became verbally 
inventive and utilised shifts in spatial and temporal perspective, as well as incorporating the fragmented 
college affects of cubist painting. The sum of these innovations was a hermeneutical plurality that had 
hitherto not been possible in poetry. This threw open a challenge to readers to become actively engaged 
in the interpretative process, rather than to be merely passive observers to a work’s perceived 
biographical, autobiographical or descriptive elements.  
Nevertheless, these liberating developments in poetry have found themselves having to compete 
alongside a more critically approved poetry that looks back to an earlier world-view. This attitude, 
which stems from some of the central poetic ideas of William Wordsworth, seeks to diminish the 
autonomy of poetic language and to focus attention upon phenomena. It is based upon the idea that 
reality exists outside of perception, and that the main function of poetic language is merely the 
delineation of this reality.  By doing this it has served to maintain a poetic aesthetic that is founded 
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entirely upon an appreciation of only one function of poetic language: that of denotation. Furthermore, 
this poetry is in principle incompatible with what we now know about the psychological mechanisms 
that underlie the process of reading, a process that recognises the reader’s active participation in the 
interpretation of what is read.  
The negative results of this have been critiques of individual poetic works based solely upon this 
criterion. We have a situation, today, in which the majority of celebrated poetry is being written 
because of, and for, this critical sensibility—and the publishing outlets that reflect it. Consequently, the 
majority of contemporary poetry is no longer about reader identification but about author 
communication. This poetry is written largely to convey the poet’s thoughts and feelings about a 
specific event, situation or place he or she has experienced. The poet is not necessarily concerned with 
whether the reader is emotionally affected or not by the poem, as long as he or she understands clearly 
the “message” the poet is trying to convey. This message may consist of some “important” insight 
gained from an experience, or it could be (as is most often the case) a commonplace observation about 
contemporary life. Such poetry is, as I will seek to demonstrate, a legacy of Wordsworth’s poetic 
aesthetic. 
It is becoming increasingly recognized that one of the most dominant aspects of Wordsworth’s 
influence is that which derives from the philosophical empiricism upon which part of his poetic 
aesthetic was based. Wordsworth used this empiricism mainly as a rationale to champion a more 
descriptive and discursive poetry than arguably had been formerly the case. It can be demonstrated that 
Wordsworth’s poetry relies too consistently upon a descriptive realist aesthetic derived from empiricist 
beliefs about subject/object relationships. As a result of this, it can be observed that Wordsworth’s 
poetic theory and practice are limiting both as a rationale for the creative impulse and as a critical 
methodology. This theory operates within the context of an assumed authorial persona, an individual 
consciousness, remarking upon an external reality. It assumes that the reader’s role in the cognitive 
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process of poetic appreciation is essentially passive, a mere witnessing to the experiences and 
perceptions of the authorial persona. Consequently, readers are excluded from any participation in the 
creation of a meaning that has individual significance for them, and with which they can fully 
empathise. This lack of a plurality of meanings limits poetry’s emotional effect, as well as greatly 
reducing the possibilities for varied exegetical analysis.  
This thesis has two connected aims. Firstly, it claims that it is meaningful to describe Wordsworth’s 
aesthetic, and his beliefs about the subject-object relationship, as substantially empiricist. However, it 
is not claimed that Wordsworth is consistently empiricist in the way that a philosopher might aspire to 
be: indeed, there is a place to be found within this argument for the recognition of his 
transcendentalism. While it is granted that the word “empiricist” is not always used in the most 
rigorous philosophical sense, the influence of philosophical empiricism on Wordsworth naturally 
figures in the argument. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that the continued influence of Wordsworth 
in the twentieth century has to be understood primarily as the influence of his empiricist aesthetic. The 
thesis concludes by suggesting that there are wider possibilities for poetry than are encouraged by this 
aesthetic. The importance of undertaking this project does not lie only in objections to Wordsworth’s 
theory or practice, but arises also from a consideration of his continuing influence. 
Chapter One argues that on the basis of his poetry and criticism of the period 1787 to 1805, the 
description “The Empirical Wordsworth” is a meaningful one. This is established through an 
examination of Wordsworth’s writings, his sister’s journal entries, his correspondence, his poetry and 
contemporaneous literary reviews of The Prelude. Chapter Two, in order to demonstrate the 
antecedents of Wordsworth’s empiricist beliefs, is a study of his philosophical development from the 
influences of Hartley, Burke and Berkeley. Chapter Three examines the influence of Coleridge on 
Wordsworth. This is predominantly an empiricist one contrary to received notions of it being 
transcendentalist. Chapter Four reviews the reading of Wordsworth in the twentieth century. This has to 
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be understood in terms of the reaction to Romanticism in the twentieth century. Finally, Chapter Five 
looks at twentieth-century poetry that largely avoids the empiricist influence of Wordsworth. It also 
introduces the concept of “Empirical Identifiers”: an analytic tool for literary criticism. 
                                                 
  1 In a letter to John Taylor dated 27 February 1818 Keats writes: ‘I think Poetry should surprise by a 
fine excess and not by Singularity—it should strike the Reader as a wording of his own highest 
thoughts and appear almost as a remembrance’. See Selected Letters of John Keats, p.74. 
  2 Arthur I. Miller, Einstein, Picasso: Space, Time, and the Beauty That Causes Havoc (New York: 
Basic Books, 2001), p.23. 
  3 Miller, p.23. 
  4 Miller, p.3. 
  5 Miller, p.3. 
  6 Miller, p.3. 
  7 Miller, p.3. 
  8 Miller, p.3. 
  9 Miller, p.2. 
 10 Miller, pp.3-4. 
 11 Miller, pp.174. 
 12 Picasso was fascinated by the psychologist William James’s “folded visual card” experiment where 
a drawing of a half folded card appears to move back and forth while remaining in position with the 
light and shade unaltered. See Einstein, Picasso: Space, Time, and the Beauty That Causes Havoc, 
p.123. 
 13 Miller, p.259.  
 14 Miller, p.165. 
 15 Thomas Vargish and Delo Monk, Inside Modernism: Relativity Theory, Cubism, Narrative (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.25-26. 
 16 Miller, p.253. 
 17 Miller, p.259. 
 18 Vargish and Monk, pp.35-36. 
 19 Eduardo Kac, ‘Recent Experiments in Holopoetry and Computer Holopoetry’, Display Holography, 
Fourth International Symposium (1991), 229-236 (p.1). 
 20 Alan Soldofsky, ‘Bifurcated Narratives in the Poetry of Robinson Jeffers, C. K. Williams, and Denis 
Johnson’, Narrative, 11 (2003), 1-19, (p.1) 
 21 Translation: ‘When April with his showers sweet with fruit / The drought of March has pierced unto 
the root / And bathed each vein with liquor that has power / To generate therein and sire the flower’. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
The Empirical Wordsworth 
 
Through an examination of Wordsworth‟s writings, his sister‟s journal entries, his correspondence, his 
poetry and contemporaneous literary reviews of The Prelude, I will argue that the description “The 
Empirical Wordsworth” is a meaningful one. However, I will not argue that Wordsworth is consistently 
empirical in the way a philosopher might aspire to be. I acknowledge that there is room within this 
argument for the recognition of his transcendentalism. With regard to this, one of my main contentions is 
that Wordsworth wrote empirically partly because of his transcendentalism, rather than despite it. I will 
look at this seemingly paradoxical stance regarding his transcendentalism and show that the widely 
accepted view of his transcendentalism‟s influence on his poetry  (namely, as being an influence that 
produced poetry that is distinctly non-empiricist merely because his transcendentalism is seen as being 
philosophically incompatible with his empiricism and, therefore, impossible to harmonise with it) is 
mistaken.   
As will be observed several times in this thesis, the claim that Wordsworth is an “empiricist” poet 
depends on selecting certain features of his work, whether ideas or stylistic qualities, which co-exist with 
other features of a different tendency: features which, in their strongest form, merit the description 
“transcendentalist”. Of course, Wordsworth is a poet,   and although he may be a philosophical poet, he is 
not an academic philosopher; consequently, these two seemingly unrelated aspects in his work might be 
difficult to reduce to a cohesive conceptual system. In any case, the separation between the “empiricist” and 
the “transcendentalist” has long been recognised as by no means complete. W. J. Bate, in From Classic to 
Romantic, demonstrated the links between empiricist ideas and Romantic theories of imagination not only 
in Wordsworth, but also in Coleridge and Keats. What this thesis attempts to do, then, is to isolate a 
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tendency, rather than to make a claim about the essential character of Wordsworth‟s work. In fact, it is a 
tendency that is stronger in the 1790s, and which is reduced to some extent under the influence of 
Coleridge‟s later developed philosophy. However, it remains true to say that, even when “empiricism” 
ceases to have much relationship to Wordsworth‟s central purposes, he is still a poet who displays 
deference for things as they are, and who is relatively opposed to the fantastic. 
Before I continue, I think it necessary to explain the way that the term  “empiricism” will be used in this 
chapter. The term is to be understood in its relation to the philosophical empiricism of Berkeley, Locke and 
Hume: which can be stated as the doctrine that all knowledge derives from experience. Anthony Easthope 
defines empiricism as „the epistemological belief that the real can be experienced and understood more or 
less directly by the unprejudiced observer‟.1  He identifies empiricism as functioning „in a scenario with 
three terms, these governing the object, the means of representation and the subject‟.2  He then elaborates 
upon each of these terms: 
(1) The object is assumed as existing in a real which is supposedly pregiven. All you have to do 
is observe the real „objectively‟, that is, without pre-judgement or self-deception, and the real 
will yield knowledge of itself.  
 
(2) The means of representation by which the object is represented to the subject is presumed 
not to interfere—or to intervene only minimally—with the subject‟s access to the real. In 
principle, discourse is transparent so that the only problem for knowledge is, as it were, to go 
and look and see what things are there.  
 
(3) As always in an epistemological scenario, subject and object are joined reciprocally, so that 
the [...] subject and the [...] real correspond to each other. In that the [...] real is simply 
autonomous, given, the English subject is similarly not constructed but always already merely 
there as the subject of or for knowledge/experience.
3
 
 
Although there are philosophical niceties in the work of Berkeley and Hume that might lead one to object to 
the use of the word “real”, Easthope‟s description is fair to the practical affects of empiricism. 
In Reading Twentieth-Century Poetry: The Language of Gender and Objects, Edward Larrissy identifies 
two modes of writing that encompass empiricist assumptions. He labels these the „empiricist attitude‟ and 
the „empiricist moment‟. By the former, he means a writing procedure that is „sceptical, discursive‟ and 
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„rationalist with a small “r”‟. By the latter, he is referring to a procedure „which cultivates the vivid 
rendering of moments of perception‟.4  As an instance of the „empiricist attitude‟, he cites Tom Paulin‟s 
poem „Desert-martin‟: 
A Jock squaddy glances down the street 
And grins, happy and expendable, 
Like a brass cartridge. He is a useful thing, 
Almost at home, and yet not quite, not quite.  
 
. . . I see a plain 
Presbyterian grace sour, then harden, 
As a free strenuous spirit changes 
To a servile defiance that whines and shrieks  
For the bondage of the letter.
5
 
 
Of this Larrissy writes: „This blend of observation and verified generalization is perfectly acceptable to the 
“empiricist attitude”‟.6  To illustrate the “empiricist moment” Larrissy offers the following extract from 
Paulin‟s poem „Yes, the Maternity Unit‟: 
  Behind sealed windows 
  each tiny grub must yell 
  inside a plastic cell, 
  be topped and tailed 
before its feed 
and with a goldfish mouth 
gnaw the embossed nibble 
on a tender shield, 
until, heavy-headed, 
a clubbed frown, 
it contemplates the wind 
and blurps a verdict.
7
 
 
Larrissy describes this as „the vivid capturing of things seen‟8 and writes: 
Paulin‟s version differs very little from that of the Metaphor Men. He dwells less gloatingly on 
the metaphors implicit in each of his unexpected epithets. It is more a matter of renewing 
individual words: a neo-Classicist‟s Martianism.9 
 
Another characteristic of empiricist poetry is its construction of a stable self. Peter Middleton says of this 
that it, 
assumes that a poem is the record of an „I‟ speaking its loves and losses. This self expresses its 
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feelings, narrates its history, and makes judgements as if its right and ability to do so were 
beyond question.
10
 
 
Furthermore, Middleton quotes Burton Hatlen‟s definition of empiricist poetry to emphasise the point. 
Hatlen says that empiricist poetry is, 
a poetry almost entirely controlled by the first person pronoun, which claims to name the one 
fixed point in an unstable world—a poetry, therefore, of nostalgia, for in the end it turns out 
that in such poems the self is constituted largely by its longing for a lost homeland.
11
 
 
From these various definitions, it is possible to construct a set of characteristics common to empiricist 
poetry:  
(1) Phenomena are posited to exist independently of consciousness which places limits as to 
how individual perceptions of these phenomena can be dealt with using language. These limits 
define what is to be regarded as an “appropriate” rendering of “reality” via language, and what 
is to be regarded as an “inappropriate” rendering. 
 
(2) Language is assumed to be a transparent and uncomplicated medium through which 
phenomena can be “correctly” represented.  
 
(3) There is reliance upon the construction of a stable ego, or self, functioning as a confessional 
witness to a reality independent of perception. This ego is conscious of itself as the controlling 
mechanism of the poem‟s structure, and its effect upon the reader‟s response.  
 
(4) Stylistically it consists of a combination of sense-data descriptions and simile, executed 
utilising conventional syntax in a tone that is conversational. It is structured using either free 
verse or regular metre, rhyme or other formal devices. But any formal artifice present functions 
merely as adornment, without interrupting the syntactical conventionality and logic. 
 
Having described how empiricism manifests poetically, we can now examine Wordsworth in light of this.  
That Wordsworth is a poet in whose work visual precision and description is of fundamental importance 
can no longer be held in doubt. In Wordsworth: A Philosophical Approach, Melvin Rader says of him:  
His mind was distinguished by the combination of very sharp perception and very intense 
subjectivity. […] But no less remarkable was the acuteness of his sensory perceptions. In his 
old age he remarked with justifiable pride: „I have hardly ever known anyone but myself who 
had a true eye for nature‟. This minute accuracy of his visual and auditory impressions was 
preserved by a most retentive memory.
12
 
 
This aspect of his writing procedure is promoted in the titles of many of his poems such as: „Suggested by 
the view of Lancaster Castle‟; „Who fancied what a pretty sight‟; „On seeing a Needlecase in the Form of a 
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Harp‟; „When looking at the present face of things‟ and Descriptive Sketches. Indeed, it was the visual 
precision and descriptiveness in Wordsworth‟s poetry that so enamoured Coleridge, in their early 
relationship. In Coleridge’s Philosophy of Nature, J. A. Appleyard notes that while listening to 
Wordsworth‟s poetry a realisation that occurred to Coleridge was that, „it was possible to describe nature 
with a fresh simplicity and exactness that surpassed anything he had thought possible‟.13  This fidelity to 
nature was important to Wordsworth because for him nature was the interface between the material world 
and the spiritual, and he believed that by describing it accurately in poetry two things would be possible. 
The first would be, as Robert Langbaum says in The Modern Spirit, to „show the spiritual significance of 
the world, to show that we evolve a soul or identity through experience‟.14 The second, because the mind 
that perceives nature is „itself part of the nature it perceives‟, it is possible for us to have confidence „in the 
reality of ourselves and the external world‟.15 These two beliefs formed the main thrust of his poetic 
agenda, and the bulk of his writings and poetry can be seen as an apologia for them. 
Wordsworth‟s writings and correspondence are replete with his advocacy of what has been called the 
„static nominals of reason‟: his use of language in a nominal way.16  David Pirie, in William Wordsworth: 
The Poetry of Grandeur and of Tenderness, comments that, „instead of concocting imaginary worlds for our 
diversion‟, Wordsworth, „directs us back to the one world which is real‟.17 In „Techniques of Truth in the 
Poetry of William Wordsworth and Ezra Pound‟, Geoffrey Clifford Jaggs notes:  
His interest is not in language for itself, but as a means to an end. That end is an irreducibly 
empiricist one: we are of the earth, our nature bound up in the larger nature that sustains us. 
Our engagement with the universe is prior to language, but language—or poetic language, at 
least—is in a constant state of reaching out to the universe.18 
 
Elements of this can be seen in his poem „The Influence of Natural Objects‟: 
Wisdom and Spirit of the universe! 
Thou Soul, that art the Eternity of thought! 
And giv‟st to forms and images a breath 
And everlasting motion! not in vain, 
By day or star-light, thus from my first dawn 
Of childhood didst thou intertwine for me 
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The passions that build up our human soul; 
Not with the mean and vulgar works of Man; 
But with high objects, with enduring things, 
With life and nature; 
19
 
 
                                                             (1-10) 
 
With regard to Wordsworth‟s subtitle for Book VIII of The Prelude („Love of Nature leading to Love of 
Man‟) Pirie writes: 
This subtitle still misdirects many readers in their approach to The Prelude as a whole and to 
much of Wordsworth‟s other poetry as well. […] „Love of Nature‟ sounds soothingly abstract 
whereas the poetry itself is often defiantly concrete and insists upon the unqualified actuality of 
„rocks, and stones and trees‟.20 
 
Of the poems in Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth writes, „I have at all times endeavoured to look steadily at 
my subject, consequently, I hope that there is in these poems little falsehood of description‟.21  In a letter to 
his sister concerning Dryden he writes: 
That his [Dryden‟s] cannot be the language of imagination must have necessarily followed 
from this. That there is not a single image from Nature in the whole body of his works; and in 
his translation from Vergil, whenever Vergil can be fairly said to have had his eye upon his 
subject, Dryden always spoils the passage.
22
 
 
Here, Wordsworth reproaches Dryden for mishandling his translation of Virgil‟s accuracy of description as 
inferred from the phrase: „to have had his eye upon his subject‟. It seems not to have occurred to 
Wordsworth that translation, at its best, might well try to avoid literal interpretations in favour of evoking 
the mood and register of the poem. Similarly, in the dedication to Robert Jones at the beginning of 
Descriptive Sketches Wordsworth writes: 
You will meet with few images without recollecting the spot where we observed them together; 
consequently, whatever is feeble in my design, or spiritless in my colouring, will be amply 
supplied by your memory. 
23
   
 
The two key words here are „observed‟ and „memory‟. For Wordsworth memory is accurate observation 
replicated in the present. He calls upon Jones to overlook any faults in the poetic structure and evocation of 
feeling confident that the accurate description of the natural settings will rekindle his memory. 
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Consequently, an important aspect of a poem—its ability to move one emotionally—is under-played. 
Indeed, Wordsworth seems to undervalue many of the traditional tenets of poetic practice. For example, as 
Walter Raleigh points out, he pays little attention to the role of expression in poetry: 
In the Preface to the later editions of the Lyrical Ballads, where he gives a careful analysis of 
the character of the poet, Wordsworth makes only the barest allusion to this essential gift of 
expression. Yet the delight in giving a resonant voice to feeling, the love of the exquisitely 
turned phrase and of the gorgeous trappings of imagery are found in many, if not all, of the best 
poets.
24
 
 
The 1802 Preface and Appendix to Lyrical Ballads, and the 1798 „Advertisment‟ for it are pregnant with 
instances of Wordsworth‟s favouring of the capacity for describing things experienced. The Preface was 
already retrospective in its first version of 1800. The extended version, published in the second volume in 
1802, retains this retrospective character, in that it is largely intended to explain the purpose of the poems 
published in 1798, as well as the more recent ones. In the Preface of 1802, Wordsworth writes: 
The principle object, then, [...] was to choose incidents and situations from common life, and to 
relate or describe them, [...] in a selection of language really used by men, and, at the same 
time, to throw over them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things should be 
presented to the mind in an unusual aspect (Emphasis added).
25
 
 
It is noticeable that he links the recording of sense-data with the act of  “imagining” as if they existed in a 
natural syllogistic unity. This conception of the imagination is not what might seem to us the 
“common-sense” one: that imagination flourishes not because we have things (images, objects etc.) 
presented to us phenomenologically but, rather, because of their absence which forces us to imagine them 
in our mind‟s eye.26  Here, Wordsworth is advocating the use of imagination to shore up reality to make 
more explicit what has been seen.
27
   
It was Wordsworth‟s conviction that the imagination could not be separated from „incidents‟, 
„situations‟, or even objects which led him to devise the familiar formula in „Tintern Abbey‟ about „the 
mighty world / Of eye and ear, —both what they half-create, / And what perceive‟. However, by the time he 
came to write Book Eleven of The Prelude (1805) Wordsworth was able to change the relationship between 
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creation and perception so that some priority (albeit a problematical one) was given to the former: „but this 
I feel: / That from thyself it is that thou must give, / Else never canst receive‟. This formulation is not quite 
as strong as the concept of imagination to be found in the Intimations Ode (the later stanzas of which date 
from 1804) where the primacy of imagination is seen as being figured in terms of Plato‟s doctrine of pre-
existence.  
Further to the above quoted passage from the Preface, is its emphasis on the modifying power of the 
mind expressed as throwing over, „incidents and situations from common life‟ a „certain colouring of 
imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual aspect‟. Later in this 
thesis, I will discuss at some length this modification process and argue that it should not be seen as 
necessarily being at odds with the passage‟s equal emphasis on describing things. For Wordsworth, the two 
amount to almost the same thing—at least in practice if not (perhaps) in theory. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the way in which Wordsworth sought to exhibit the „colouring of 
imagination‟ thrown over „incidents and situations from common life‟ is to be found in „The Thorn‟, not 
only because of the insistent way in which this aim is pursued, but also because Wordsworth provides a 
“Note” to underline his purpose. The Note, famously, explains that the speaker might have been a man („a 
captain of a small trading vessel, for example‟) who had retired „to some village or country town of which 
he was not native‟. Men such as these, „having little to do, become credulous and talkative from indolence‟ 
and are „prone to superstition‟. Most importantly, „They have a reasonable share of imagination, by which 
word I mean the faculty which produces impressive effects out of simple elements‟. Consequently, the 
speaker of „The Thorn‟, contemplating a little „hill of moss‟ is able not only to imagine that this is the grave 
of Martha Ray‟s infant because it is „like an infant‟s grave in size‟, but also to think there is significance in 
the fact that the „mossy network‟ looks as if it had been woven „by hand of lady fair‟. From one point of 
view, even this psychological attribution can be related to Wordsworth‟s empiricism, especially when one 
contrasts it with the genuinely Gothic ballad by Gottfried August Bürger to which it is indebted. From 
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another point of view, however, the emphasis on imagination cannot be overlooked entirely.    
Imagination, for Wordsworth, functions additionally as a barometer for recognising one‟s 
self-consciousness within the phenomenal world. In this sense, he saw consciousness correlated with 
imagination. This is implicit in the following passage from Albert Wlecke‟s Wordsworth and the Sublime: 
In Book VI of The Prelude, after Wordsworth describes his discovery of having crossed the 
Alps without realizing it, the poet is suddenly confronted directly by his imagination: 
 
          here the Power so called 
Through sad incompetence of human speech, 
That awful Power rose from the mind‟s abyss 
 Like an unfathered vapour that enwraps, 
 At once, some lonely traveller. 
 
The imagery here is especially involved. Not only does the imagination rise from the by now 
familiar subjective abyss; but the mind itself, confronted suddenly by its immanent power, is 
enclosed (imagination “enwraps” the traveler) by the intensity of its reflexive awareness. 
Consciousness is both the container that in its depths contains imagination and, now that 
imagination has leapt forth from these depths, the contained.
28
 
  
In The Romantic Predicament, Geoffrey Thurley says, „In Romantic art the motifs (things, people, 
houses) themselves stand forth as content: they do not “mean” anything else, they are not in that sense 
symbolic or allegoric‟.29 Although Thurley is correct regarding the paucity of connotation in Romantic 
semantic usage, it should not be overlooked that Wordsworth, in particular, did indeed think of phenomena 
as symbolic, in the sense that they represent objectively what exists spiritually. Like Coleridge, he regards 
phenomena as a veil that enshrouds a superior reality normally imperceptible. In this sense, his poetry can 
be seen as a mimesis of the  “unseen”. Coleridge concedes as much in „This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison‟: 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily; and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence.
30
 
 
                                                               (40-43) 
 
Wordsworth is advocating, not so much to obviate the need for symbolism altogether, but a new use for it.  
He wants to apply something equivalent to the old symbology: to travel in an indirect route to make objects 
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emblematic. However, to do this he has to increasingly depend upon the particular, as this is the only 
gateway to the spiritual.  
In an effort to be able better to justify description in poetry, Wordsworth redefines poetry as recollected 
emotion. This recollected emotion, as R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones say in their Introduction to Lyrical 
Ballads, „needs some empirical event to have caused it, therefore, describing this event (or scene) recreates 
the emotion (or something like it) and, therefore, is poetic‟.31   According to this view, for poetry to exist it 
must be based upon a memory, which in turn is based upon an experience, which in turn is based upon the 
senses, which in turn are based upon phenomena. „Every poet has to work with the world of the senses‟, 
Maurice Bowra says, „but for the Romantics it was the instrument which set their visionary powers in 
action‟ (Emphasis added).32 In light of this, the following statements made by Wordsworth become more 
meaningful: 
But habits of meditation have, I trust, so prompted and regulated my feelings, that my 
descriptions of such objects as strongly excite those feelings, will be found to carry along with 
them a purpose (Emphasis added).
33
 
 
[The poet considers man] as looking upon this complex scene of ideas and sensations, and 
finding every where objects that immediately excite in him sympathies which, from the 
necessities of his nature, are accompanied by an overbalance of enjoyment (Emphasis added).
34
 
 
The objects of the Poet‟s thoughts are every where; though the eyes and the senses of man are, 
it is true, his favourite guides, yet he will follow wheresoever he can find an atmosphere of 
sensation in which to move his wings (Emphasis added).
35
 
 
[Of the general passions and feelings of man] And with what are they connected? Undoubtedly 
with our moral sentiments and animal sensations, and with the causes which excite these; with 
the operations of the elements, and the appearances of the visible universe; [...] These, and the 
like, are the sensations and objects which the Poet describes, as they are the sensations of other 
men, and the objects which interest them (Emphasis added).
36
 
 
In these assertions, we see an extreme concentration upon the objects of the “real” world as catalysts for 
producing poetry. This marks a considerable departure from the operating procedures of seventeenth-
century poets who „even at their most lucid, never allowed an interest in the actual nature of objects to 
prevail over the “profound sensuousness” of the meanings they intended to convey‟.37   The result of this is 
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that the poem becomes, as M. H. Abrams clearly recognises,  
essentially the internal made external [...] embodying the combined product of the poet‟s 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings. [...] The paramount cause of poetry is not [...] the effect 
intended upon the audience; but instead an efficient cause—the impulse within the poet of 
feelings and desires seeking expression.
38
 
 
Wordsworth is concerned with the idea of the poet as teacher whose sole function is to deliver “truth” to an 
unquestioning audience. The poet is someone who, by some mysterious and nebulous gift of insight, has 
access to the hidden world of truth that lies covered beneath the veil of language. Wordsworth 
unmistakably articulates this in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads: 
He is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endued with more lively sensibility, more 
enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more 
comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his 
own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in 
him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings-on of 
the universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them.
39
 
 
Wordsworth felt himself equal to this calling and his developing theories on poetics were, „a clearing 
ground for his own work, [...] with what happens, or should happen, in the poet‟s mind in the act of 
composition‟.40 His main consideration was whether he, the poet, had sufficiently described his state of 
mind.
41
  
Something that, perhaps, should not be overlooked in this discussion of his penchant for description is 
Wordsworth‟s favourable attitude towards his sister‟s heavily descriptive journal entries. Susan Levin 
observes that Dorothy's writing is, 
characterized by refusal: refusal to generalise, refusal to reproduce standard literary forms, 
refusal to undertake the act of writing [...]. She often appears a mere cataloguer of irrelevant 
detail, a person strangely fixed on the minutiae around her.
 42
 
 
Adding that the journals „reveal a writer who insistently and coherently puts down what she sees‟.43  In this 
respect, she is similar to her brother in that she had an eye for detail. In her introduction to the Journals of 
Dorothy Wordsworth Helen Darbishire writes: 
It was not only minute observation that Dorothy gave to Nature [...]. As we follow her from day 
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to day we are never allowed to forget the season of the year, the time of day—and the 
weather!
44
     
 
Darbishire adds that Dorothy, like Wordsworth,  „saw things […] which belongs to things seen by the 
painter or poet‟.45 It is significant that Darbishire (however tenuously) equates the painter‟s art with that of 
the poet‟s, the art of the former being based (as it was in Dorothy‟s period) upon representation—that of the 
latter supposedly upon semantics. Wordsworth does as much when he says, „We are fond of tracing the 
resemblance between Poetry and Painting‟.46  Darbishire has unwittingly acknowledged the visual and 
descriptive emphasis  that Dorothy has introduced into her writing and which Wordsworth so admired. This 
approbation was such that he would frequently duplicate sentences from her journals into his notebook for 
future use by himself.
47
  Moreover, he, 
drew sustenance for his poetry from Dorothy‟s journal. He would make her read out a passage 
which could revive his memory, as he did with the record of the daffodils by Ullswater. His 
poem „I wandered lonely as a cloud‟, owes much to Dorothy‟s prose description.48 
 
Indeed, she continued to write her journal partly to please him.
49    
The fact that Wordsworth is pleased with 
the merely descriptive nature of Dorothy‟s writing is at odds with his various statements in the Preface (and 
his other writings) that seek to justify description in terms of its “alchemic” transformation of objects into 
transcendendental realisations. In his selection of fragments of her prose for insertion into his poetry he is 
certainly not appropriating anything from Dorothy in terms of the “metaphysical” or “mystical”, as she does 
not claim that her writing possesses these qualities—nor does she claim to have the special insight (as 
defined by her brother) requisite for a poet. In light of this, it is puzzling that his sister‟s writing should hold 
him in such thrall if description was not largely his motivating force. It seems that sometimes he is 
motivated by transcendental imperatives and sometimes not, but he always temperamentally wishes to be 
descriptive. 
Throughout her journals, Dorothy constantly refers to Wordsworth‟s keen descriptive sense: „William 
wrote a description of the storm‟,50 and „William wrote some lines describing a stunted thorn‟ (two 
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descriptions that later became „A whirl-blast from behind the hill‟ and  „The Thorn‟).51 She furthermore 
records that, „William observed some affecting little things in Borrowdale. A decayed house [...] in the 
church-yard, the tall silent rocks seen thro‟ the broken windows‟.52   The significance of this is that the next 
day's entry mentions that Wordsworth is writing the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads—a preface that, as we 
have seen, advocates the use of observation-based descriptive writing. The temporal contiguity of these two 
events (his observation of things in Borrowdale one day, and then his writing the Preface the next) indicate 
that the Preface was written during a period when he was frequently immersed in nature; observing and 
describing the things seen in his notebooks, and thinking of these observations in an empirical way.  In such 
circumstances, it is easy to see how the content and general direction of the Preface could become heavily 
weighted towards an empirical approach to writing. Confirmation of this comes from Dorothy who 
acknowledges that he „went into the wood to compose‟.53 Much of his writing was done in the physical 
presence of the things he is describing and it seems that he had to be physically present in nature to be able 
to write effectively. This reliance upon being present before objects fits perfectly with his stated poetical 
aims. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for a poet so heavily dependent upon physical vision and the 
rendering of it into words to be absent from the objects he is recording. It would be analogous to a portrait 
painter imagining his subject.   
However, the descriptive elements in Wordsworth are not always the result of his observing of objects in 
their natural surroundings. He was impressed by the way in which Dorothy‟s writing exemplified a 
directness he admired so much that he allowed it to stand in occasionally for his own presentness at the 
scene. Consequently, he sometimes appropriates descriptions (as in the case of the aforementioned „A 
whirl-blast from behind the hill‟ and „The Thorn‟) directly from his sister‟s journals. This tendency is also 
acknowledged by Nicholas Roe in The Politics of Nature, particularly with respect to „Tintern Abbey‟: 
Some details of the scene at the beginning of Wordsworth‟s poem are also to be found in 
Dorothy Wordsworth‟s beautiful description of the view from the Quantock Hills above 
Alfoxden House, 24 February 1798.
54
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Adding: 
 
The verbal similarities between Wordsworth‟s poem and this passage [Roe quotes part of the 
entry for 24 February] from Dorothy‟s Journal strongly suggest that in „Tintern Abbey‟ (as of 
course in many other poems) Wordsworth‟s imagination responded to Dorothy‟s prose rather 
than to his own immediate observation.
55
 
 
In addition, Geoffrey Hartman in The Unremarkable Wordsworth says: 
When Wordsworth said of Dorothy, „She gave me eyes, she gave me ears‟, it was no vain 
compliment. In her Journals we read, for example, of their meeting the poor old man who 
became the Leechgatherer of „Resolution and Independence‟ or that description of the daffodils 
which Wordsworth transformed into „I wandered lonely as a cloud‟.56 
 
However, unlike Coleridge (who famously used Dorothy's description of the moon and clouds from her 
journal entries for the 25th and 31st of January 1798 to inspire his treatment of the moon in Part I of 
„Christabel‟) Wordsworth does not transform his sister's journal descriptions into poetry—he merely 
interpolates them into his poems, almost to the letter. His poem  „A Night-Piece‟ is a characteristic example 
of this. In her journal entry for 25 January 1798, Dorothy makes the following observation:   
At once the clouds seemed to cleave asunder, and left her [the moon] in the centre of a 
black-blue vault. She sailed along, followed by multitudes of stars, small, and bright, and 
sharp.
57
 
 
In „A Night-Piece‟ Wordsworth writes:  
There, in a black-blue vault she sails along, 
Followed by multitudes of stars, that, small 
And sharp, and bright, along the dark abyss  
 
                                                         (14-16) 
 
Here, Wordsworth has copied seventeen words from his sister's journal entry and interpolated them directly 
into his poem. These words are: 
a black-blue vault. She sailed along, followed by multitudes of stars, small, and bright, and 
sharp.  
 
His rendition of them is: 
               a black-blue vault she sails along, 
Followed by multitudes of stars, that, small 
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And sharp, and bright 
 
All that Wordsworth does with them is to merely change the tense of the word „sailed‟ from past to present, 
and reorder the wording (as well as adding the word „that‟) in the phrase: „of stars, small, and bright, and 
sharp‟ in order to render it: „of stars, that, small / And sharp, and bright‟. The result is a poem that is not 
only descriptive but also based upon someone else's description. The poem attempts „to win assent to the 
delight by mere accumulation of circumstance and detail‟.58 
In examining Wordsworth‟s correspondence, we can see further examples of his empiricist attitude. In a 
letter to a Miss Taylor on 9 April 1801, he criticises his poem The Female Vagrant because „the 
descriptions are often false, giving proofs of a mind inattentive to the true nature of the subject on which it 
was employed‟.59 This criticism of a poem‟s lack of authenticity is echoed in a letter to Samuel Rogers: 
I am happy to find that we coincide in opinion about Crabbe‟s verses; for poetry in no sense 
can they be called. [...] I remember that I mentioned in my last [letter] that there was nothing in 
the last publication [Crabbe‟s The Parrish Register] so good as the description of the Parrish 
workhouse, Apothecary, etc. This is true—and it is no less true that the passage which I 
commended is of no great merit, because the description, at the best of no high order, is in the 
instance of the Apothecary, inconsistent, that is, false.
60
 
 
To Dorothy, on 6 September 1790, while on a walking tour through France and Switzerland, he writes: 
My Spirits have been kept in a perpetual hurry of delights by the almost uninterrupted 
succession of sublime and beautiful objects which have passed before my eyes during the 
course of the last month (Emphasis added).
61
 
 
In the same letter he enthuses on the natural world: 
I am a perfect Enthusiast in my admiration of Nature in all her various forms; and I have looked 
upon and as it were conversed with the objects which this country has presented to my view so 
long, and with such encreasing pleasure, that the idea of parting from them oppresses me with a 
sadness similar to what I have always felt in quitting a beloved friend (Emphasis added).
62
 
 
To the painter B. R. Haydon on 13 January 1816, praising the painting Christ’s Entry into Jerusalem, he 
writes: 
It is better that expression should give way to beauty than beauty be banished by expression. 
Happy is he who can hit the exact point, where grandeur is not lowered but heightened by 
detail (Emphasis added).
63
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Here, in relation to a different art form, he confirms Raleigh‟s observation of him (quoted earlier) 
concerning his devaluation of expressiveness in favour of detail.
64
   In another letter to Haydon, he almost 
admits to a valuing of painting over poetry when he advises Haydon to „paint and leave writing to the 
dunces and malignants‟.65   It is difficult to see any trace of irony or self-effacement here. That he should 
make such a comment in light of his ideal of the Poet as “seer” would make little sense were it not for the 
fact that the painting style of the period was operating more efficiently in the terms of his stated aims for 
poetry.  
It is no secret that Wordsworth was an admirer of the Dutch painters principally because of their 
„excellent use of Objects‟.66 The Dutch School, which included the painters Cuyp (1605-1691), van 
Ruysdael (1628-1682), Hobbema (1638-1701) and van der Velde (1663-1707), dispensed with Christian or 
classical subjects in favour of more contemplative works based on the observation of nature and 
landscapes.
67
 Furthermore, such poems as: „On  a Portrait of  I.F. painted by Margaret Gillies‟; „Upon 
seeing a coloured Drawing of the Bird of Paradise in an Album‟; „To R. R. Hayden, on Seeing his Picture 
of Napoleon Bonaparte on  the Island of St  Helena‟; and „On a Portrait of the Duke of Wellington upon the 
Field of Waterloo, by Hayden‟, were inspired by paintings. Moreover, in „Tintern Abbey‟ he refers to his 
writing procedure as “painting”: 
                                                                                I cannot paint 
What then I was. The sounding cataract 
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock, 
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood, 
Their colours and their forms, were then to me 
An appetite 
68
  
 
                                                              (75-80) 
 
This is the background to the celebrated claim, in a letter to James Tobin on 6 March 1798, in which he 
says of his poem The Recluse that he has written 1300 lines which „can contrive to convey most of the 
knowledge of which I am possessed. My object is to give pictures of nature‟.69  Notice how he says, „give 
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pictures of nature‟ rather than “give pictures to nature ”: the latter calling for more literary invention. 
In light of this, it becomes clear why many of Wordsworth‟s letters comment approvingly on certain 
paintings given over to the works of nature, landscapes, and non-classical subjects. It is possible to assume 
that such painting was, for him, the yardstick by which poetry was to be measured. The major emphases of 
his theory on poetry seem to converge at the point where painting begins. His ideas of the sublime and the 
picturesque seem also to coalesce at this point. In a letter to Jacob Fletcher, he says that the Dutch painters‟ 
use of objects is quite proper and that the criticism of its use is more to do with the nature of these objects 
than their status as objects per se. Noting the revulsion evoked by paintings dealing with „the insides of 
stables—dung carts—dunghills and foul and loathsome situations‟, Wordsworth adds that if more pleasing 
objects were portrayed „then I think it may be safely said, that the qualities which constitute the picturesque, 
are eminently inherent in such objects‟. He concludes: 
Our business is not so much with objects as with the law under which they are contemplated. 
[...] We hear people perpetually disputing whether this or that thing be beautiful or not—
sublime or otherwise, without being aware that the same object may be both beautiful and 
sublime, but it cannot be felt to be such at the same moment.
70
 
 
Wordsworth‟s empirical predisposition appears throughout his poetic works but it is most clearly 
expressed in The Prelude, where he records how he is able to make use of objects to better remember the 
physicality of environments: 
                                                          the earth  
And common face of Nature spake to me  
Rememberable things; sometimes, „tis true,  
By chance collisions and quaint accidents  
(Like those ill-sorted unions, work supposed  
Of evil-minded fairies), yet not vain   
Nor profitless, if haply they impressed  
Collateral objects and appearances,  
Albeit lifeless then, and doomed to sleep  
Until maturer seasons called them forth  
To impregnate and to elevate the mind. 
—And if the vulgar joy by its own weight  
Wearied itself out of the memory,  
The scenes which were a witness of that joy  
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Remained in their substantial lineaments  
Depicted on the brain, and to the eye  
Were visible, a daily sight; and thus  
By the impressive discipline of fear,  
By pleasure and repeated happiness,  
So frequently repeated, and by force  
Of obscure feelings representative  
Of things forgotten, these same scenes so bright,  
So beautiful, so majestic in themselves,  
Though yet the day was distant, did become  
Habitually dear, and all their forms  
And changeful colours by invisible links   
Were fastened to the affections.
71
 
                                        (1850, I, 586-612)  
 
Here the sheer physicality of the process and its significance is expressed with the words: „collisions‟, 
„impressed‟, „impregnate‟,  „vulgar‟,  „weight‟, „force‟, and „fastened‟. This passage leaves us in no doubt as 
to the intrusiveness of the process. Yet, for Wordsworth, this was not something he finds unpleasant. He 
finds joy in merely perceiving objects, as can be seen in the following:  
The sands of Westmoreland, the creeks and bays  
Of Cumbria‟s rocky limits, they can tell  
How, when the Sea threw off his evening shade  
And to the shepherd‟s hut on distant hills  
Sent welcome notice of the rising moon,  
How I have stood, to fancies such as these  
A stranger, linking with the spectacle  
No conscious memory of a kindred sight,  
And bringing with me no peculiar sense  
Of quietness or peace; yet have I stood,  
Even while mine eye hath moved o‟er many a league  
Of shining water, gathering as it seemed,  
Through every hair-breadth in that field of light,  
New pleasure like a bee among the flowers.
72
  
 
                                                         (1805, I, 567-80)  
 
Turning to Wordsworth‟s other poems, we can clearly see how his empirical ideas manifest in them. In 
Book I of The Excursion, the traveller tells us the following about his friend:  
                                     Nor did he fail,  
While yet a child, with a child‟s eagerness  
Incessantly to turn his ear and eye  
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On all things which the moving seasons brought  
To feed such appetite 
73
 
 
                                                                                             (I, 148-52) 
 
As a child, the friend perceived phenomena with a sensual and emotional intensity that,  
                                                   had impressed  
So vividly great objects that they lay  
Upon his mind like substances 
74
 
 
                                                                                          (I, 136-38) 
Moreover,  
                                    as he grew in years,  
With these impressions would he still compare  
All his remembrances, thoughts, shapes, and forms;  
And, being still unsatisfied with aught  
Of dimmer character, he thence attained  
An active power to fasten images  
Upon his brain 
75
 
                                                                                                 (I, 140-46)  
 
Such is the fascination for sensual stimulation that the traveller and friend relish each instance of its 
occasion: 
                                     Many a time,  
On holidays, we rambled through the woods:  
We sate—we walked; he pleased me with report  
Of things which he had seen 
76
 
 
                                                                                               (I, 61-64) 
 
When the friend is unable to share his sensual reports with anyone moroseness sets in: 
                              From that bleak tenement  
He, many an evening, to his distant home  
In solitude returning, saw the hills  
Grow larger in the darkness; all alone  
Beheld the stars come out above his head,  
And travelled through the wood, with no one near   
To whom he might confess the things he saw.
77
 
 
                                                                                               (I, 125-31)  
 
This ability of the friend to impress the objects of his sight to memory and to accurately describe them 
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comes in useful when he recounts the tale of Margaret: 
                                           He had rehearsed  
Her homely tale with such familiar power,  
With such an active countenance, an eye  
So busy, that the things of which he spake  
Seemed present 
78
 
 
                                                                                       (I, 614-18) 
 
Another poem that demonstrates Wordsworth‟s application of empiricism to verse is „The Thorn‟, which 
despite certain uses of poetic artifice such as inversion („woven been‟, „thing forlorn‟), archaism  („As if by 
hand of lady fair‟) and the fictive element of the subject matter is essentially descriptive. This can be seen 
in the opening stanza: 
There is a thorn; it looks so old, 
In truth you‟d find it hard to say, 
How it could ever have been young, 
It looks so old and grey 
Not higher than a two-years‟ child, 
It stands erect this aged thorn; 
No leaves it has, no thorny points; 
It is a mass of knotted joints, 
A wretched thing forlorn. 
It stands erect, and like a stone 
With lichens it is overgrown.
79
 
 
                                              (1-11) 
 
Here we find references to the act of visual perception: „There is a thorn; it looks so old‟ and „It looks so 
old and grey‟. The addition of the words „and grey‟ in line four is intended to further establish the 
objectivity and materiality of the thing perceived to render it more accurate.  Similarly, the preceding 
repetition of  „It looks‟ emphasises the spatial separation between the thing perceived and the perceiver—
lest we forget. The same affect is achieved with the phrase: „It stands erect‟, which again is repeated in line 
ten. It is as if Wordsworth, by this use of repetition, is trying to convince us that the speaker of the poem 
has sensible perceptions that are sufficiently capable of perceiving accurately; in addition to a mastery of 
language that is equal to the painter‟s use of brush and palette in rendering those perceptions lucidly. Yet, it 
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also seems as if the speaker‟s constant need to reaffirm the capabilities of language to achieve this clarity 
suggests a lack of assurance that this is, in fact, what is being achieved.  
In stanza three we see the fruits of his sensible perceptions after they have been extrapolated into the 
spatial dimension: 
High on a mountain‟s highest ridge, 
Where oft the stormy winter gale 
Cuts like a scythe, while through the clouds 
It sweeps from vale to vale; 
Not five yards from the mountain-path, 
This thorn you on your left espy; 
And to the left, three yards beyond, 
You see a little muddy pond 
Of water, never dry; 
I‟ve measured it from side to side: 
„Tis three feet long, and two feet wide.80 
 
                                                         (23-33) 
 
Putting aside the ubiquitous reference to visual perception in line 28 („on your left espy‟), the stanza is 
curious in that it introduces into the realm of tragic verse observations more appropriate to land surveying. 
Phrases such as: „not five yards from‟; „to the left‟; „three yards beyond‟; „three feet long, and „two feet 
wide‟, again, seem to be attempts by the poet to reassure himself of the ability of language to render 
perception reliably. It also attempts to make increasingly accurate what the poet is seeing, in an effort to 
leave little room for doubt as to the objective status of the things perceived. In this instance, the use of 
geometrical accuracy principally acts as an empirical verification for the objectivity of the spatial 
relationships between the observer/perceiver and the objects sensed (and these objects‟ relationship to each 
other). That this is of urgent importance to the speaker is indicated by his anxiousness to emphasise that he 
has taken great pains to be thorough having „measured it from side to side‟.   
In stanza four, we see more use of visual references: 
 
And close beside this aged thorn, 
There is a fresh and lovely sight, 
A beauteous heap, a hill of moss, 
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Just half a foot in height. 
All lovely colours there you see, 
All colours that were ever seen, 
And mossy network too is there, 
As if by hand of lady fair 
The work had woven been, 
And cups, the darlings of the eye, 
So deep in their vermilion dye.
81
 
 
                                         (34-44) 
 
The references to visual perception are: „lovely sight‟, „there you see‟, „ever seen‟, and „darlings of the eye‟. 
As well as these, we have an indication that supports my earlier suggestion that Wordsworth viewed poetry 
as doing something similar to painting. In lines 40 to 42, the speaker compares the hill of moss to a work of 
embroidery woven by „hand of lady fair‟. This conversion of mundane phenomena into art is driven home 
in line 44 with: „So deep is their vermilion dye‟— „dye‟ being a man-made substance used in artwork, and 
„vermilion‟ being a colour available to most painters‟ palettes. Of this poem Jaggs says: 
The narrator, for all his limitations, is trying to tell us about his way of seeing the world—and 
he is not altogether unsuccessful.
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This way of „seeing the world‟ is empirical. As John F. Danby says in William Wordsworth: The Prelude 
and Other Poems: 
[For Wordsworth] mountains, lakes, winds, clouds, the sky, the sea, flowers, birds [...]. None of 
them is a single counter of allegorical significance [which refers] to things other than 
themselves.
83
 
 
Here, Danby is reiterating what Thurley is quoted as saying earlier in this chapter regarding the romantic 
symbol.   
 Wordsworth‟s use of language in „The Thorn‟ to re-engage with itself to get closer to the object  (or as 
Jaggs‟s phrases it: „range-finding‟) demonstrates his desire to get to the “truth” behind phenomena.84 The 
poem, for Jaggs, „presents a range of seductive and interesting alternatives to the attempt to see the truth‟.85 
 Nevertheless, these „seductive and interesting alternatives‟ are, as Jaggs acknowledges, still subordinate to 
sense experience and should not be taken as a sign that Wordsworth was in favour of artifice for its own 
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sake. Larrissy observes that, „the empiricist is not expected to renounce imagination, merely to base it on 
facts‟.86   Jaggs agrees: 
[…] the transcendent moments in Wordsworth‟s poetry [...] derange and subvert not in 
accordance with individual fictions, but with the aim of moving us towards a closer 
engagement with an underlying objective reality. [...] For a closer insight into the objective 
order.
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For Wordsworth this „underlying objective reality‟ is held together divinely. Larrissy  writes:  
The world of Nature has the task, in Wordsworth and Coleridge, of evincing the divinity of 
things. Yet this divinity remains, as far as the poem is concerned, a fiat of consciousness.
88
 
 
Larrissy has reservations about the reliabilility of such an approach. In relation to his reading of Coleridge‟s 
„This Lime-tree Bower my Prison‟, he makes the following comment that is equally applicable to 
Wordsworth: 
And the fact that he [Coleridge] is able to imagine the pleasure of his absent friends may prove 
his capacity for “sympathy”. But the evident sub-text about the reconciliation of contraries as a 
fundamental structure of things, maintained by the Almighty Spirit, is not proved by anything 
except his own faith in it. One is left with a large residue of relatively pure description: the 
irreducibly “hard” world of Nature. And yet without the world there would be no poem.89 
The metaphysical assumptions, at least as they operate within this poem, are groundless because they are 
unable to be verified by scientific investigation. In the absence of any such verification, we are left with a 
poetry that is incomplete and unable to achieve its intended affects—able only to rely upon a language 
assumed to be transparent.  
In light of this, it is revealing that Wordsworth should have made the following statement concerning the 
use of words: 
Words are too awful an instrument for good and evil to be trifled with; they hold above all 
other external powers a dominion over thoughts. If words be not [...] an incarnation of the 
thought but only a clothing for it, then surely will they prove an ill gift [...]. Language, if it do 
not uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a 
counter spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to 
vitiate, and to dissolve.
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By saying that words should have „a dominion over thoughts‟, he is accepting a connection between 
thought and linguistic expression. This obviously rules out the possibility for a disjunction between 
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signifier and referent. This means that any use of language operating independently of referents is, to 
Wordsworth, a language drawing attention to itself  because it does not „leave in quiet‟ and is, therefore, a 
„counter spirit‟ which is out of control, the result of which is „to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, 
and to dissolve‟ denotation. The empirical basis behind these statements seems clear: Wordsworth is 
advocating a language  that can convey directly the poet‟s experience of phenomena. Regarding this 
passage, Albert Wlecke says: 
Wordsworth observes that words are to be ideally „an incarnation of the thought‟. This 
metaphor rejects the curious distinction between word and thought implied in the popular 
eighteenth-century metaphor of words being the “clothing” of thought. The metaphor also 
intimates, I believe, that a sequence of words in a poem by Wordsworth can be taken as an 
enactment of a certain sequence of thought, or better, of thinking. The word is not an overt 
statement of an already conceived thought, somehow separable from that thought as clothing is 
from the body. Rather, the relationship between word and thought is analogous to the 
relationship between body and soul: words “body forth” an otherwise hidden activity of the 
mind, they are one with that activity, and their progression is expressive of a certain 
progression in consciousness.
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That, for Wordsworth, „a certain progression in consciousness‟ can be expressed with words indicates that 
he views poetic language as a means to make possible the mimesis of consciousness based upon an 
experience of phenomena. 
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that Wordsworth‟s frequent use of repetition pertaining to visual 
perception in „The Thorn‟ seemed to suggest insecurity about the competency of language to convey, 
lucidly, the nature of reality. A letter he wrote to Isabella Fenwick in 1843 may point to the psychological 
roots for his over-reliance upon a non-connotative use of language, and his interest in empiricism in 
general. In it he says: 
I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I consumed with 
all that I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. Many 
times while going to school I have grasped at a wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of 
idealism to the reality. At that time I was afraid of such processes.
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Of this Robert Rehder says, „This is an extraordinary confession: that often the world existed for him only 
when he made an effort and that without this effort he could not escape from his phantasies‟.93  He also says 
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that for Wordsworth, „writing poetry was like reaching out a hand to steady himself ‟.94  Pirie offers a 
possible reason behind this: 
One diagnoses sees Wordsworth as feeling so betrayed in childhood by the early deaths of both 
his parents that, finding himself still surrounded by a landscape as evocatively permanent as the 
Lake District, he unconsciously invested his strongest emotional commitments in those 
mountainous images which had proved so much more reliable than mankind.
95
 
 
Dorothy Wordsworth was, perhaps, similarly motivated. Levin says, „One way of explaining Dorothy‟s 
faithfulness to objects, her continual cataloguing, is as a kind of perpetual reality testing‟.96 And that „her 
insistence on detail, on naming and minutely describing what goes on around her, may indicate a fear of 
being absorbed and thus annihilated‟.97  Given this, Pirie‟s explanation may equally apply to Dorothy, 
seeing that she shared Wordsworth‟s parentage. It certainly offers plausible grounds for Wordsworth 
excessive descriptiveness. It is almost as if the noting of details in his poetry is the equivalent to the 
“grasping” mentioned in the Fenwick letter.  
Wordsworth‟s dependence on immediate experience indicates that he favours this to intellectual activity. 
For him, nature is a better teacher for humanity than is formal learning. The intellect is held to be unequal 
to the task as is recourse to books and rational discussion. Instead, he advocates an attitude of passivity 
towards nature; an attitude in which one‟s senses are left to experience the objects of the natural world 
unmediated by the operations of the mind. This passivity forms the main poetic aesthetic for his literary 
output. In „Expostulation and Reply‟, the poet is reproached by his friend for day-dreaming. He responds by 
saying: 
The eye, it cannot choose but see; 
We cannot bid the ear be still 
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                                          (17-18)  
 
Notice how experience via the senses is unavoidable: the eyes „cannot choose but see‟ and we „cannot bid 
the ear be still‟. In this poem, Wordsworth is railing against the intellect. Only the sensations of seeing and 
hearing, which are beyond human control (and by implication under the control of nature), are capable of 
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conveying pure knowledge. This is because these senses represent a direct unmediated channel to (for want 
of a better term to describe Wordsworth‟s belief in an intelligence behind nature) “the Absolute”. All that is 
needed to access this Absolute is a passive attitude towards experience:  
That we can feed this mind of ours 
In a wise passiveness.
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                                           (23-24) 
 
This passivity is the key to understanding Wordsworth‟s writing. For it is in this approach to experience 
that one can become aware of the “divinity” in material objects. One has to pay heed to the placement of the 
word „wise‟ alongside „passiveness‟. Clearly, this qualifies the degree to which the experience is passive. 
The usage is consonant with formulations such as “emotion recollected in tranquillity”, and the insistence 
that the poet not only possesses “sensibility”, but has also „thought long and deeply‟.100  However, 
“thought” for Wordsworth does not always refer to rational thinking, as I will look at shortly in relation to 
„Old Man Travelling, Animal Tranquillity and Decay, a Sketch‟. Wordsworth still has a strong investment 
in objectivity. 
The “mind” of which Wordsworth speaks is similar to (and possibly influenced) Emerson‟s concept of 
the Oversoul—variously called the “higher self” or “universal mind” in eastern mystic tradition. This mind 
informs and controls the senses to the extent that the human body functions as a conduit, or host, whereby 
this transcendental mind can enter into relationship with the world of objects. Human beings are no more or 
no less than expressions of this transcendental “consciousness”, unaware of themselves as such until poets 
(such as Wordsworth), who are able to recognise this fact through intense observation of nature, tell them 
so. Coleridge shares a similar view of “mind”: 
The subject of eye, ear, touch and taste, in contact with external nature, is in danger of 
believing that his mind is compounded out of his senses, as if mind were simply a function or 
by product of (the sensory experience of) nature. Coleridge counters this erroneous assumption 
with a transcendental insistence on the autonomy of an already existent mind: the mind will 
inform the senses and not be their compound.
101
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For Wordsworth and Coleridge nature is Mind, and what we call our individual “minds” are simply 
localized manifestations of it. Our perceptual faculties are merely receptors for the ongoing experiences of 
Nature/Mind. This passivity is further evidenced in „The Tables Turned‟ where the poet tells his friend to 
leave his books and come out into the open because books are a, 
                 dull and endless strife: 
Come, hear the woodland linnet, 
How sweet his music! on my life, 
There‟s more of wisdom in it.102 
 
                                           (9-12) 
 
and that, 
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man, 
Of moral evil and of good, 
Than all the sages can.
103
 
 
                                        (21-24)  
 
Wordsworth then restates his position with regard to the intellect: 
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings; 
Our meddling intellect 
Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things:- 
We murder to dissect.
104
 
                                                       (25-28) 
 
In „Tintern Abbey‟, the superiority of unmediated experience is again shown in Wordsworth‟s 
subordination of “thought” to visual sensation: 
An appetite; a feeling and a love 
That had no need of a remoter charm, 
By thought supplied, nor any interest 
Unborrowed from the eye 
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                                                (80-83)  
 
The result of this is that nature is able to “instruct” us:   
                               she can so inform  
The mind that is within us, so impress 
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With quietness and beauty, and so feel 
With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues, 
Rash judgements, nor the sneers of selfish men, 
Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all 
The dreary intercourse of daily life, 
Shall e‟er prevail against us, or disturb 
Our cheerful faith, that all which we behold 
Is full of blessings.
106
 
 
                                                             (125-34)  
 
Without the subordination of intellectual activity to experience by means of the visual senses, human beings 
would be unable to commune with the Absolute. Consequently, the world of natural objects would not hold 
any special divinity within it. By advocating intellectual passivity as a poetic aesthetic, Wordsworth aims to 
“enlighten” us to the presence of the Absolute in phenomena. Such “enlightenment”, he hopes, would 
reward us with a sense of “peace” or “serenity”.  
Such a reward is evident in the old man described in „Old Man Travelling, Animal Tranquillity and 
Decay, a Sketch‟. In this poem, the old man conforms to the dictates of nature. Indeed, it is unequivocally 
stated that he is „by nature led‟ (11). Wordsworth paints an unsettling picture of  a human being who is as 
much under the control of nature as are the birds that instinctively „peck along the road‟ (1) and are blind to 
his presence. Like the birds he also is blind, but to his bodily sensations. He is „insensibly subdued‟ (7), and 
„all effort‟ (9) is irretrievable.  The only indication that he is indeed human is that he „moves / With 
thought‟. But for Wordsworth, the word “thought” does not refer to the complex abstract rational thinking 
processes of the human brain but rather to the controlling power of the Absolute which, as mentioned in 
„Tintern Abbey‟,  
                                        impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through things 
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                                                        (100-102) 
 
In this sense, then, the old man is being controlled by the Absolute and as such functions as an extension of 
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it. For the casual observer the positive benefits of this are many. Not the least being that he is devoid of 
human suffering. It is easily overlooked that the old man is travelling to see his dying son in hospital, and, 
given this, it is remarkable that he „has such mild composure‟ (10). It is true that this has been the result of  
„long patience‟ (10) on his part, but now this is no longer the case as nature has taken control even of that 
and, in doing so, given him an enviable serenity which leads, 
To peace so perfect, that the young behold 
With envy, what the old man hardly feels.
108
 
 
                                                                                              (12-13) 
The idea of the body under the direction of the Absolute via the senses is further seen in  „Intimations of 
Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood‟. Here the Child is envisaged as the physical conduit of 
„the eternal mind‟ (113) in that he has access to knowledge that others do not have. As Larrissy has said, the 
Child „possesses resources of inner vision‟.109  This vision is connected to the divine in such a way that the 
Child is „haunted for ever by the eternal mind‟ (113), a mind that informs the body via the senses, the latter 
of which the poet connects to „outward things‟ (145). And the „radiance which was once so bright‟ has now 
been taken from the poet‟s sight (178-79). Here radiance is discerned by sight, and Wordsworth uses the 
word “sight” instead of “intuition” to emphasise the notion that the senses have supplanted rational 
methods of acquiring spiritual knowledge. The idea that mystical experience can be accessed by 
withdrawing the senses from the objects of perception, as practised by the Christian contemplatives and 
others, is here inverted. The consequence of this is that the senses rather than reason control the process by 
which ultimate truth can be known. As children, we had the ability to “see” what the Child sees because our 
reason had not developed sufficiently to hinder the senses. Philosophical empiricism enabled Wordsworth 
to construct a seemingly plausible rationale to make this poetic aesthetic credible. Without this rationale, it 
is doubtful whether his poetry would be regarded as much more than a development of what we understand 
as seventeenth-century nature poetry. Certainly, its justification on philosophical grounds is insufficient 
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when placed next to artistic imperatives. 
It should be noted at this point, that some Wordsworth criticism 
110
 has suggested that „Tintern Abbey‟ is 
less an example of Wordsworth‟s more usual approach of recording his sensations both physical and 
mental, than it is of an attempt to investigate the boundaries of meaning in language.
111
  Of „Tintern Abbey‟ 
Marjorie Levinson says: 
Most readers observe that an object does not materialize in the poem before it is effaced or 
smudged; a thought does not find full articulation before it is qualified or deconstructed; a point 
of view is not established before it dissolves into a series of impressions.
112
 
 
In illustration of this, the following lines are often cited to demonstrate a semantic slippage around the 
words „hardly hedge-rows‟ in „Tintern Abbey‟:  
                         Once again I see 
These hedge-rows, hardly hedge-rows, little lines 
Of sportive wood run wild 
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                                                                   (14-16) 
 
It is difficult to see the presence of slippage here. If anything there is a more determined call to accuracy 
with Wordsworth attempting to define even further what he has seen visually as „hedge-rows‟. Far from the 
acceptance of any ambiguity in the line he seems to be determined to nullify it, and in so doing „making the 
words of the poem more satisfactorily referential‟.114 
Indeed, if there is any slippage in certain words of the poem (and given the nature of language it would 
be improbable for some not be found) the main point to consider is whether it is intentional or not. The 
whole focus of the discussion turns upon this point. Even if there is slippage and it could be found to be 
intentional, the accumulative affect of the language of the poem is still towards a descriptive rendering of 
the activity of consciousness. This is achieved by the use of abstract nouns in such a way that their 
collocation becomes referential to the extent that any supposed intention towards the ambiguous is 
undermined. For example, the accumulative effect of the repeated use of the demonstrative adjective 
“these” along with other present tense affirmations places the subject (Wordsworth) within a specific 
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spatial, temporal and experiential relationship to the object (nature). Affirmations of the present such as „I 
hear‟ (1); „these waters‟ (2); „these steep and lofty cliffs‟ (5); „here under this dark sycamore‟ (10); „these 
plots of cottage-ground‟ (11); „these orchard tufts‟ (11); „at this season‟ (12); „lose themselves‟ (13); „I see‟ 
(14); „these hedge-rows‟ (15); „while here I stand‟ (63); „of present pleasure‟ (64); and „that in this moment‟ 
(65) serve to concretise the language of the poem. Neither should the lack of attention by Wordsworth to 
the abbey itself suggest that his emphasis is not upon the corporeal environment he is experiencing. When 
one recognises that the full title of the poem is „Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey, on 
revisiting the banks of the Wyre during a tour, July 13th, 1798‟ it becomes clear that the real subject of the 
poem is the prospect from above the abbey. Larrissy has pointed out that, 
the abbey makes no appearance whatsoever in the poem. This is indeed a nature poem, offering 
a striking re-interpretation of the picturesque and its union with  the sublime, in relation to a 
secluded spot.
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It may seem in this discussion of Wordsworth‟s empiricism that I am giving undue importance to his 
visual acuity in my demonstration of his empiricism, and leaving out of account those aspects of his work 
which suggest that, whilst he was, indeed, aware of vision‟s dominance, he, nevertheless, sought to reduce 
its importance. His awareness of this dominance is evident in Book XII of The Prelude:   
I speak in recollection of a time 
When the bodily eye, in every stage of life 
The most despotic of the senses, gained 
Such strength in me as often held my mind 
In absolute dominion.
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                                                                           (1850, XII, 127-31) 
Although this makes it clear that he does view vision as despotic, it remains unclear as to why he would 
think this necessarily a bad thing given his posture on passivity with regard to the senses discussed above. It 
could be that although visual acuity is highly regarded by him, it becomes suspect if valued for its own 
sake. That when he says that the eye is the most despotic of the senses what he means is that visual acuity 
has its limitations, because it cannot enable natural objects to provoke him into reasoned thinking. 
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However, why he would want this given, again, his position on passivity is not altogether clear. 
Nevertheless, these speculations aside, Wordsworth does seem to seek a solution to vision‟s dominance. 
Vision‟s control can be emasculated by working out the means that Nature, 
                       studiously employs to thwart  
This tyranny, summons all the senses each  
To counteract the other, and themselves,  
And makes them all, and the objects with which all  
Are conversant, subservient in their turn  
To the great ends of Liberty and Power.
117
 
 
                                                  (1850, XII, 134-39) 
 
In this way, then, the visual sense is made equal to the other senses. However, this is an unsatisfactory 
solution as it is not clear how this has sufficiently undermined the visual sense in its role as an empirical 
marker between the world of objects and the thinking mind. The fact that all the senses become valued 
merely emphasizes Wordsworth‟s empiricism all the more. 
Moreover, in his attempt to demonstrate the value of profound thoughts over mere perception 
Wordsworth falls into contradiction. On the one hand, he places a premium on complex thought admitting 
that his former penchant for the merely visual was „vivid though not profound‟ (142). Yet, on the other 
hand, he dismisses the complexity associated with profound thought because it makes the slavery of the 
visual sense „hard to shun‟ (151). In the former position expressed, complexity is regrettably absent from 
the visual; in the latter position, complexity is regrettably the cause of visual dominance. Similarly, there 
are contradictions in his treatment of the maid‟s state of mind in the following passage: 
Her eye was not the mistress of her heart;  
Far less did rules prescribed by passive taste,  
Or barren intermeddling subtleties,  
Perplex her mind; but, wise as women are  
When genial circumstance hath favoured them,  
She welcomed what was given, and craved no more;  
Whate‟er the scene presented to her view  
That was the best, to that she was attuned  
By her benign simplicity of life,  
And through a perfect happiness of soul,  
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Whose variegated feelings were in this  
Sisters, that they were each some new delight.  
Birds in the bower, and lambs in the green field,  
Could they have known her, would have loved; methought  
Her very presence such a sweetness breathed,  
That flowers, and trees, and even the silent hills,  
And everything she looked on, should have had  
An intimation how she bore herself  
Towards them and to all creatures. God delights  
In such a being; for, her common thoughts  
Are piety, her life is gratitude.
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                                             (1850, XII, 153-73) 
 
Wordsworth firstly says that „her eye was not the mistress of her heart‟ (153), leading us to believe that she 
has overcome visual domination and is free of the attendant passivity. However, he then make obvious her 
passivity: „she welcomed what was given, and craved no more;  /  Whate‟er the scene presented to her view 
 /  That was the best‟ (158-60). It was her „benign simplicity of life‟ (161) that enabled her to view nature in 
this way, and which produced in her „common thoughts‟ (172) that Wordsworth  (earlier so vigorous in 
defence of profundity) now admires. Either Wordsworth‟s solution is ineffective or his contradictory 
positions indicate that he is not seriously seeking one. If he were, then his explanation as to its remedy (and 
lines 153-73 above) would be consistently expressed. 
Geoffrey Hartman, in relation to Descriptive Sketches, mentions Wordsworth‟s failed attempt to gain 
control of this despotic sense: 
The eye, the most despotic of the bodily senses in Wordsworth, is thwarted in a peculiar 
manner. It seeks to localize in nature the mind‟s intuition of „powers and presences‟, yet nature 
itself seems opposed to this process, and leads the eye restlessly from scene to scene.
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In this view of Wordsworth, it is nature, or sense data, which is the controlling factor in vision. Similarly, in 
Book II of The Prelude, Wordsworth recognizes nature‟s unremitting controlling influence over his senses: 
My soul was unsubdued. A plastic power  
Abode with me; a forming hand, at times  
Rebellious, acting in a devious mood;  
A local spirit of his own, at war  
With general tendency, but, for the most,  
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Subservient strictly to external things  
With which it communed.
120
 
 
                                     (1805, II, 362-68)  
 
Wordsworth‟s recognition of the despotic nature of vision and his subsequent “solution” should not lead us 
to the conclusion that his passivity in the presense of nature was undesirable to him.  
Before concluding, I would like to mention some of the literary reviews The Prelude received upon 
publication. The review from Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine says: 
As „The Prelude‟ is not, nor pretends to be, a tale of stirring interest, and as it is also of very 
considerable length, it necessarily requires all legitimate aids of poetic art to sustain the 
continued attention of the reader. Unfortunately, Wordsworth never attributed to these their 
due importance; and, accordingly, in „The Prelude‟, as in all his longer pieces, we cannot 
conceal from ourselves that the bard is sometimes prolix, and sometimes careless, in the 
selection of his phrase, and still more often we find his humbler themes become almost trivial  
(Emphasis added).
121
 
 
The reviewer is aware of two of Wordsworth‟s most frequent practices: undervaluing poetic artifice and 
concentrating on the quotidian aspects of nature:    
From multiplicity he shrinks as from confusion; and in no instance does he summon thoughts 
and feelings from various regions to converge like troops in a campaign [...]. His is the ripple of 
the brook in one huge billow on the shore. 
122
 
 
The British Quarterly Review echoes this, and compares Goethe‟s Dichtung und Wahrheit with The 
Prelude:  
One sees the difference between the two poets. Goethe, the larger and more complex nature, 
writes an autobiography full of facts, incidents, sketches, episodes; but artistically evoking out 
of his past life the most beautiful and sweet of its multitudinous recollections. Wordsworth, a 
poet too, but of a mind more meagre and didactic, first sketches as it were a line of bare 
autobiographic theory along the period he means to traverse, and then hangs upon it a few 
reminiscences that shall be ornamental and illustrative. [...] That Wordsworth should have 
made such an attempt in verse at all, is to be regarded as a consequence of his peculiar theory 
of poetic diction [...]. According to that theory, large portions of the poem which, from another 
point of view, would appear decidedly cold and prosaic, are strictly and sufficiently poetical 
(Emphasis added).
123
 
This aloofness and insipidness is also acknowledged in the review from the Gentleman’s Magazine: 
In Wordsworth‟s most excited mood we have rather the reflexion of the flame than the 
authentic or derivative fire itself. Its heat and glare pass to us through some less pervious and 
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colder lens.
124
 
 
There are many more reviews reflecting the criticisms of these but space will not allow a full examination 
of them.  
In this chapter, we have seen how Wordsworth‟s poetic ideas are motivated by philosophical 
considerations to the significant detriment of artistic and aesthetic ones. Moreover, in various of his 
statements he is seen as valuing content over expressiveness and accuracy of observation over poetic 
artifice. We have seen how his theoretical writings place undue emphasis on descriptive accuracy, and how 
they advocate a quest for “authentic” experience. We have seen how his high regard for his sister‟s 
descriptive journal entries resulted in his appropriating (without first modifying or editing them) segments 
of these entries and incorporating them directly into his poetry. In addition, we have seen that she is aware 
of his practice of being constantly in the presence of nature in order to write poetry that is more accurately 
descriptive. From his correspondence, we saw that he admires painting because it represented objects 
accurately and in such a manner that lessons from it could perhaps be learned for poetry. We saw how his 
poetry is overly descriptive and advocates a subordination of the intellect to experience, primarily by means 
of the visual sense. We have also seen how contemporary reviews of The Prelude viewed it as largely 
unremarkable and lacking in poetic imagination. All of these aspects, I believe, demonstrate that the term 
“The Empirical Wordsworth” is an accurate and fair one.   
  It is not a term without, however, a slight qualification. Certain aspects of Wordsworth‟s poetry do not 
fit comfortably into this denomination. There would seem to be an anomaly between his “theory of objects” 
and the application of such in verse. Indeed, in some instances he appears to stride both the objectivist and 
non-objectivist camps.
125
  This is to be expected given the hermeneutic possibilities inherent in language. 
My contention is that their presence  in his poetry (intentional or otherwise) is irrelevant to my larger 
argument, which is to claim that it is Wordsworth‟s empiricism that most influenced twentieth-century 
poetry.  
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Chapter Two  
 
 
The Philosophical Influences on Wordsworth 
 
 
Before dealing with the philosophical influences that bear directly on Wordsworth‟s poetic aesthetic, I 
would like to take a brief historical overview of the development of empiricism as a philosophical principle 
applied to language.
1
 This is relevant because it formed the linguistic paradigm from which Wordsworth 
established his assumptions regarding the empirical use of language. Indeed, it could be supposed that 
Wordsworth‟s importance is in his developing the premises of empiricism in ways that are natural, but 
which had not yet been worked through in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, empiricism as a linguistic 
barometer for poetic precision grew out of the prevalent philosophical climate: one that put an emphasis on 
the verifiable as opposed to the intuitive. Isaiah Berlin in The Age of Enlightenment offers the reasons 
behind this shift towards accuracy: 
Despite advances in science the ancient disciplines of metaphysics, logic, ethics, and all that 
related to the social life of man, still lay in chaos, governed by the confusions of thought and 
language of an earlier and unregenerate age. It was natural, and indeed almost inevitable, that 
those who had been liberated by the new sciences should seek to apply their methods and 
principles to a subject [philosophy] which was clearly in even more desperate need of order 
than the facts of the external world. Indeed this task was of critical importance; for without a 
true and clear picture of the principal of  “faculties” and operations of the human mind, one 
could not be certain how much credence to give to various types of thought or reasoning, nor 
how to determine the sources and limits of human knowledge, nor the relationship between its 
varieties.
2
 
 
Because of this philosophers such as Hobbes, Berkeley and Locke (and indeed Descartes, Spinoza, and 
Leibniz) sought to give their reasoning a structure of a mathematical kind. Language must be able to be 
stated in quasi-mathematical terms, for,  
language less precise may turn out to conceal the fallacies and obscurities, the confused mass of 
superstitions and prejudices, which characterised the discredited theological  or other forms of 
dogmatic doctrine about the universe, which the new science had come to sweep away and 
supersede.
3
 
 
One of the most voluble advocates of this “school” was Thomas Hobbes who rejected the Aristotelian 
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structures of knowledge and sought a new system of philosophic reasoning based upon an empirical 
perception of nature. In doing so, he condemned connotative words in favour of precision and clarity and 
rejected metaphors, which he considered, „untrue‟.4  Of Hobbes‟s four “abuses” of language the first two 
are:  
(1) When men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their 
words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so 
deceive themselves. (2) When they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that 
they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others.
5
 
 
Hobbes continues by cautioning the use of words that can be linked to the psychological and personality 
idiosyncrasies of the speaker: 
And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of 
what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest 
of the speaker; such are the names of Virtues and Vices; for one man calleth “wisdom”, what 
another calleth “fear”; and one “cruelty”, what another “justice”; one “prodigality”, what 
another “magnanimity”; and one “gravity”, what another “stupidity”. And therefore such names 
can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes of speech: 
but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.
6
 
 
George Berkeley, who also advocated a more precise use of language, 
believed that knowledge would be advanced by the admission that abstract generalities do not 
exist because such an admission redirects mental energy away from trying to probe the fantastic 
and reorients it toward trying to disclose what can be known.
7
 
 
What can be known was also a concern of Locke who, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
wrote: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any 
Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? [...] To this I answer, in one word, from experience: In 
that, all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.
8
 
 
What we experience is derived from our senses: 
The foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things, lies in our senses [...]. The whole 
extent of our knowledge, or imagination, reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to our 
ways of perception.
9
 
 
These various philosophical ideas resulted in a paradigm shift in the way language was used. Consequently, 
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there was a shift away from a suggestive use of language towards a more representational and utilitarian 
approach based upon the growing scientific and rationalist ethos of the period. It would be unusual if this 
universal trend did not have an indirect influence upon the shaping of Wordsworth‟s poetry.  
In Wordsworth and Philosophy: Transcendentalism in Poetry, Keith G. Thomas writes: 
 
Although Wordsworth makes few references to the philosophy of his time, there is no reason to 
believe that his knowledge of it was not, in many cases, firsthand. His library (at the time of his 
death, at any rate) contained many books of philosophy that one might expect to see on an 
intellectual‟s shelves: for example, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Locke, 
Berkeley, Hartley, Paley, Rousseau and Burke.
10
 
 
Melvin Rader in Wordsworth: A Philosophical Approach says that Wordsworth‟s library at his death 
comprised nearly three thousand books „including many on philosophy or religion‟.11  However, Rader 
notes that there were only two major works by the English empiricists: Francis Bacon‟s Two Books of the 
Proficience and Advancement of Learning, and George Berkeley‟s Alciphron.12  Rader says that there were 
no philosophical works by Hobbes,  Hume, Hartley, Godwin, or Priestley but there were, 
two of Locke‟s minor works—A letter to the Right Reverend Lord Bishop of Worcester […] 
and Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His 
Letter. But these works are of more significance as contributions to the deistic controversy than 
as repositories of Locke‟s own philosophy.13 
 
According to H. W. Piper in The Active Universe, there is scant evidence that he was familiar with 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy before he became acquainted with Coleridge and others: 
Studies of the early development of Wordsworth‟s philosophy give most of their attention to 
his supposed reading of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics […]. Little reason for 
reading of this kind is offered by his other interests and friendships of the time.
14
 
 
It is certainly possible that Piper is nearer the truth of the matter than Thomas is. Having a well-stocked 
library is not necessarily proof of having read its contents. However, at least as regards the relevant phase of 
Wordsworth‟s life, Thomas is aware of this possibility but thinks that if true it is inconsequential because of 
other sources of philosophical knowledge available to Wordsworth at the time. After noting that Coleridge 
lent Wordsworth, „one book popularising German philosophy for an English audience, Willich‟s Elements 
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of the Critical Philosophy (1798), which gives an accurate, succinct account of Kant‟s philosophy and 
major works‟,15 Thomas says: 
While we cannot know for certain whether or when he read this or other works of philosophy, 
we can be sure of some texts he did read—or else assimilated through general cultural 
osmosis.
16
 
  
Thomas thinks this was possibly done whilst Wordsworth was an undergraduate at Cambridge where 
Newton‟s Principia and Locke‟s Essay on the Human Understanding were part of the curriculum.17  
Yet, according to Book III of  The Prelude it seems doubtful whether Wordsworth had a natural aptitude 
or interest for scholarly pursuits at all while studying at Cambridge: „Such glory was but little sought by me, 
 / And little won‟.18  Nor did he see himself as destined for such a life: 
And more than all, a strangeness in my  
       mind, 
A feeling that I was not for that hour, 
Nor for that place.
19
 
 
                          (1850, III, 80-82)  
In The Prelude (which is supposed to be a comprehensive account of the growth of a poet‟s mind) there is, 
as Graham Hough observes, „little mention of intellectual influences‟.20  Moreover, in the entire poem the 
only books mentioned are Don Quixote and The Arabian Nights.
21
  It becomes plain that inward pursuits of 
the mind are not pressing concerns for Wordsworth during this period. He seems to have been more 
attracted to outdoor activities such as a walking tour of France, Switzerland and Germany in the summer 
and autumn of 1790, and which is recorded in Descriptive Sketches (1792).  
After his graduation in 1791, he spent time in London and North Wales before visiting France again.
22
  It 
was while he was in France during the revolutionary period that it could be said that he became politicised. 
Through his friendship with Michel de Beaupuy, an aristocratic supporter of the Revolution, Wordsworth 
similarly became committed to the cause. However, according to Piper, though Beaupuy did influence 
Wordsworth‟s political ideas there is no indication that Wordsworth was familiar with any of the 
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philosophical ideas that Coleridge would later introduce to him.
23
  He was, however, familiar with the ideas 
of William Godwin (whom he started reading in 1794, a year before he met Coleridge); though once he met 
Coleridge, his philosophical education would have been broadened.
24
  
Coleridge introduced to Wordsworth David Hartley‟s theory of association from which Wordsworth 
gleaned his sense of nature as having some sort of moral purpose.
25
  There were many theories of 
association in circulation before Hartley formulated his, and in doing so, he borrowed heavily from Isaac 
Newton, John Locke and from John Gay who, in his A Dissertation, had applied it to explain the 
relationship between morality and private happiness. What gave Hartley‟s theory some originality was „his 
attempt to explain it physiologically‟ (that physical impressions are made on the brain by means of 
vibrations passing along the fibres).
26
 His main proposition was that the sense organs, when in contact with 
external objects, trigger movements, or vibrations, which travel, via the nervous system, to the brain 
causing ideas or thoughts. These ideas remain in the brain even when the objects that cause them are no 
longer present; but the longer the objects are absent the fainter the ideas become. 
27
   The brain receives 
these sense impressions passively and constructs from them mental processes. Whatever changes are made 
in the brain substance itself due to this process, equivalent changes are made in our mental state also, and 
vice versa. Consequently, for Hartley, there are no innate ideas:  mental states are derived entirely from 
sensations that in turn are derived from direct contact with external objects. Through the “mechanism” of 
association, these sensations are transformed into complex mental patterns that we call “thought”, 
“thinking”, and “consciousness”.28 Each mental state was contingent upon „simple, discrete components in 
the form of sensations or ideas‟.29 Consequently, man was a prisoner to the necessities of associational 
processes. As Melvin Rader writes: 
The whole of mental life, he [Hartley] believed, is explicable by the combination and 
recombination of these elementary states in conformity with the necessary laws of association. 
These laws explain not only the mechanism of our mental life but the growth of our moral and 
religious traits.
30
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The theory that impressions are associated in the brain in mechanical fashion assumes a materialist model 
of mental operations and development. Given the reference to the „association of ideas‟ in the Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads, and recognising the influence of Coleridge, we can see that this model is the source of the 
interest in bodily sensation evident in certain passages in Wordsworth such as: „our bodies feel, where‟er 
they be  / Against or with our will‟ („Expostulation and Reply‟); „sensations sweet, /  Felt in the blood, and 
felt along the heart; / And passing even into my purer mind‟ („Tintern Abbey‟). 
The importance of Isaac Newton‟s concept of “aether” should not be overlooked in an examination of 
Hartley‟s theory of the physiological basis underlying vibrations because it draws some of its substance 
from Newton‟s theory of nervous transmission:  
In later editions of his two major works, Isaac Newton proposed an electrical hypothesis of 
nervous transmission. According to this hypothesis, an electrical “aether” permeates the nerve 
and transmits vibrations along it.
31
 
 
The similarity of operation between Newton‟s “aether” and Hartley‟s is striking. For Hartley, „when 
external objects are impressed on the sensory Nerves, they excite Vibrations in the Aether residing in the 
Pores of these Nerves‟.32 These vibrations then „agitate the small particles of the medullary Substance of the 
sensory Nerves with synchronous Vibrations‟.33 Both the vibrations in the aether and in the medullary 
particles then travel to the brain. In this model, we see how Newton‟s concept of aether has been 
appropriated by Hartley to construct a theoretical basis in support of his physiological explanation for the 
process of association. The difference being, as Ian Wylie notes in Young Coleridge and the Philosophers 
of Nature, that for Newton aether was „an agent of divine action which transmitted God‟s energy into each 
part of nature‟.34  In the Newtonian model, aether is a manifestation of God. In a letter written on 7 
December 1695, Newton hypothesises that the structure of nature is made up of the aether reduced to basic 
forms, 
at first by the immediate hand of the Creator, and ever since by the power of Nature, who […] 
became a complete imitator of the copies set by her by the Protoplast [Protoplast being a 
biological unit consisting of a nucleus and the body of cytoplasm with which it interacts].
35
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Of  this, Wylie says,  „the order of nature is maintained by aether, and the phenomena generated are 
physical copies of divine Ideas‟. 36   However, in Hartley‟s theory, also, there is room for the concept of 
deity and a “soul”. From the first and most basic of sense impressions that we receive there is, Hartley 
surmises, an action of the human soul which changes these crude experiences into their relevant moral 
equivalents which, according to Hartley, are classified under such terms as “pleasure” and “pain”.  
There is little space here to elaborate on each of the senses he deals with but it will be interesting to look 
briefly at two of them: “sensation” and “imagination”. For Hartley sensation forms a continuum running 
through to the idea that by the associating of pleasure through contact with sense-objects a sort of monistic 
unity can ultimately be achieved: 
Since God is the source of all Good, and consequently must at last appear to be so, i.e. be 
associated with all our Pleasures, it seems to follow [...] that the idea of God, and of the Ways 
by which his Goodness and Happiness are made manifest, must, at last, take the place of and 
absorb other Ideas, and He Himself become, according to the Language of the Scriptures, All in 
All.
37
 
 
The second sense he deals with is imagination: 
The Recurence [sic] of Ideas, especially visible and audible ones, in a vivid manner, but 
without any regard to the Order observed in past Facts, is ascribed to the Power of Imagination 
or Fancy.
38
 
 
The pleasures of the imagination are pleasures that are not “original”, but inferred from sensible ones by 
association. These pleasures of the imagination are, 
the next remove above the sensible ones, and have, in their proper Place and Degree, a great 
Efficacy in improving and protecting Natures. They are to Men in the early part of their adult 
Age, what Playthings are to Children; they teach them a love for Regularity, Exactness, Truth, 
Simplicity; they lead them to the knowledge of many important Truths relating to themselves, 
the external world, and its Author; they habituate to invent, and reason by Analogy and 
induction; and when the social, moral, and religious Affections begin to be generated in us, we 
may make a much quicker progress towards the perfection of our natures by having a due 
Stock, and no more than a due Stock, of knowledge in natural and artificial Things, of a relish 
for natural and artificial Beauty.
39
 
 
Brett and Jones in their Introduction to Lyrical Ballads say the reason that Wordsworth found Hartley‟s 
theory so appealing was because his, 
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temperament had always caused him to rely more on sensory observation than rational 
principles, and his character had been influenced more by natural surroundings than formal 
education.
40
 
 
Hartley was also influential in Wordsworth‟s view of nature as a moral tutor: 
Hartley had stressed the importance of sensation as the basis of all our knowledge, including 
our moral principles. Morality, on such a view, was the product of experience, built up from the 
effects of environment upon one‟s personal development.41 
 
Rader illustrates this:  
The trick, if one wants to rear a child aright, is to surround him with the right stimuli, and then 
he will form associations leading inevitably to correct ideas in morality and religion. Thus 
“science” can be devoted to the glory of God and the salvation of man.42 
 
Graham Hough in The Romantic Poets similarly recognises the importance of Hartley in informing 
Wordsworth‟s ideas concerning nature and morality:  
It is Hartley‟s contention that since our minds are built up entirely by  “association”, it is 
extremely important to make the right impressions and associations in early life. This provides 
the philosophical background for Wordsworth‟s belief in the influence of natural objects in the 
formation of character, and perhaps too goes far to account for his sturdy reliance on immediate 
sensuous experience, his abstention from the fanciful and arbitrary, his feeling that his verse 
must „deal substantially with bodily things‟.43 
 
Wordsworth expresses this in Book III of The Prelude:  
To every natural form, rock, fruits, or flower,  
Even the loose stones that cover the highway,  
I gave a moral life 
44
 
 
                                                                                  (1850, III, 127-29) 
 
And in Book I of The Excursion: 
                                       Thus informed,  
He had small need of books; for many a tale  
Traditionary, round the mountains hung,  
And many a legend, peopling the dark woods,  
Nourished Imagination in her growth,  
And gave the Mind that apprehensive power  
By which she is made quick to recognise  
The moral properties and scope of things.
45
  
 
                                                                                          (I, 162-69) 
 
 
 
 
59 
We can see further examples in The Prelude where the application of the Hartleian principle of the 
educative benefits of nature has led to moral recognition via feelings of guilt or sorrow. The most 
recognised instance is in Book I where the young Wordsworth projects his feelings of guilt onto the 
enlargement of the mountain as it “grows” larger due to the shifting spatial perspective caused by the 
progress of the boat through the water. The mountain becomes alive with retributive intent: 
                             with purpose of its own 
And measured motion like a living thing, 
Strode after me.
46
 
 
                                                                                        (1850, I, 383-85) 
 
The resultant lesson/punishment is described in the following manner: 
 
                         for many days, my brain 
Worked with a dim and undetermined sense 
Of unknown modes of being; o‟er my thoughts 
There hung a darkness, call it solitude 
Or blank desertion. No familiar shapes 
Remained, no pleasant images of trees, 
Of sea or sky, no colours of green fields; 
But huge and mighty forms, that do not live 
Like living men, moved slowly through the mind 
By day, and were a trouble to my dreams.
47
  
 
                     (1850, I, 391-400) 
 
Another instance of this is evident while he is trapping birds. After stealing a bird from someone else‟s trap, 
nature again becomes infused with retributive purpose:  
I heard among the solitary hills 
Low breathings coming after me, and sounds 
Of undistinguishable motion, steps 
Almost as silent as the turf they trod.
48
 
 
                                                                                        (1850, I, 322-25) 
An interesting feature of this verse paragraph is that it would seem that Wordsworth has turned to his 
imagination (rather than to experience) to invent the various ominous sounds detailed herein. In actuality, 
the natural surroundings he inhabits display no obvious auditory output—the turf is silent. The „low 
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breathings‟ and „sounds  / Of undistinguishable motion‟ are projections onto natural objects of his fearful 
mental state. This projection, however, is contingent upon the actual objects being present to his senses; 
without this proximity, such projection would be impossible. Wordsworth is actually “hearing” nature‟s 
rebuke—and to him it is very real. In this stanza, then, he is merely recording that experience and in doing 
so is demonstrating his empiricist attitude. In this, and the preceding verse paragraphs quoted, we can 
clearly see how Wordsworth has taken Hartley‟s idea of sensation as being the basis of moral principles, 
and morality being the result of experience, and expressed it in terms that accentuate the importance (as 
Wordsworth saw it) of nature‟s instructive qualities.49  Matter and morality have become entwined. 
This emphasis on nature and morality was influenced not only by Hartley but also by Edmund Burke‟s 
concept of  “the Sublime” as a fearful manifestation of an ultimate power. In Romanticism and Gender, 
Anne Mellor says:  
Burke identified the experience of the sublime with the idea of pain or the annihilation of the 
self, at a time when one also knows that one‟s life is not genuinely threatened‟.50  
 
She quotes him as saying: 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger; that is to say, whatever is 
in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to 
terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the 
mind is capable of feeling.
51
 
 
For Burke, this sort of emotion is only produced, Mellor says, „by a power greater than oneself‟.52  Burke 
writes: „[…] pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior, because we never submit to pain 
willingly‟.53  Mellor concludes: 
Confronted with such overwhelming natural phenomena as the Alps, huge dark caves, a 
blinding sunset, or a towering gloomy ruin, the human mind first experiences terror or fear and 
then—as our instinct for self-preservation is gradually relaxed—astonishment, admiration, 
reverence and respect. Thus, Burke concluded, from the contemplation of a sublime landscape, 
one is led to a sensible impression of the Deity by whose power such magnificent scenes are 
created.
54
 
 
According to Mellor, Wordsworth (and Coleridge) „radically transformed‟ this notion of the sublime, „by 
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insisting that the experience of infinite power is attended, not by fear and trembling, but rather by deep awe 
and profound joy‟.55 
However, the Burkean concept of the sublime can still be discerned in Wordsworth‟s poems, such as 
„There was a Boy‟, „The Simplon Pass‟ and the stanzas I discussed above relating to nature‟s morality. In 
„There was a Boy‟, Wordsworth reveals a natural world that is filled with menace and threat. It is a world 
with „all its solemn imagery‟ (23). Far from negating Burke‟s “terrible sublime”, the poem‟s mood and 
imagery gives good reason to confirm it. Nature is personified and addressed by the poet in a manner that 
indicates a threatening stance: 
There was a Boy; ye knew him well, ye cliffs 
And islands of Winander!
56
 
 
                                                               (1-2) 
 
The stars move along the „edges of the hills‟ (4) furtively—almost fearfully. The boy is depicted as being 
alone in this setting, yet we sense that he is being observed from every quarter by the unseen eyes of nature. 
Such is the intrusiveness of the observation that the cliffs and islands of Winander „knew him well‟. His 
hand gesture as he prepares to mimic the owls is redolent of the hand gesture when praying solemnly. 
Moreover, the owls‟ responses to his call are portrayed as fearful and uncertain—„quivering peals‟ (13), 
„screams, and echoes‟ (14)—despite the assurance of a „jocund din‟ (16). The poem concludes with the 
death of the boy, thus, reinforcing the idea that a Burkean sublime has informed Wordsworth‟s composition 
of this poem. 
Similarly, images of fear, menace, and foreboding are evident in „The Simplon Pass‟ 57.  The Pass is 
described as „gloomy‟ (2), and the travellers‟ journey is „several hours  / At a slow step‟ (3-4). The trees are 
„decaying‟ (5); waterfalls produce „blasts‟ (6); winds are „bewildered   and forlorn‟ (8); rocks are „black 
drizzling crags‟ (11) that „muttered close upon our ears‟ (9); the stream is „raving‟ (13) and produces a „sick 
sight‟ (12); and the clouds seem wild because „unfettered‟ (14). Furthermore, the poem ends with visions of 
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„the great Apocalypse‟ (18). This imagery places the poem, also, within the area of Burkean sublime. 
Returning to Hartley‟s influence on Wordsworth, a further example of this is drawn to our attention by 
Brett and Jones who suggest that the framework for „Tintern Abbey‟ „derives  from Hartley and 
presupposes an empiricist philosophy‟.58  For them the poem is analogous with Hartley‟s associationist 
psychology: 
Hartley‟s account of how the mind moves from sensation through perception to thought, is 
turned into an analogy of how the individual passes from childhood through youth to 
maturity.
59
 
 
And they illustrate these transitions in terms of the poem‟s structure by first citing the following lines:  
          had no need of a remoter charm, 
By thought supplied, or any interest, 
Unborrowed from the eye 
60
 
 
These lines represent, 
 
a time when sensory pleasures were  all important [before the move to] a more mature wisdom 
when [quoting from the poem] „these wild ecstasies‟ have given way to „a sober pleasure‟.61 
 
The influence of Hartley is clearly apparent in Wordsworth‟s Preface to Lyrical Ballads. This can be seen 
from the following passage:  
For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are 
indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the relation of these 
general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important to men, so by the 
repetition and continuance of this act feelings connected   with important subjects, will be 
nourished, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much organic sensibility, such habits 
of mind will be produced that by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits 
we shall describe objects and utter sentiments of such a nature and in such connection with 
each other, that the understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, if he be in a 
healthful state of association, must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, his taste exalted, 
and his affections ameliorated.
62
 
 
We can see here  (as well as a strong connection to Hartley‟s associationism) a further confirmation of the 
importance to Wordsworth of a passive attitude with regard to the perceiving of phenomena by the poet. 
The poet is advised to obey „blindly and mechanically‟ the dictates of his thoughts that are derived from 
sense impressions or as Wordsworth terms it „influxes of feeling‟. That these influxes of feeling are 
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„modified and directed by our thoughts‟ does not necessarily indicate a negation of passivity in favour of a 
pro-active stance. 
Throughout Wordsworth‟s theoretical writings, there are copious examples of inconsistencies and 
contradictions.
63
  For example, elsewhere in the Preface he writes, „What then does the Poet? He considers 
man and the objects that surround him as acting and reacting upon each other‟.64  This would appear to 
support the pro-active stance if the matter were not confused by a later statement where he says that the 
poet considers, „man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man as naturally the 
mirror of the fairest and most interesting qualities of nature‟. 65   Here the mind is seen as a mirror—a mere 
reflector of unchangeable reality, rather than as something capable of modifying it. Given such a confusion 
of intent, my view (based on the evidence of his poetry, correspondence, theoretical writings and his 
expressed philosophical concerns) is that passivity would seem to be the main tendency in operation in his 
poetic practice. 
This would appear to jar with the obvious fact that the passage (quoted above beginning: „For our 
continued influxes of feeling …‟) does advocate a model of the mind that is non-passive. However, it 
would be incorrect to assume that this “activity” operates in an actively creative capacity. While it is true 
that Wordsworth uses the word “create” in The Prelude to describe this activity (i.e. the modification of 
incoming sense impressions), his use of it should not be confused with the commonly understood sense the 
word evokes:  to make or cause to be or to become. In The Prelude, he is arguing for something more 
modest. According to Wordsworth, this creative activity is present in early infanthood. He expresses this in 
the “child in its mother‟s arms passage” of Book II of The Prelude where the child, frail as he is, is 
nevertheless,   
An inmate of this active universe: 
For feeling has to him imparted power  
That through the growing faculties of sense  
Doth, like an agent of the one great Mind  
Create, creator and receiver both,  
 
 
 
 
64 
Working but in alliance with the works  
Which it beholds.
66
 
 
                                                                               (1850, II, 254-60) 
 
Because of the creative power of the „one great Mind‟ of the universe in operation in every living thing 
(including the child), the child is able to share in this Mind‟s creativity. Accordingly, rather than passively 
perceiving the world around him, the child is able to “create” or make more sensual what would otherwise 
be indistinct and unregulated incoming sense data. In other words, this creative activity‟s function is simply 
to enable a more accurate perception of inert matter: reality is not falsified, and no new thing is created. As 
Wordsworth writes in „Tintern Abbey‟: 
                                of all the mighty world 
Of eye and ear,—both what they half create, 
And what perceive 
67
 
 
                                                            (105-7) 
 
The salient phrase here being „half create‟. This accurately expresses the balance whereby perception and 
“imagination” are held in tension. It is this regulation of sense data to render it more tangible that 
Wordsworth sees as the poet‟s main duty. However, all that this duty allows is for a greater accuracy of 
description in Wordsworth‟s poetry. 
Wordsworth‟s view that influxes of feeling are modified by thought derives from Coleridge who later in 
a letter to Thomas Poole in 1801 wrote that the mind was not „a lazy Looker-on on an external world […] 
any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system‟.68 Coleridge was perhaps 
alluding to Hartley‟s theory, for which he had lost his enthusiasm. Moreover, as Melvin Rader points out, 
Coleridge attacked Hobbes, Locke and Hume by saying he could prove, „that the Reputation of these three 
men has been wholly unmerited, and I have in what I have already written traced the whole history of the 
causes that effected this reputation entirely to Wordsworth‟s satisfaction‟.69  Rader also quotes from an 
early version of Coleridge‟s poem Dejection that is directed to Wordsworth expressing Coleridge‟s view 
 
 
 
 
65 
that the mind is far from passive: 
O Wordsworth! we receive but we give, 
And in our Life alone does Nature live: 
Our‟s is her Wedding-garment, our‟s her Shroud! 
And would we aught behold of higher Worth 
Than that inanimate cold World allow’d 
To the poor loveless ever-anxious Crowd, 
Ah! from the Soul itself must issue forth 
A Light, a Glory, a fair luminous cloud 
   Enveloping the Earth! 
And from the Soul itself must there be sent 
A sweet and pow‟rful Voice, of its own Birth, 
Of all sweet Sounds the Life and Element!
70
 
 
Rader concludes that, „Coleridge and Wordsworth must have reached substantial agreement  in converse 
with each other, not entirely rejecting associationism, but modifying and subordinating it.
71
  
Nevertheless, in those parts of Wordsworth‟s works that seem to be operating non-empirically if one 
looks deeply enough one can usually find an empiricist origin. In his essay, „Emotion and Cognition in The 
Prelude‟ Joel Pace says that for Wordsworth „imagination functions as a faculty which is both emotional 
and cognitive‟.72  He then demonstrates this concept in action by citing lines 398-403 of Book V of The 
Prelude: 
Even now appears before the mind‟s clear eye  
That self-same village church; I see her sit 
(The throned Lady whom erewhile we hailed) 
On her green hill, forgetful of this Boy 
Who slumbers at her feet,—forgetful, too, 
Of all her silent neighbourhood of graves 
 
                                                                                 (1850, V, 398-403)  
 
He says of these lines: 
 
Let us suppose that in his travels Wordsworth sees a village church. Empirically speaking, he 
has received an object and it has entered into his mind through his eyes. However, in his mind‟s 
eye he transforms the church […]. He is now creator and receiver both, for (through his senses) 
he has received or perceived the church; and (through his imagination) he has created the 
„throned lady‟ […] from the church.73 
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Adding: 
 
The imaginative transformation which the church undergoes is due partially to cognition. If he 
has long passed from the actual sight of the church yet he can still see it with his mind‟s eye 
(memory) then he has abstracted the church, and in doing so he has used a cognitive function. 
[…]  He has processed the church and its neighborhood of graves and likened them to a mother 
and family of children. He has made this association (or analogy) through the cognitive process 
of comparison, which is part of the imaginative faculty that creates a lady or mother from a 
church. Thus, he unites imagination, cognition, and reflection in his creative process; insofar as 
imagination comes to be seen as „amplitude of mind,  / And reason in her most exalted mood‟ 
(1805, XIII, 169-70).
74
 
 
An essential aspect to Wordsworth‟s empiricism  (as I explore more fully in chapter three) is his desire 
to invest poetry with humanistic concerns.  In The Politics of Nature, Nicholas Roe says that, „an important 
precedent for „Tintern Abbey‟, […] was William Crowe‟s loco-descriptive poem Lewesdon Hill, published 
in 1788‟.75 Coleridge‟s „Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement‟ similarly alludes to this poem.76 
 Both Wordsworth and Coleridge had been impressed with the poem‟s prospect introduced in the following 
lines: 
Up to thy summit, LEWESDON, to the brow 
Of yon proud rising, where the lonely thorn 
Bends from the rude South-east, with top cut sheer 
By his keen breath, along the narrow track 
By which the scanty-pastured sheep ascend 
Up to thy furze-clad summit, let me climb; 
My morning exercise; and thence look round 
Upon the variegated scene, of hills, 
And woods, and fruitful vales, and villages 
Half-hid in tufted orchards, and the sea 
Boundless, and studded thick with many a sail.
77
 
 
 Roe says of these lines that,  
Crowe looks around on a landscape that resembles the pleasing aspects and „tufted trees‟ of 
Milton‟s „L‟Allegro‟, rather than the meadows of West Dorset. His „variegated scene‟ is also a 
recollection of the garden of Eden in Paradise Lost, „A happy rural seat of various view‟.78 
 
However, the poem has, according to Roe, „a third, very different Miltonic precedent: the hilltop vision of 
post-lapsarian history granted to Adam by the Archangel Michael‟.79  He cites the following lines in 
illustration:  
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                                                        it was a hill 
Of paradise the highest, from whose top  
The hemisphere of earth in clearest ken  
Stretched out to the amplest reach of prospect lay.
80
 
 
Of this, he says: 
 
This ample prospect revealed no “sweet variety” but the future history of a „world perverse‟, 
subject to time, change, and the „many shapes  / Of death‟ (xi. 466-7). So Adam is brought to 
contemplate „miserable mankind‟ as the historic consequences of the fall.81 
 
Roe concludes that for Crowe „the prospect from Lewesdon comprehended an ideal landscape, but also 
embraced the realities of history, politics and human society‟.82  
Roe‟s reading of Lewesdon Hill is pertinent to our discussion of Wordsworth‟s empiricism as it indicates 
a tension between the transcendental and the material in the poem. This is expressed by the transcendental 
being represented by the Edenic prospect and the material represented by the post-lapsarian view of 
humanity after the Fall. Roe says that,  
the view of „fruitful vales, and villages / Half-hid in tufted orchards‟ is a picturesque image of 
man‟s Edenic home, but also a reminder of „the fruit  /  Of that forbidden tree‟ and the „effects 
which [man‟s] original crime has wrought‟ (xi. 424) 83 
 
He also adds that the poem‟s „specific visual and verbal details worked in a contrary direction as reminders 
of man‟s fall and the realities of the present world‟.84 Roe also notes the similarity between Lewesdon Hill 
and „Tintern Abbey‟ with regard to humanity‟s fall: 
The „tufted orchards‟, like the „orchard-tufts‟ in „Tintern Abbey‟, punningly signify more than 
picturesque „richness and beauty‟. In both poems the orchard is a token of man‟s fallen nature, 
and of his post-lapsarian existence as a mortal being subject to history.
85
 
 
This „being subject to history‟ ultimately demythologises both poems and aligns them to an empiricist 
aesthetic that sees importance in representations of the actual within a humanistic context. 
Another influence on Wordsworth was that of Berkeley. In my view, he is indebted to Berkley more than 
he is to Locke because his views on language are in conflict with certain statements made by Locke 
concerning the nature of language.
86
 Locke, stresses the generalities inherent in language:  
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All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which 
ought to be conformed to things, should be so too, I mean in their signification: but yet we find 
quite the contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms; 
which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity.
87
 
 
In Wordsworth and the Empirical Dilemma, Regina Hewitt says that, „Berkeley believed that Locke was 
mistaken in construing words as representative of abstract general ideas […]‟.88  She continues: 
To Berkeley, Locke‟s theory implied that abstract words and ideas exist independently of the 
particulars from which they have been derived. They became barriers between the perceiver 
and his perceptions of particular things.
89
 
 
Wordsworth demonstrates this Berkeleyan influence in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads when he says that 
there should be „no object standing between the Poet and the image of things‟.90 Confusingly, he uses the 
word “object” differently from his customary use of it to denote material phenomena. In this instance it is 
used to denote language while the word “things” is used to denote phenomena. Therefore, from this it is 
clear that Wordsworth tends  towards Berkeley than he does to Locke. 
In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley denies abstract words: 
Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He 
draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is 
nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all 
particular lines whatsoever, for that which is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines [...]. 
And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name “line”, which 
taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. And as the former owes its 
generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines 
that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same 
cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.
91
 
  
Of this passage Hewitt says, „By bringing general words and ideas closer to their particular origins, 
Berkeley took a step towards reintegrating the perceiver with his environment‟.92 This is precisely what 
Wordsworth was attempting to do with his poetry. Moreover, Berkeley, according to Rader,  
maintained that the vivid qualitative features of the natural world are genuinely real—much 
more real than Newton‟s atoms. One of the Berkelian doctrines that inspired Coleridge and that 
may have impressed Wordsworth was the notion that we “see God” in the same way that we 
“see man”; that is to say, by means of sense data (misleadingly called “ideas” in Berkeley‟s 
terminology).
93
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Rader quotes the following from Berkeley‟s Principles of Human Knowledge: 
 
It is plain that we do not see a man—if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and 
thinks as we do—but only such a certain collocation of ideas as directs us to think there is a 
distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. 
And after the same manner we see God: all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and 
narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our 
view, we do at all times see manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we can see, hear, feel, 
or otherwise perceive by Sense; being a sign or effect of the power of God; as in our perception 
of those very motions which are produced by men.
94
 
 
Rader says, „This conception of sense data as “the divine visual language” was elaborated in Berkeley‟s 
Alciphron, a copy of which Wordsworth owned‟.95 He links this concept to a similar conception in a 
passage from Coleridge‟s „Frost at Midnight‟, saying that „the sense of sacredness, which had traditionally 
been associated with the supernatural, has become attached to Nature itself‟.96 Adding pertinently, and with 
a quotation from Book XI of The Prelude, Rader says:  
The essence of the Wordsworthian revolution is precisely this transfer of the “numinous” from 
the remote heavenly sphere to „The very world / Of all of us—the place where, in the end, / We 
find our happiness, or not at all!‟97 
 
Rader sees Berkeley as „combing a sensationalist theory of knowledge with imminent theism‟ that may 
have „contributed substantially to Wordsworth‟s religion of nature‟.98 
In summary, we have seen how Wordsworth‟s main poetic aesthetic was influenced by Hartley‟s 
associationist theory, and that this theory appealed to Wordsworth because of his being temperamentally 
more inclined towards sensory perception than to rational principles. We learned how Hartley‟s ideas 
converged with Wordsworth‟s belief in nature as a moral tutor, and how this is manifested in The Prelude 
and The Excursion. We described how Burke‟s concept of “the Sublime” was influential on Wordsworth‟s 
conceptualisation of the “character” of nature‟s morality. We considered how Wordsworth is inconsistent in 
his views regarding the passivity of the human mind. Additionally, we looked at how he uses his 
empiricism to invest his poetry with humanistic concerns. Finally, we saw how Berkeley was more of an 
influence to him than Locke was. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The Influence of Coleridge on Wordsworth 
 
 
It is generally accepted that the chief intellectual influence on Wordsworth was that of Coleridge.
1
 The case 
with Coleridge, though, is at least as complicated as that with Wordsworth in terms of the relationship 
between “empiricism” and “transcendentalism”. Indeed, it is scarcely acceptable to describe Wordsworth‟s 
transcendentalism as influenced by Coleridge‟s without conceding the obvious fact that Coleridge himself 
became a transcendentalist poet and thinker, whose Biographia Literaria was partly intended to 
demonstrate the malign effect of the Locke tradition on poetry. Even so, that book is partly a work of self-
correction. There is ample evidence of Coleridge‟s immersion in empiricist philosophy in the 1790s, as well 
as in the kind of scientific enquiry that was thought to be congenial to that philosophy. The sway of Hartley, 
in particular, over his thoughts is prominently demonstrated by the choice of a name for his son.  
However, even though he was reading Hartley (or attending lectures on science), he was also reading the 
Neoplatonists. Scholars such as Kathleen Wheeler emphasise the fact that the latter kind of influence was 
operative throughout the 1790s. From one point of view, it is not entirely clear how much of a separation 
between these apparently different influences Coleridge would have perceived at that time. One form of 
“natural supernaturalism” to be found in the Romantic period is that which makes it uncertain whether 
contemporary discoveries about electricity and magnetism are not really just the identification of what the 
Neoplatonists and other ancient thinkers had conceived in terms of the subtle materiality comprised in 
phrases such as “animal spirits”. Indeed, it could be claimed that Mary Shelley‟s Frankenstein exploits just 
such an uncertainty. Certainly, Kelvin Everest, by contrast with Kathleen Wheeler, is able to claim that 
there is nothing in the „conversation poems‟ that does not fit firmly with the Locke tradition.  
However, the fact that there is disagreement about such questions is partly due to the ambiguity of the 
poems of the 1790s themselves, where, just as in Wordsworth, one finds a strong emphasis on the 
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modifying power of the mind. Consequently, the progress of the speaker‟s consciousness in „This Lime-
Tree Bower My Prison‟ is from a kind of egotistical blindness to his surroundings, caused by self-pity 
because he has not been able to go for a walk with his friends, to the pleased perception that the lime-tree 
bower in which he is trapped is itself beautiful. At the same time, the pleasant descriptions that convey the 
beauty of the natural world offer a kind of detailed word-painting that one can relate to the “empiricist” 
Coleridge. Nevertheless, the forms of Nature are of „such hues / As clothe the Almighty Spirit‟. In addition, 
while the formulation is consistent with Deism, it is also obviously Berkeleyan, and the implications of 
Berkeley‟s idealist development of empiricism are capable of being developed towards transcendentalism. 
This is indeed the direction in which Coleridge himself traveled, and in retrospect this is not surprising, 
since the poems of the 1790s are so expressive not only of the transforming power of the imagination, but 
also of its fundamental role in human experience. Coleridge was prepared for Kant and German philosophy 
before he came  to them, and it is well known that he also mediates this influence to Wordsworth. 
Coleridge‟s empiricism is therefore as complex and perhaps in need of qualification as Wordsworth‟s is.  
As is well known Coleridge introduced Wordsworth  to the associationist psychology of  David Hartley, 
and was partly responsible for the formulation of ideas presented in the 1798-1802 prefaces for Lyrical 
Ballads. Coleridge‟s vast reading had given him a mind capable of more range and philosophical 
eclecticism than that of Wordsworth. In addition, this eclecticism enabled Wordsworth to see that there was 
more to intellectual thought than the Godwinianism to which he was then rooted. Furthermore, because 
Coleridge‟s philosophy was „infinitely richer in poetic suggestion than the rationalism of the revolutionary 
thinkers‟, it enabled Wordsworth to relinquish, to some extent, the stress of the moral crisis he was 
experiencing as a result of his time in France.
2
  Of Coleridge‟s influence, I. A. Richards has said:   
It is arguable that as to many modes of excellence—by finding the style which Wordsworth 
was to advocate in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, by uttering a good half of the thoughts in 
that and in Wordsworth‟s later prose, by designing Wordsworth‟s major poems for him, and by 
discovering the philosophic seas on which they float—Coleridge was Wordsworth‟s creator; or, 
since that is clearly too strong a word, that he first truly showed Wordsworth how to become 
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his own poetic self.
3
 
 
Wordsworth‟s penchant for the philosophic as applied to poetry is almost certainly a legacy of Coleridge 
who said, „No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher‟.4 
René Wellek has also acknowledged Coleridge‟s influence on Wordsworth: 
We could easily match all the fundamental concepts of Wordsworth in Coleridge; probably 
their phrasing is due to the influence of Coleridge, who early was a student of the Cambridge 
Platonists and Berkeley.
5
 
 
And so has Melvin Rader: 
 
Coleridge abandoned neccessitarianism, revised associationism and subordinated it to an 
intuitional psychology, embraced ideas of an idealistic and transcendentalist import, and 
changed from pantheism to immanent theism. Wordsworth attained, with Coleridge‟s 
assistance, to like convictions.
6
 
 
Before his German visit Coleridge‟s exposure to philosophy had comprised mainly studies of Plato and 
the Neoplatonists; Christian mystics such as William Law; and the English divines; all mixed in with the 
philosophical ideas of Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Condillac and Hartley.
7
  Much has been made of the 
Neoplatonist significance in Religious Musings to argue that Coleridge was mainly an idealist during the 
1790s. But we must not forget that his main philosophical reading at the time the poem was written were 
works by Newton, Locke, Berkeley and Priestley.
8
  Furthermore, all of his substantial poems were written 
while he was under the influence of the empiricists.
9
  These included „The Eolian Harp‟, „Kubla Khan‟, 
„The Rime of the Ancient Mariner‟ and „Christabel‟: all written before he deserted empiricist philosophy in 
1801.
10
 As Religious Musings was written before 1801 we, therefore, have to discount a significant 
Neoplatonist influence.   
In Coleridge’s Secret Ministry Kelvin Everest says of Religious Musings that, 
Coleridge shared the Unitarian wariness of mysticism and Religious Musings itself offers a 
good example of the rational, scientific „proof‟ that a Hartley or Priestley provided of the 
millennium‟s ultimate inevitability.11 
Furthermore, he goes on to say that, 
 
Coleridge describes early in the poem the process by which the soul develops into a selfless 
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identity with God. [...] The account itself seems to derive in part from a neo-platonic source, 
but Coleridge was anxious to correct this impression in 1797.
12
 
 
He then quotes the following extract from the 1797 text of the poem: 
 
                             Lovely was the death 
Of Him whose life was love! Holy with power 
He on the thought-benighted Sceptic beamed 
Manifest Godhead, melting into day 
What floating mists of dark idolatry 
Broke and misshaped the omnipresent Sire: 
And first by Fear uncharmed the drowsed Soul. 
Till of its nobler nature it „gan feel 
Dim recollections; and thence soared to Hope, 
Strong to believe whate‟er of mystic good 
The Eternal dooms for His immortal sons. 
From Hope and firmer Faith to perfect Love 
Attracted and absorbed: and cantered there 
God only to behold, and know, and feel, 
Till by exclusive consciousness of God 
All self-annihilated it shall make 
God its Identity: God all in all! 
We and our Father one!
 13
 
 
                                                                                                (28-45) 
 
He then quotes Coleridge‟s footnote to line 43 of the poem in support of the idea that Coleridge was 
reluctant to be associated with mystical beliefs: 
See this demonstrated by Hartley, vol. I, p.114, and vol. 2. p.329. See it likewise proved, and 
freed from the charge of Mysticism, by Pistorius in his Notes and Additions to part second of 
Hartley on Man, Addition the 18th, the 653rd page of the third volume of Hartley, Octavo 
Edition.
14 
 
On his return in 1799 after ten months of study in Germany, Coleridge‟s aim was to „make poetry an 
instrument of metaphysical research‟.15  However, his mystical idealism is more prominent in theories that 
he formulated after 1800. As Norman Fruman says in his biography of Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel: 
In 1796 the „illustrious sage‟ was still „the most unintelligible Emanuel Kant‟. It was not until 
at least 1801, well after his return from Germany, that Coleridge began a thorough study of 
Kant.
16
 
 
What primarily motivated and informed his poetic ideas during the 1790s was the empiricism of  Hartley.
17
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Coleridge‟s introduction of Hartley‟s theory of associationism to Wordsworth can be considered as 
Coleridge‟s main influence upon Wordsworth‟s approach to poetry. Rader acknowledges this:  
In his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1800) he spoke of the effect of the association of ideas in 
establishing firm habits of mind: „By obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those 
habits‟ the poet is bound to „describe objects, and utter sentiments, of such a nature, and in 
such connection with each other, that the understanding of the reader must necessarily be in 
some degree enlightened, and his affections strengthened and purified.
18
 
 
Coleridge, himself, was deeply influenced by Hartley. Dorothy M. Emmet in her essay „Coleridge on the 
Growth of the Mind‟ says that, „There was a stage in Coleridge‟s development when Hartley was his 
mentor, suggesting a way of trying to understand the working of the mind‟.19  She quotes the following 
lines dedicated to Hartley from Religious Musings: 
            he of mortal kind 
Wisest, he first who marked the ideal tribes 
Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain.
20
 
 
                                                         (368-70) 
 
She then points out that these lines refer to Hartley‟s notion of a physiological process causally linking 
mind and matter: „Note “ideal tribes” for nervous currents conveying sensations; “ideas” were held to be 
somehow derivative of these‟.21  She then explains why Coleridge was so enthralled with this aspect of 
Hartley: 
Coleridge had an active interest all through his life in physiology and chemistry; he was 
fascinated as a schoolboy in his brother Luke‟s medical studies; he kept this interest at 
Cambridge, and followed it more thoroughly when he went to GÖttingen; he kept up a 
friendship and correspondence with Sir Humphrey Davy, and took interest in his experiments 
on respiration and gases. So it is quite untrue to think that he swam off into speculative 
philosophy, and had no interest in the scientific and experimental study of mind and body.
22
 
 
Any reservations Coleridge had about Hartley‟s ideas were not to do with their being too empiricist but, as 
Emmet says, their being not empiricist enough: „His quarrel with the Hartleian sensationalist theory of the 
compounding of ideas was not that it was empirical but that it was untrue to experience‟.23 She quotes him 
as saying in Anima Poetae: 
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How opposite to nature, and to the fact to talk of the „one moment‟ of Hume, of our whole 
being an aggregate of successive single sensations! Who ever felt a single sensation? Is not 
every one at the same moment conscious that there co-exist a thousand others, a darker shade 
or less light, even as when I fix my attention on a white house or a grey bare hill or rather long 
ridge that runs out of sight each way.
24
 
 
Coleridge is saying that the associationist idea that the incremental accumulation of sensations affects 
conscious apprehension of the physical world is not, in fact, the true way that this apprehension occurs. 
Rather the objects of sensation are simultaneously apparent to the organs of perception as a gestalt. 
Therefore, to Coleridge, the weakness in Hartley‟s associationism is that it is not based on an accurate 
observation of the perceptual process. Emmet notes that, 
Coleridge was seeing the limitations of this [Hartley‟s theory] when it was the fashionable 
philosophy in this country. And he was doing so not because he had imbibed speculative 
notions from Germany, but because it was untrue to what he discovered in his own 
experience.
25
 
 
The misconception that Coleridge was indifferent to the physical world is partly the result of projecting 
backwards onto his 1790s incarnation his later Kantian influenced theories. Because of this assumption, it 
is considered reasonable that Coleridge‟s influence upon Wordsworth (since they were both close 
collaborators on Lyrical Ballads) must necessarily be of a Kantian nature.  
Of Coleridge‟s eagerness to engage with the physical world Trevor Levere, in Poetry Realized in Nature, 
writes: 
Coleridge was a brilliant observer of the minutiae of nature. He perceived and recorded details, 
while seeking to comprehend their significance through their interrelations within the web of 
nature.
26
 
 
Moreover, in Coleridge, Humphrey House says that by under emphasising Coleridge‟s regard for the 
external world, 
we run the risk of diverting attention from some of his most characteristic strengths as a 
writer—from his power of detailed poetic description of objects in nature; from his power of 
attuning moods of emotion to landscape and movements of weather; of using the shapes and 
shifts and colours of nature as symbols of emotional and mental states. Even his critical 
idealism, whether expressed in poems or in his more technical philosophy, is grounded in a 
minute analysis of the phenomena of sense.
27
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He then says that „one is surprised over and over again by the combination of delicacy and strength with 
which Coleridge can handle visual detail in his poems‟.28  House then mentions how this attention to detail 
in „Frost at Midnight‟ achieves an expressionistic affect: 
In the poem „Frost at Midnight‟ [...] several different kinds of experience are given outwardly 
in detail and are then drawn in to a centre, first in the room and then in the consciousness. And 
by this means we are given an extraordinary living impression of the whole personality, 
together with its context; of the mind projected outwards into the detail and then contracting 
onto itself so that the context is back-coloured by the prevailing emotion.
29
 
 
Although firmly grounded upon empiricist principles, this ability of Coleridge to transform basic sensual 
data into something more than their crude significance is a skill that Coleridge may have failed to impress 
upon Wordsworth. Via an examination of two of Dorothy Wordsworth‟s descriptive journal entries and 
their influence upon Coleridge‟s poem „Christabel‟ (written three months after the entries were made), 
House further demonstrates the transformative power that Coleridge frequently utilised.
30
  He quotes the 
following entry from Dorothy‟s Journal dated 25 January 1798: „The sky spread over with one continuous 
cloud, whitened by the light of the moon [...]‟. 31 Then the entry for 31 January 1798: „When we left home 
the moon immensely large, the sky scattered over with clouds. These soon closed in, contracting the 
dimensions of the moon without concealing her‟. 32 Then he quotes the following lines from the Gutch 
Memorandum Book: 
                          Behind the thin 
Grey cloud that covered but not hid the sky 
The round full moon looked small.
33
 
 
Then these lines from Part I of  „Christabel‟:  
 
Is the night chilly and dark? 
The night is chilly, but not dark. 
The thin grey cloud is spread on high, 
It covers but not hides the sky. 
The moon is behind, and at the full; 
And yet she looks both small and dull.
34
  
 
                                              (I, 14-19)  
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House points out that although Coleridge has appropriated Dorothy‟s observation and transferred it into his 
poem he has in the process, 
very much modified his own first verse draft in the Gutch book. Especially by adding the 
moon‟s dullness [...] he has increased the mysteriousness and vagueness of the midnight light.35 
  
This element in Coleridge‟s treatment of sensual data should not allow us to forget that this transformative 
power stands ultimately upon a firm conviction in the importance of physical objects in nature; the 
perception of which Coleridge still regards as valuable. Without such an empiricist conviction, it would be 
difficult for him to have utilised the raw materials of experience to achieve the affect that he has in these 
lines from „Christabel‟.  
That he was as much an empiricist as Wordsworth during this period is indicated by his flattering regard 
for Wordsworth‟s “greatness” in letters to friends. In a letter to Robert Southey dated 17 July 1797 he 
writes: „Wordsworth is a very great man—the only man, to whom at all times & in all modes of excellence I 
feel myself inferior‟.36 Moreover, after knowing Wordsworth just over a year he says in a letter to John 
Prior Estlin on 18 May 1798: „My admiration, I might say, my awe of his intellectual powers has increased 
even to this hour‟. 37 In addition, on December 19 1800 he writes to Francis Wrangham, saying of 
Wordsworth: „He is a great, a true Poet—I am only a kind of a Metaphysician‟. 38  It is unlikely that 
Coleridge would have enthusiastically praised Wordsworth in this way if he seriously disagreed with 
Wordsworth‟s empiricist poetic aesthetic. Of Coleridge‟s empiricism House writes: „He is far more alert 
and sensitive to the modes in which sense-experience conditions the life of the mind than most technical 
philosophers‟, 39 and: „The more one reads Coleridge‟s descriptions and dwells on them, the less easy it is 
to be convinced that he ever needed Dorothy Wordsworth as his tutor in seeing‟.40  Along with: 
The selections from the Note-Books given in Anima Poetae, and even in Inquiring Spirit, do 
not fairly represent the frequency of such entries as this: 
 
Black round Ink-spots from 5 to 18 in the decaying Leaf of the Sycamore.
41
 
 
This empiricism seems somewhat remote from the more customary idea we have of Coleridge as a 
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“visionary mystic”. Furthermore, his interest in science was also of some importance to his poetry. In 
Religious Musings, he mentions approvingly such notable scientific figures as Newton, Hartley and 
Priestly.
42
  Moreover, his social circle consisted of either scientists or those interested in it such as Thomas 
Beddoes who made his library of scientific books available to Coleridge.
43
  In addition, Levere quotes him 
as saying: „Without natural philosophy and without the sciences which led to the knowledge of objects 
without us, man himself would not be man‟,44 adding that for Coleridge, 
science, through its foundation in facts and its informing structure of ideas and laws, related 
mind to nature, the ideal of the real […]. Science, in short, was fundamental in Coleridge‟s 
thought.
45
  
 
Given these particulars his empiricism should therefore not surprise us. Nor should it be surprising that he 
may have held a biological conception of mind.  
In support of this possibility, Alan Richardson cites cognitive psychologist Allan Paivo‟s observation 
that Coleridge‟s narrative of „Kubla Khan‟ reveals, „its intuitive glimpse into the fundamental “duality” that 
empirical research would later establish between the visual systems, supporting two distinct “modes of 
thought”‟.46  For Richardson, 
what Coleridge describes in the introductory notice to Kubla Khan might be seen as the most 
spectacular psychophysiological experiment of his career, […] And when read against the 
background of Coleridge‟s fraught relation to contemporary biological accounts of mind, the 
introductory note becomes a still more remarkable document than before. […] Moreover [it 
gives] aid and comfort to the materialist adversary. [And] all but guaranteed that Kubla Khan 
would become an object lesson for the biological study of psychology and an irresistible 
subject for the psychological study of literature.
47
 
 
Kenneth Burke in Language of Symbols comes close to suggesting that „Kubla Khan‟ is a mimesis of the 
thinking process in that it is, 
in effect a poeticized psychology detailing not what the reader is to see [as in Wordsworth] but 
what mental states he is thus empathically and sympathetically imitating as he reads.
48
 
 
Because of this, the thinking process itself has become objectified in an attempt to render it as tangible to 
sense experience as are the other objects in nature.  
 
 
 
 
82 
The “biological” aspect of Coleridge‟s poetry (i.e. its formal structure mirroring the biological rhythms 
of the body) is articulated by Albert Gérard in his essay, „The Systolic Rhythm: The Structure of 
Coleridge‟s Conversation Poems‟. Gérard notes that  „The Eolian Harp‟, „Frost at Midnight‟, „Fears in 
Solitude‟ and „Reflections of having left a Place of Retirement‟ express a systolic rhythm: a process of 
contraction and expansion.
49
   Of  „The Eolian Harp‟ he says: 
We can observe a heartbeat rhythm of systole and diastole, contraction and expansion, in which 
the poet‟s attention is wandering to and fro between his concrete, immediate experience and the 
wide and many-faceted world of the non-self [nature, God, etc] […] the self to which the poet 
finally turns back is not the same self from which he had started: it has been enriched, 
heightened and uplifted by the various inner and outer experiences to which it has submitted 
and from which it now emerges with what the poet considers to be a deeper and more accurate 
knowledge of the universe and of his place in it.
50
 
 
The most obvious instance of this is in „This Lime-Tree Bower my Prison‟ where we see the poet‟s self-
consciousness directed outwards to contemplate his friends and their present activities. We can see this in 
action in the opening lines that could be seen as the first expansion: 
Well, they are gone, and here must I remain, 
This lime-tree bower my prison! I have lost 
Beauties and feelings, such as would have been 
Most sweet to my remembrance even when age 
Had dimm‟d mine eyes to blindness! They, meanwhile, 
Friends, whom I never more may meet again, 
On springy heath, along the hill-top edge, 
Wander in gladness, and wind down, perchance, 
To that still roaring dell, of which I told 
51
 
 
                                                                                                                      (1-9) 
 
From this overview, there is a contraction as the poet returns his focus to the landscape where he over 
describes it in the following manner: 
The roaring dell, o‟erwooded, narrow, deep, 
And only speckled by the mid-day sun;  
Where its slim trunk the ash from rock to rock 
Flings arching like a bridge;—that branchless ash, 
Unsunn‟d and damp, whose few poor yellow leaves 
Ne‟er tremble in the gale, yet tremble still, 
Fann‟d by the water-fall!52 
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                                                                                                           (10-16) 
 
Again, we have an expansion: 
 
                                            Now, my friends emerge 
Beneath the wide wide Heaven—and view again 
The many-steepled tract magnificent 
Of hilly fields and meadows, and the sea, 
With some fair bark, perhaps, whose sails light up 
The slip of smooth clear blue betwixt two Isles 
Of purple shadow!
53
 
 
                                                                                                             (20-26) 
 
In a letter to Thomas Poole on 16 October 1797, Coleridge made the following comment that is often 
brought into play to argue against Coleridge being an empiricist:  
My mind had been habituated to the vast [and] I never regarded my senses in any way as the 
criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions not by my sight.
54
  
 
This statement seems at odds with what Coleridge has written elsewhere—and especially from the evidence 
for his empiricism that we find in his conversation poems. In „The Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree‟ 
we can see that Coleridge, far from being  „habituated to the vast‟, is immersed in the commonplace 
panorama of nature with its: „Fields, forests, ancient mountains, ocean, sky‟. Moreover, the importance of 
sensual impression is emphasised with: „The finer the sense for the beautiful and the lovely, and the fairer 
and lovelier the object presented to the sense; the more exquisite the individual‟s capacity of joy‟. This 
pleasure with sensual impression is further expressed in a letter to his brother, George, dated 10 March 
1798 he writes: 
I love fields & woods & mounta[ins] with almost a visionary fondness—and because I have 
found benevolence & quietness growing within me as that fondness [has] increased, therefore I 
should wish to be the means of implanting it in others.
55
 
 
We see, then, that Coleridge‟s remark: „I never regarded my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief‟ 
does not sit too comfortably with his attitude in this poem. Of the sentence quoted above from the letter to 
Poole, House (quoting from „Solitary Date-Tree‟) says: 
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That sentence has been quoted over and over again as if it were the most fitting and almost 
adequate introduction to the study of Coleridge‟s mind and habits of vision; but it leads people 
to forget that he also wrote that one of his greatest qualities was „delight in little things‟, the 
kind of delight which belonged to „the buoyant child surviving in the man‟.56 
 
Delighting in „little things‟ is certainly something that was not on Coleridge‟s mind when he wrote the 
following, also from the letter to Poole: 
Those who have been led to the same truths step by step thro‟ the constant testimony of the 
senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess—They contemplate nothing but parts—and 
all parts are necessarily little—and the Universe to them is but a mass of little things.57  
 
Richardson notes further ambivalences in Coleridge‟s thinking, this time concerning his attitude towards 
the mechanistic model of mind as opposed to the more “organic” conception:  „Materialist, naturalistic, and 
embodied notions of the psyche would continue to play an ambiguous role in Coleridge‟s thinking 
throughout his career‟.58  Moreover, this tension is evident, as Richardson further notes, in Coleridge‟s 
attitude, in 1796, towards Erasmus Darwin, whom he mocks for his atheism; while, as John Beer argues, 
Coleridge drew heavily on Darwin‟s Zoonomia, during this same period, for insights into the active 
conception of mind.
59
  
How can these various divergent elements in our reading of Coleridge be reconciled? With regard to 
Coleridge appearing enthralled with material phenomena on the one hand, and almost shunning them on the 
other, one suggestion by J. A. Appleyard is interesting. He begins by acknowledging that Coleridge‟s 
earliest philosophical theories were derived from associationist psychology and that even after he rejected 
it, „the clarification of the relationship of external nature to mind and imagination was one of the central 
problems of his philosophy‟.60  He suggests that the „notion of objectivity involved here‟ may depend upon 
the understanding of the word  “empirical” as it applies to Coleridge.61 He regards Coleridge as probably 
rejecting its positivist implications but sees no reason why his experiences (mental, spiritual and physical) 
could not similarly be labelled “empirical”—and, therefore, “objective”.62 This approach does harmonise 
the various empiricist and idealist strands co-existing in Coleridge‟s thought. As Appleyard says: 
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This gap between an insight capable of grasping a “vast” truth or an ineffable feeling and, on 
the other hand, the sense knowledge of the “rationally educated” which contemplates only parts 
or little things is basic to Coleridge‟s thought.63 
 
However, a more comprehensive explanation for the contradictions in Coleridge‟s thought has been 
posited by Seamus Perry in Coleridge and the Uses of Division. Perry‟s thesis is that, 
Coleridge‟s thought is best understood, not as the solution to a problem, but as the experience 
and exploration of a muddle. That sounds derogatory, but I don‟t mean it to be: in fact, I mean 
to be quite laudatory. For it is arguable that certain kinds of muddle are entirely respectable; 
and the proper task of criticism, in that case, would not be an attempt at the solution of the 
muddle (for that would be to mistake it for a problem), but rather a description of the particular 
brand of indecision that constitutes it.
64
  
 
He says Coleridge‟s practice of collecting incongruent fragments of truth scattered through systems, 
means that philosophical positions ostensibly passed through are not, in practice, discarded (as 
someone learning the truth about oxidation would properly jettison the phlogiston theory); 
typically they are kept current in his thinking, running in incongruous, if notionally inferior, 
parallel to the new line. But the attractions of the old theory, which were, after all, perfectly 
genuine, are always liable to reassert themselves; and so comes about the kind of muddlesome 
doubleness I am taking about.
65
  
 
Consequently, in much of Coleridge‟s writing „you find not simply a concept at work, but a concept and its 
alternative or counter-concept. 
66
  Perry sees this pluralism as an expression of Coleridge‟s belief that 
humans have a spiritual instinct to seek unity. 
67
 Perry notes that, 
Coleridge‟s thinking habitually seeks to correct into oneness the apparently incorrigible 
plurality continually rediscovered in the sharpness of his senses; while […] in the teeth of his 
commitment to universality and oneness, diversity and particularity continue to exert there 
interest—so that, in practice, the unity which he proclaims so vociferously is typically 
submerged by the protracted exhibition of the contradictory elements he is meant to be bringing 
together. This is not just an oblique way of embracing heterogeneity after all; it is trying to have 
things both ways.
68
 
 
For Perry, this is not as negative as it may appear: 
 
„Coleridge keeps hold, so to speak, of both handles,‟ as Wellek notices with irritation, but 
which I notice to appreciate: „the unity and the things unified, the whole and the parts.‟ […] To 
compare small things with great, my attitude towards Wellek on Coleridge is like Lewis‟s 
towards Leavis on Milton: „He sees and hates the very same I see and love.‟ 69  
 
Perry‟s analysis plausibly accounts for Coleridge‟s philosophical inconsistencies. 
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Having looked at Coleridge‟s empiricism I would now like to look at his poetry in terms of its empirical 
elements. Everest observes that there is a continuation of the empiricism of nature poetry evident in 
Coleridge‟s verse: 
We can turn back again to the preceding tradition of English nature poetry to place Coleridge‟s 
poetry as continuous with its past; for his achievement in the conversation poems gathers part 
of its impetus from the emerging direction of English nature poetry.
70
 
 
Everest sees the conversation poems as articulating „a certain form of consciousness‟ that evolved out of the 
“retirement tradition” present in late seventeenth-century verse.71 Coleridge merely appropriated forms and 
conventions and then adapted them to his own poetic language.
72
  This is evident in the conversation poems 
that are replete with „the values he found in nature‟.73  Everest notes that a feature common to all the 
conversation poems is, 
their constant readiness to marry a high pitch of feeling in response to nature, with an impulse 
to explain or account for the experience, or to articulate it in terms that appear philosophical.
74
 
 
In addition, he notes that Coleridge is,„at his best when he can test and measure the developing and always 
relative judgments of consciousness against its relationship with nature‟.75  Everest then points out the 
typical features of the conversation poems. These are their: „private mode of address, the opposition of 
town and country, their heightening response to nature that culminates in philosophical generalisation‟.76  
He says that these are also present in English poetry after the Civil War.
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House similarly acknowledges Coleridge‟s debt to the past, especially to Cowper: 
In the conversation poems Coleridge is carrying on where Cowper left off. The 
autobiographical element is given a deeper psychological analysis and the thought about it 
carries into what is properly metaphysical poetry […] everything has greater import; the 
imagery leaves Cowper‟s direct statement; the descriptive passages are more intricately and 
closely knit to their psychological affects; the description is more minute.
78
 
 
In Coleridge’s Philosophy of Language, James McKusick includes Bowles along with Cowper as 
contributing to Coleridge‟s “realism” where he (McKusick) cites the following from Biographia Literaria: 
„Bowles and Cowper were, to the best of my knowledge, the first who combined natural thoughts with 
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natural diction‟.79 In addition, he notes Coleridge as saying with regard to the poetry of Pope that it was 
written in „language the most fantastic and arbitrary‟.80  Of this McKusick says: 
All of Coleridge‟s subsequent career, according to the account given in the Biographia, was 
conditioned by his initial preference for the “natural” language of Bowles over the “arbitrary” 
language of Pope.
81
 
 
Furthermore, concerning Coleridge‟s expressed disapproval (in a 1796 article for the Watchman) of the 
linguistic inventiveness of a passage in Laurence Sterne‟s Tristram Shandy, when compared to the writing 
style of Thomas Beddoes in The History of Isaac Jenkins, McKusick writes: „Coleridge has no use for the 
artificial sensibility of a writer like Sterne; only the unstudied descriptive style of a writer like Beddoes or 
Bowles meets his approval‟.82  In the same article Coleridge says that the perfect poetic style is that „in 
which we think always of the matter, never the manner‟.83  In other words, he advocates content over form. 
The influence of nature poetry could have been the result of an attempt by Coleridge to correct what he 
considered as stylistic faults in his own early poetry. One of these “faults” was the frequent use of 
personification that is in evidence in his poetry from 1786 to 1796. The following are some of  the poems 
written during this period along with the personifications they contain:  
„Genevieve‟ (1786)—Beauty.  
„Dura Navis‟ (1787)—Fancy, Sorrow, Bliss, Terror, Wave, Vengeance. 
„Sonnet to the Autumnal Moon‟ (1788)—Splendour, Night, Hope, Despair. 
„Life‟ (1789)—Death.  
„Monody on the Death of Chatterton‟ (1790)—Fame, Neglect, Rage, Woe, Liberty, Bliss.  
„Sonnet on quitting School for College‟ (1791)—Fancy, Joy, Hope.  
„On seeing a Youth affectionately welcomed by his Sister‟ (1792)—Death, Knowledge, Wit. 
„Lines on an Autumnal Evening‟ (1793)—Fancy, Hope, Learning, Love, Peace, Quiet.  
„The Sigh‟ (1794)—Hope. 
 „Lines Written at Shurton Bars‟ (1795)—Mirth, Fancy, Dread, Evening. 
„To a Young Friend‟ (1796)—Pensiveness, Knowledge, Inspiration.  
 
In Coleridge: Early Visions, Richard Holmes says that during this period, 
there was a long struggle between the „florid diction‟ and epigrammatic polish and 
personifications of many of his longer and more formal Odes, Effusions and Monodies; and the 
Bowles-like plain style, expressing emotion in run-on lines, musical  alliteration, and bold 
monosyllabic statements of personal feeling.
84
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Holmes sees the Bowles-like plain style represented in those poems written between 1789 and 1794   as a 
„profound attack on eighteenth-century conventions‟.85 Of such poems, he cites „Sonnet to the Autumnal 
Moon‟ and „Sonnet on quitting School for College‟ as examples. While he is correct in noting that these 
poems primarily deal with Coleridge‟s personal response to the universality of change and loss, thereby 
distinguishing them from the more impersonal aspects of eighteenth-century verse, it seems an 
overstatement to label them as constituting a „profound attack‟ on those conventions. Thematic 
considerations aside,  „Sonnet to the Autumnal Moon‟ is almost weighed down with eighteenth-century 
hyperbole and personification such as: „Mild Splendour of the various-vested Night!‟ and „Ah such is 
Hope! as changeful and as fair!‟ Hardly anything better can be said for „Sonnet on quitting School for 
College‟ with its: „FAREWELL parental scenes! A sad farewell!‟ and „Adieu, adieu! Ye much-loved 
cloisters pale!‟. After 1796, Coleridge used few, if any, personifications. 
An additional “fault” was his lush poetic diction, which, during this period, is noticeably lacking in 
descriptive terms, as can be seen in „To the Evening Star‟: 
O first and fairest of the starry Choir, 
   O loveliest „mid the daughters of the night, 
Must not the mind I love like thee inspire 
    Pure joy and calm Delight? 
86
 
 
                                                               (5-8)                                                
The presence of these non-realistic and artificial devices, among others, is referred to in Biographia 
Literaria where he tells us that his first volume of poetry, Poems on Various Subjects (published in 1796), 
was criticised for its „obscurity, a general turgidness of diction, and a profusion of new coined double 
epithets‟.87  These aspects were criticised because they represented aesthetic values opposite to those 
favoured by the arbiters of poetic taste of the day. This aesthetic, as I have demonstrated, called for poetic 
language to be treated as transparent. Consequently, any attempted innovation such as the use of  “new 
coined” double epithets or, for that matter, a turgid and obscure lexis, was bound to cause consternation. 
Because of such criticism, Coleridge was forced radically to modify his poetic approach: „In the after 
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editions, I pruned the double epithets with no sparing hand, and used my best efforts to tame the swell and 
glitter both of thought and diction‟.88  That his first volume of poems was published in 1796 and that his 
poetry from 1797 onwards contains none of the perceived faults I have mentioned, indicates that it was this 
critical reaction that was responsible for the sea change in his poetic style after 1796. If it were not for this 
transformation in Coleridge‟s poetry, he would have had little connection with nature poetry. Consequently, 
the modifications Coleridge made because of these criticisms brought him firmly into line with the 
predominant empiricist aesthetic of the period. This resulted in his poetry being not such a marked 
departure from that which preceded it after all.  
He extended this criticism to his advice to friends who offered him samples of their own poetry for his 
comment. For instance, when giving Robert Southey advice on a sonnet Southey had written, Coleridge 
says that the phrase „wild wind‟ should be changed to: „That rustle to the sad wind moaning by‟ because 
“wild wind” is not a true description of „the Autumnal Breeze that makes the trees rustle mournfully‟. 
„Wild wind‟, Coleridge says, „applies to a storm‟.89  This newly found confidence in his poetic judgement is 
even brought into play when, upon receiving a batch of poetic works he requested—including poems by 
Bowles and Shakespeare—Coleridge comments favourably on Bowles‟s poems saying they are 
„descriptive, tender, sublime‟ adding that the Shakespeare is „sadly unequal to the rest‟—presumably 
because Shakespeare‟s descriptive powers are wanting.90  
Coleridge‟s empiricism, as worked out in his poetry and critical thought, is expressed well by William 
Empson in Coleridge’s Verse, where he says that for Coleridge poetry had to be, „spontaneous, interesting, 
and profound; an unexpected general truth, of universal  concern […] illustrated by a direct and urgent 
experience of the author‟.91  The formal aspects of the poem were to be similarly transparent leading to a 
prose-like register: 
In my defence of the lines [of a poem] running into each other, instead of closing at the couplet, 
and of natural language, neither bookish, nor vulgar, neither redolent of the lamp, nor of the 
Kennel, such as   I will remember thee; instead of the same thought tricked up in the rag-fair 
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finery of  „Thy image on her wing / Before my Fancy‟s eye shall MEMORY bring‟.92  
 
The phrase: „I will remember thee‟ allows for a closure of meaning that is well suited to the imperative 
inherent in prose communication for transparency, whereas: „Thy image on her wing / Before my Fancy‟s 
eye shall MEMORY bring‟ inhibits hermeneutic closure and is therefore incompatible with prose 
communication. Such was Coleridge‟s desire for clear and precise communication that, like Wordsworth, 
he argued for a direct causal connection between thought and language. In response to John Thelwall‟s 
criticism that „Sonnet, Composed on a journey homeward; the author having received intelligence of the 
birth of a Son‟ was obscure, he writes: 
My first Sonnet is obscure; but you ought to distinguish between obscurity residing in the 
uncommonness of the thought, and that which proceeds from thoughts unconnected & 
language not adapted to the experience of them. When you do find out the meaning of my 
poetry, can you (in general, I mean) alter the language so as to make it more perspicacious—the 
thought remaining the same? 
93
 
 
Here language is offered as a tool to mimic thought. It cannot be independent of thought. The lexis must 
follow the thought. However, as I said in chapter two in relation to various ambiguities present in 
Wordsworth‟s poetry, language is slippery despite the best attempts by a writer to accomplish concision to 
limit meaning. The following lines are from Coleridge‟s unfinished poem „The Destiny of Nations‟: 
     When love rose glittering, and his gorgeous wings 
Over the abyss fluttered with such glad noise, 
As what time after long and pestful claims, 
With slimy shapes and miscreated life 
Poisoning the vast Pacific, the fresh breeze 
Wakens the merchant-sail uprising 
94
 
 
We can infer from what Coleridge says of them that he, too, would not altogether disagree: „These are very 
fine lines, tho‟ I say it […]. But hang me, if I know or ever did know the meaning of them, tho‟ my own 
composition‟.95  Holmes‟s says of this statement: „For the first time he is suggesting that poetry may be 
written from somewhere outside conscious control‟.96  In terms of Coleridge‟s poetic ideals, this would 
indicate something of a failure. Nevertheless, this is not a rare occurrence for him: „As to my own poetry I 
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do confess that it frequently both in thought & language deviates from “nature & simplicity”‟.97  From this 
it would seem that Coleridge‟s poetic ideas have some sort of quantifiable criteria to inform them. 
However, as this brief discussion indicates, this in not so. Sometimes he is for clarity of expression, at 
others he is not. Holmes offers a possible reason for this confusion that sits well with the one Perry 
suggested above. Holmes says that Coleridge held the concept of „power in poetry arising from a 
combination of clarity and obscurity‟.98  In addition, he quotes the following entry from Coleridge‟s 
Notebook kept when he was studying in Germany: 
The elder Languages fitter for Poetry because they expressed only prominent ideas with 
clearness, others but darkly … i.e. Feelings created by obscure ideas associate themselves with 
the one clear idea. When no criticism is pretended to, & the Mind in its simplicity gives itself 
up to a Poem as to a work of nature, Poetry gives most pleasure when only generally & not 
perfectly understood.
99
 
 
Commenting on this Holmes says: 
Coleridge was here reaching towards a complex idea of poetry that was more than mere 
youthful “intoxication”; it had to be both intelligible and mysterious, the proper subject of a 
critical, adult mind playing over it in detail.
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Being „intelligible and mysterious‟ was also something Coleridge emphasised to Thelwell when discussing 
the ability of philosophical mysticism to produce intelligent poetry.
101
 However, in practice Coleridge‟s 
poetry for the most part demonstrates clarity over ambiguity. 
I would like now to look at some of the ways in which Coleridge influenced Wordsworth. This is not an 
easy matter as they both influenced each other to such an extent that it is difficult to see where Wordsworth 
begins and Coleridge ends.
102
 Certainly, it was to his friendship with Wordsworth that he „attributed his 
insight into the nature of imagination‟.103 By the summer of 1797 Wordsworth, „seems to have provided the 
example of self-possession and a sureness both in his philosophical principles and in his poetic craft that 
Coleridge […], badly lacked‟.104 However there are certain areas where it is possible to discern strands of 
influence from Coleridge to Wordsworth. Gérard says that the following passage from Coleridge‟s preface 
to his Poems on Various Subjects anticipate certain considerations that Wordsworth would elaborate on in 
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his preface to Lyrical Ballads: 
The communicativeness of our nature leads us to describe our own sorrows; in the endeavour 
to describe them, intellectual activity is exerted; and by a benevolent law of our nature, from 
intellectual activity a pleasure results which is gradually associated and mingles as a corrective 
with the painful subject of the description.
105
 
 
Gérard fails to mention what these “considerations” are, but one of them may have been Wordsworth‟s 
“emotion recollected in tranquility”, as this passage seems to be navigating similar terrain. 
That Coleridge had a considerable input in the formulation of the poetic ideas contained in the Preface of 
1800 is clear in a letter he wrote to Robert Southey on the 29 July 1802: 
Wordsworth‟s Preface is half a child of my own Brain […] & so arose out of Conversations, so 
frequent, that with few exceptions we could scarcely either of us perhaps positively say, which 
first started any particular Thought.
106
 
 
And in an earlier letter to William Sotheby on the 13 July 1802 he writes: 
 
I must set you right with regard to my perfect coincidence with his [Wordsworth‟s] poetic 
Creed. It is most certain, that that Preface arose from the heads of our mutual Conversations 
[…] the first passages were indeed partly taken from notes of mine […] for it was at first 
intended, that the Preface should be written by me.
107
 
 
This is a striking claim to equal authorship of the ideas contained in the Preface. A further indication that 
Coleridge helped write the Preface is the setting of a precedent by Wordsworth for outside assistance in its 
composition. In her journal entry for 5 October 1800, Dorothy Wordsworth writes: „A delicious morning. 
Wm [William] and I were employed all the morning in writing an addition to the preface‟.108  In a letter 
(enclosed with a first draft of the Preface) to Joseph Cottle on 20 September of the same year Wordsworth 
writes: „I have again requested the assistance of a friend [Coleridge] who contributed largely to the first 
volume [of Lyrical Ballads]‟.109 It is strange that Wordsworth regards Coleridge‟s contribution to the first 
edition of Lyrical Ballads as worthy of mention, as Coleridge contributed only four of the twenty-three 
poems to that edition. Could Wordsworth, when he says, „contributed largely‟, be referring to some other 
sort of contribution other than poems?  If so, it could only be that of inspiration or advice of some sort. 
Herbert Read in The True Voice of Feeling supports this possibility: 
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It must always remain uncertain to what extent Wordsworth derived his ideas about the form of 
poetry from Coleridge. The moral force that Wordsworth exhibits in the Preface is obviously 
his own; his, too, is the historical criticism embodied in them—the references to classical and 
to Elizabethan poets. But when Wordsworth begins to write about „the primary laws of nature‟, 
then he is either interpreting Hartley‟s psychology, or expounding Coleridge‟s. Phrases like „the 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings‟, „organic sensibility‟, „influxes of feeling‟, 
„passions and volitions‟, are at any rate common to Coleridge and Wordsworth, and I cannot 
conceive that their origin was other than those German writings to which Coleridge alone had 
direct access.
110
 
 
Holmes partially echoes this with an example of Coleridge‟s participation with Wordsworth in the 
production of the Preface: 
They had discussed a new, critical preface, and Coleridge‟s Notebooks suggest he may have 
initiated Wordsworth‟s famous line of argument concerning “emotion recollected in 
tranquility”.111 
 
Holmes also gives us a glimpse of Wordsworth‟s dependence upon Coleridge:   
Wordsworth, from a position of apparent weakness, had ruthlessly come to dominate the terms 
of the collaboration. Having used Coleridge—even, one might think, having exploited him—as 
advisor and editor, drawing him up to the Lakes for that very purpose.
112
  
 
That Wordsworth was willing to go to such circuitous lengths in order to gain Coleridge‟s assistance 
indicates a need that is devoid of pride to such an extent that it leads one to suspect a poverty of fresh ideas. 
Pride was certainly missing when, as we have seen, he copied entries  from his sister‟s Journals to furnish 
his poetry with descriptive phrases. Furthermore, little creativity was required in his need to be physically 
present in nature to better describe what was before his eyes. Therefore, given such precedents, it is 
plausible that he related to Coleridge similarly.   
Brett and Jones refer to Coleridge‟s letter to his brother dated 10 March 1798 to show how close 
Coleridge and Wordsworth were in their thinking. In the letter, Coleridge describes his poetic purpose, 
which is, „to elevate the imagination & set the affections in right tune by the beauty of the inanimate 
impregnated, as with a living soul, by the presence of Life‟.113 In addition, Brett and Jones say of the 
following passage (quoted earlier), 
I love fields & woods & mounta[ins] with almost a visionary fondness—and because I have 
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found benevolence & quietness growing within me as that fondness [has] increased, therefore I 
should wish to be the means of implanting it in others.
114
 
 
that it reads „like a commentary upon, and, in places, is almost a paraphrase of Tintern Abbey‟.115 
Signs of another possible Coleridgean influence can also be gleaned from a letter Coleridge wrote to 
Thomas Poole on 19 January 1801 saying that promotional copies of Lyrical Ballads had been sent with 
covering letters to various dignitaries; adding that he had dictated all of them except for one addressed to 
Charles James Fox—which Wordsworth had written.116  Enclosed with this letter to Poole was a copy of a 
letter to William Wilberforce composed by Coleridge as if he (Coleridge) were Wordsworth and signed in 
his (Wordsworth‟s) name. In it Coleridge says: 
When the material forms or intellectual ideas which should be employed to represent the 
internal state of feeling, are made to claim attention for their own sake, then commences [in 
literature] bombast and vicious refinements, an aversion to the common conversational 
language of our Countrymen.
117
 
 
The letter then goes on essentially to rehearse the arguments set out in the Preface concerning poetic 
diction. What is striking is the letter‟s similarity in tone and register to the Preface.118 
When we look at Coleridge‟s ideas concerning “philosophical language” and its importance to poetic 
composition we can see in even sharper relief his influence upon Wordsworth‟s aesthetic. Wylie suggests 
that Coleridge‟s interest in the relationship of nature and language may have its origin in Hartley‟s theory of 
the origins of language.
119
 Hartley thought that since speech was a necessary requirement for Adam and Eve 
to name the animals in Eden, God granted it them and from it language developed.
120
  Initially, this 
language was monosyllabic and its usage was limited to referring to „visible Things‟.121  After the Fall, 
Hartley supposes that Adam and Eve „extended their Language to new Objects and Ideas‟ and principally to 
those associated with pain.
122
  For this the invention of new words was required.
123
  Eventually, this 
language became corrupted as humans, according to Hartley, acquired names for evil things, which led to a 
greater propagation of self-interest. In response to this, God disrupted the construction of the Tower of 
Babel and in doing caused the confusion of tongues in order to halt the progress of further corruption to this 
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language and thereby preventing its dominance over mankind by it being the cause of false perceptions.
124
  
These false perceptions were the result of the corrupted language having acquired the means to become 
ambiguous—a major departure from Adam‟s original language, which was unequivocal.125  By the 
eighteenth century, the expansion of knowledge had resulted, as Hartley saw it, in humanity having moved 
closer to an original state of pure knowledge. This being the case, it was necessary to go back to the original 
language of Adam, integrating the languages of the world in the process, to reinstate the purity of the 
original language.
126
  This language would be a “philosophical one” „without any Deficiency, Superfluity, 
or Equivocation‟.127  McKusick notes that this “Adamic” language is analogous to Plato‟s idea that an 
object‟s name represents the object‟s essence.128  The idea that objects had essences was familiar to 
Coleridge from his reading of Plato‟s Cratylus.129 The dialogue between Hermogenes and Cratylus 
demonstrates the tension between words being envisioned as expressing the „inner nature of the things they 
designate‟ and their being merely arbitrary signs.130  In this dialogue the character of Cratylus, 
represents the extreme naturalist position, according to which all names bear an intimate, 
though perhaps mystically obscure, connection with the things they designate.
131
 
 
Coleridge and Wordsworth would most probably agree with this position.  
 
A further aspect of Hartley‟s theory that bears a relevance to Coleridge is that Hartley thought it possible 
that mental images if sufficiently vivid could be erroneously taken for sense impressions if the clarity was 
of a significant concentration.
132
 Coleridge was undoubtedly taken by this possibility for he writes: 
Ideas may become vivid & distinct, & the feelings accompanying them as vivid, as original 
Impressions—and this may finally make a man independent of his Senses. —one use of 
poetry.
133
 
 
In addition, in Biographia Literaria he says that one of the two cardinal points of poetry is „a faithful 
adherence to the truth of nature‟.134  Moreover, driving home the point, Wylie says: 
Poetry might create such powerful images inside the mind of the reader that ideas could replace 
sense impressions completely. Hence people would be led away from the false perceptions of 
nature [due to the Fall] to the true picture created by the poet‟s words.135 
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Despite the underlying idealism intrinsic to this position, Coleridge is not gainsaying empiricism merely 
because it engages with phenomena and ipso facto is invalid, but rather because it is insufficient as a means 
to gaining a true description of reality.
136
  Although this reality is beyond perception, and is a more perfect 
and purer facsimile of the one we are aware of, Coleridge nevertheless conceives it as having some visual 
and auditory frames of reference. Although Hartley was a significant influence on Coleridge, it was 
Berkeley‟s conception of reality as being a perception „originating in the divine mind or as, in effect, the 
language of God‟ that motivated Coleridge into finding ways to best understand this language via poetry, 
and in doing so to forge a closer bond with God.
137
  By turning the objects of nature into symbols „designed 
to impress man‟s mind with the presence of God‟, Coleridge saw himself   as doing something theologically 
and devotionally important.
138
  In this way, he hoped to find a unity and meaningfulness in what otherwise 
would be a chaotic and disconnected reality.
139
 
Wordsworth was undoubtedly influenced by this poetic potential but for different reasons. Rather than 
finding value in its “mystical” promise of re-establishing the true perception of Adam before The Fall, he 
sought to apply it to concerns that were more practical. He was still trying to come to terms with his 
disappointment and emotional shock over the failure of the French Revolution to deliver its promises. Such 
was his distress that only could its sublimation through empathy with the natural world bring him 
therapeutic relief. Poetry provided him with a legitimate reason to withdraw more and more into the natural 
world. Consequently, he felt it only natural to take parts of Hartley‟s theory and incorporate them into his 
long-established beliefs concerning the therapeutic value of the natural world.  
Allied closely to the restorative qualities of nature are its educative qualities. From an early age, as The 
Prelude demonstrates, Wordsworth projected profound meaning onto the natural world. He saw in it not 
arbitrariness and chaos but a subtle order governed by benign if austere forces. These powers were 
discerned more obviously during times of positive and negative emotional excitement. It was during such 
times that the natural world was likely to reveal itself to the observer: sometimes as a teacher and 
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sometimes as a judge—we see this repeatedly in Wordsworth‟s work. Consequently, he sought to articulate 
these polarities through the medium of a poetic language that was able to instruct and guide humanity 
towards a more morally conscientious conduct.  
For this important instructional process to be effective Wordsworth had to prioritise the  “message” of 
the poem over the more irrelevant (as he saw it) individual semantic elements that comprise it; and the 
message in Wordsworth‟s case was of a philosophical nature. This philosophical emphasis is recognised by 
Keith G. Thomas in Wordsworth and Philosophy, where he cites Coleridge concerning his and 
Wordsworth‟s programme with reference to Coleridge‟s summary of the philosophical approach planned 
for Wordsworth‟s Recluse: 
Then the plan laid out, and I believe, partly suggested by me, was that Wordsworth should 
assume the station of a man in mental repose, one whose principles were made up, and so 
prepared to deliver upon authority a system of philosophy. He was to treat man as man—a 
subject of eye, ear, touch, and taste, in contact with external nature, […].140 
 
Wordsworth reiterates this to some extent in his preface to The Excursion where he mentions his early,  
determination to compose a philosophical poem, containing views of Man, Nature, and Society; 
[...] as having for its principal subject the sensations and opinions of a poet living in 
retirement.
141
 
 
As Thomas says, Wordsworth regards the subjective experiences of the poet as sufficient justification for 
the poem‟s philosophical discourse.142  And that, 
any philosophical statement will derive its authority from this speaker and his experience, 
conditioned as they will be by the contingencies of time and place and by the varying motions 
of the senses, the mind and external nature.
143
 
 
As an example of this procedure in operation, Robert Rehder in Wordsworth and the Beginnings of Modern 
Poetry, quotes the following passage:  
Our animal appetites and daily wants, 
Are these obstructions insurmountable? 
If not, then others vanish into air. 
“Inspects the basis of the social pile: 
Enquire,” said I, “how much of mental power 
And genuine virtue they possess who live 
 
 
 
 
98 
By bodily toil, labour exceeding far 
Their due proportion, under all the weight 
Of that injustice which upon ourselves 
Ourselves entail.” Such estimate to frame 
I chiefly looked (what need to look beyond?) 
Among the natural bodes of men, 
Fields with their rural works; recalled to mind 
My earliest notices; with these compared 
The observations made in later youth, 
And to that day continued.
144
 
 
                                                                                (1850, XIII, 91-106) 
 
Rehder observes that in this passage Wordsworth describes his feelings and then determines philosophical 
conclusions from them.
145
  These conclusions are never fully stated but are manifested as a set of nebulous 
assumptions that are not fully formed methodically, nevertheless they,  
find their way into his poetry when he needs to follow his feelings to something that he can 
believe in as a conclusion. Often these conclusions are rather perfunctory religious statements 
[...]. The very abstract passages are never far away from the description of a definite moment or 
a particular feeling; they are the result of Wordsworth‟s capacity to enter into reality in very 
specific terms.
146
 
 
Quoting from The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, Alan Bewell, in Wordsworth   and the 
Enlightenment: Nature, Man and Society in the Experimental Poetry, notes that for Wordsworth language 
is of prime importance in the formation of morality.
147
  However, by language he means that which is 
precise and does not consist of „lifeless words & abstract propositions‟, which are „impotent over our 
habits‟.148  The cause of these „lifeless words‟ is the attempt by moral philosophers to overvalue the faculty 
of reason.
149
 In doing so they „appeal to us‟ in a language devoid of images.150  Imageless language is 
unable to influence, what Wordsworth calls, „habitual feelings‟.151  It fails to be what he defines as poetry in 
the 1850 Preface: „truth ... general and operative‟.152  Bewell says: 
Furthermore, because moral philosophical texts „contain no picture of human life‟, because 
„they describe nothing‟, they cannot inform „us how men placed in such or such a situation will 
necessarily act ... thence enabling us to apply ourselves to the means of turning them into a 
more beneficial course‟.153 
 
Paul Hamilton in Coleridge’s Poetics echoes Bewell with regard to the passage Bewell is referring to: 
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Wordsworth‟s condemnation of certain kinds of philosophy on the grounds of its failure as 
description lends philosophical weight to the task he then saw himself as performing in Lyrical 
Ballads. Poetry remedies a deficient philosophy of action by showing how human actions, 
whose motives are never purely rational, are significant.
154
  
 
Wordsworth‟s efforts are, as Hamilton says, „devoted to making human actions intelligible by showing how 
they can speak to us, how they can be construed as the language of human “interest”‟.155  It would seem, 
then, that Wordsworth‟s aims for poetry were exclusively political, educational, social and moral.156  
Indeed, Wordsworth makes this explicit in an 1808 letter to George Beaumont where he says, „Every great 
Poet is a Teacher: I wish either to be considered as a Teacher, or as nothing‟.157  Bewell adds in reference to 
The Recluse: 
When one recognises that Wordsworth‟s poems are more than vaguely philosophical, that they 
had their genesis in his ongoing critical engagement with Enlightenment moral philosophy, one 
can begin to appreciate that the coherence of The Recluse did not lie in its formal structure, but 
instead in the experimental discourse that shaped individual poems. This suggests that 
Wordsworth would have felt it necessary to take up, in individual poems or series of poems, the 
topics and speculative concerns that normally fell within moral philosophy‟s purview.158 
 
Therefore, by appropriating the various concerns of moral philosophy and couching them in a discourse 
heavily contingent upon the use of images (i.e. descriptions) Wordsworth was attempting to achieve 
through poetry what he felt these philosophies were failing to do as enquiries. It would seem, then, that for 
Wordsworth the major motivation for his poetic output is not so much for it to entertain or be artistic 
expression but for it to function didactically as social education. This didactic intent can be seen in the 
following lines from The Prelude: 
Prophets of Nature, we to them will speak 
A lasting inspiration, sanctified 
By reason, blest by faith: what we have loved, 
Others will love, and we will teach them how 
159
 
 
                                                             (1850, XIV, 444-47)  
 
As Geoffrey Hartman notes in The Unremarkable Wordsworth: 
The overt interpreter is rarely absent from Wordsworth‟s poems: a purely lyrical  or descriptive 
moment is invariably followed by self-conscious explication. In „The Old Cumberland Beggar‟, 
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after passages of description subtly colored by his feelings, Wordsworth turns to the statesmen 
of the world in a sudden moralizing apostrophe longer than these passages.
160
 
 
Related to this is the observation that Nicholas Roe makes in The Politics of Nature that,  
Wordsworth‟s frustrated history as radical journalist and French revolutionary was bound-up 
with his later career as a poet. […] As a poet, one of Wordsworth‟s priorities was an 
imaginative restitution for complicity in revolutionary defeat.
161
  
 
Consequently, according to Roe, Wordsworth,  
 
manipulated his own past, therefore, to create himself as a poet and prophet: a figure of public 
authority who, in The Recluse, would address the great revolutionary themes of the day: 
„Nature, Man and Society‟.162 
 
T. S. Eliot comes to similar conclusions in his lecture „Wordsworth and Coleridge‟: 
Wordsworth‟s revolutionary faith was more vital to him than it was to Coleridge. You cannot 
say that it inspired his revolution in poetry but it cannot be disentangled from the motives of his 
poetry.
163
  
 
This goes a considerable way in explaining why his poetry is prose-like. To fulfil what he considers his 
educational and prophetic responsibility he has to express his moral and social agenda in a language that is 
devoid of the possibility of misinterpretation and ambiguity by educated readers,
164
 otherwise the 
“importance” of his message would be in danger of being misconstrued by those he is attempting to educate 
and reform. This is something that is recognised by Eliot, who sees a measure of value in it: 
When you find Wordsworth as the seer and prophet whose function it is to instruct and edify 
through pleasure, […] you may begin to think that there is something in it, at least as for some 
kinds of poetry.
165
 
 
In this chapter, I have not argued that Wordsworth‟s empiricism was an unmediated consequence of 
Coleridge‟s influence, or that he (in any organised sense) specifically favoured aspects of Coleridge‟s ideas 
that he understood to be empirical. However, the chapter does demonstrate the indirect influences that 
Coleridge‟s ideas had on Wordsworth. We have seen how Coleridge was certainly an empiricist in the 1790s 
and how his poetry and various statements reflected this. We saw how (like Wordsworth) he used poetry as 
primarily a means for communicating his philosophical ideas rather than for purely artistic purposes. We also 
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saw how Wordsworth‟s “emotion recollected in tranquility” was most probably the result of Coleridge‟s 
influence. We looked at how Coleridge influenced Wordsworth‟s preface to Lyrical Ballads (and openly 
claimed as much). We examined how Wordsworth‟s understanding of the Hartleian conception of “a 
philosophic language” was also most probably due to Coleridge‟s influence. Finally, we learned that 
Wordsworth‟s main motivating force was to use poetry as an educational tool for a better moral life. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
The Reading of Wordsworth in the Twentieth Century 
 
 
The reading of Wordsworth in the twentieth century has to be understood in terms of the reaction to 
Romanticism in that century. While there is no consistent response to either, the debate to some extent 
echoes the uncertainty to be found within the Romantic period between empiricism and transcendentalism. 
In this chapter, I would like to take a thematic rather than  a strictly chronological overview of the various 
readings of Wordsworth in the twentieth century in order to trace the development of  a “Wordsworthian 
empiricism” that had become dominant by the end of that century.1  This thematic approach will make it 
necessary to reduce the emphasis normally placed on the literary and historical account of the development 
of  these ideas.  In doing so, I will illustrate how criticism of  Wordsworth in the twentieth century (even 
that which viewed him principally in transcendentalist terms) tended to foreground his empiricism resulting 
(intentionally or otherwise) in it being widely regarded as the best model for poetic composition. As I have 
said, the reading of  Wordsworth in the twentieth century is best understood in terms of the wider critical 
reaction to Romanticism. This reaction has some bearing upon what John Casey in his The Language of 
Criticism sees as „certain presuppositions about “facts” and “emotions” which are very deeply ingrained in 
the empiricist tradition and which have generally dominated critical theory since Wordsworth‟.2 
 Both the transcendentalist and empiricist strains in Wordsworth, at one time or another, have been 
foregrounded. Wordsworth‟s poetical modus operandi was often to observe closely the objects of the 
natural world, reflect upon the thoughts, emotions and memories that these objects evoked in him, and then 
to describe both the objects and the resultant effects upon him.
3
 Where this modus operandi was successful, 
the resultant verse can be seen to be heavily descriptive—I will refer to this aspect as the empiricist strain. 
Where it was not successful, given the natural ambiguities inherent in language, the poetry evinces 
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ambiguities and vagueness—I will refer to this as the transcendentalist strain.4 In this chapter, I will show 
how it is Wordsworth‟s empiricist strain that was valued by twentieth-century critics over the 
transcendentalist strain and how this critical favour consequently shaped twentieth-century poetry to the 
extent that we can say it is “Wordsworthian”.  
When we come to examine the critical reaction to the Romantics in the wake of the acceptance of 
Modernism in the early twentieth century, we find that the majority of criticism is hostile to Wordsworth 
and many other romantic poets. F. R. Leavis, for instance, criticised Shelley‟s „Ode to the West Wind‟ for 
what he saw as its confused imagery due to Shelley‟s „weak grasp upon the actual‟.5 Edward Larrissy lists 
the romantic qualities deprecated by Modernists as being „discursiveness, the emphasis on personality, the 
use of the language of the emotions and the aesthetic ideal of organic form‟.6 In their place, Modernists 
privileged „impersonality, directness of presentation and [...] the analogy of mechanical or sculptural form, 
as opposed to organic form‟.7 Moreover, T. S. Eliot's mentor, Irving Babbitt, saw Romanticism‟s 
foregrounding of the spontaneous and the individualistic, coupled with its philosophical thought, as being 
negatively influential upon modern democratic society.  In Rousseau and Romanticism, he says that these 
romantic principles lead „to an anarchistic individualism that tends in turn to destroy civilisation‟.8 
George Bornstein in his Introduction to Romantic and Modern: Revaluations of Literary Tradition 
explains the Modernist reaction to Romanticism thus: 
Modernist criticism often conflated strong, early Romanticism with its later and weaker 
derivatives. Early twentieth-century writers understandably attacked the debased Romanticism 
around them and then read their objections to its tone, conventions, and world view back onto 
the high Romantics.
9
  
 
The result of this was to create a false perception among Modernist writers and critics that there was a 
permanent fracture between Romanticism and Modernism. In reality, however, there was no such breach. 
Rather, there was a continuation of romantic descriptiveness through Symbolist poetry and into Modernist 
poetry. This has been noted by Geoffrey Thurley who says, „The emergence of the descriptive poem is in 
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itself an important event in the history of Western literature. It led directly to the Romantic and thence, to 
the Symbolist poem‟.10  From Symbolist poetry, Imagism eventually emerged—Imagism being only a 
modification of Symbolism.
11
 Consequently, Modernism inevitably shared with Romanticism the tenet that 
saw value in descriptions of the physical world.   
Ezra Pound‟s attack on the Romantics was not because he disagreed with their empirical values but 
because they typified for him establishment poetry. Hugh Witemeyer expresses this view in his essay 
„Walter Savage Landor and Ezra Pound‟: 
Pound reacted specifically to a late Victorian reading of the Romantics which enshrined 
Wordsworth and Keats with Milton and Tennyson in a pantheon of stylistic and social 
respectability. This „cult of the innocuous‟ impeded the acceptance of the modern poetry which 
Pound‟s circle was creating.12 
 
Witemeyer further states: 
Pound‟s strategy was to offer a deliberately subversive reading of literary history intended to 
shock received opinion. […] If Wordsworth, Keats, and Tennyson had been made respectable 
establishment figures whose influence was grown oppressive, then they had to be undermined 
and blasted to make way for the new poetry.
13
 
 
Of  Pound‟s omission of any reference to Wordsworth, Coleridge and Blake in his The ABC of Reading 
while giving space to Browning, Crabbe, Landor and Beddoes, Witemeyer says: 
This emphasis is no mere Browningesque obsession with scriptores ignoti, the unknown 
secondary artists of the period. It is a revolutionary effort to establish a heritage for a literary 
counter-culture.
14
  
 
That Witemeyer‟s analysis is reasonable is supported by Pound‟s respect for Wordsworth‟s poetic 
empiricism. This is mentioned by Herbert N. Schneidau who says that Pound, despite his,  
dismissal of Wordsworth as a „silly old sheep‟ still grudgingly ascribed to him  „a genius, an 
unquestionable genius, for imagisme, for presentation of natural detail‟.15  
 
Moreover, that Pound not only shared Wordsworth‟s fascination with objects but also his bias towards 
prose as superior to poetic artifice is illustrated in the following:  „In a curious extension of their parallel 
attacks on „poetic diction‟, each [he and Wordsworth] offered prose as a model for good poetry‟.16  
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Schneidau then quotes the following lines from Wordsworth‟s 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads: 
There neither is, nor can be, any essential difference between the language of prose and 
metrical composition  […] some of the most interesting parts of the best poems will be found 
to be strictly the language of prose when prose is well written.
17
 
 
Then comments, „With this we may compare Pound‟s belief in the „prose tradition in verse‟, his dictum that 
poetry must be „as well written as prose‟, and so on‟.18  Indeed, Pound‟s comment in a letter dated 4 
February 1913 to Alice Corbin Henderson (the Associate Editor of Poetry) on one of her poems is, „Your 
most obvious superficial fault is that you invert, and in various ways disturb the natural prose order of the 
words‟.19  Adding, „Every alteration of this sort, that is not made for definite and worthy reason weakens 
the impact‟.20   Moreover, to William Carlos Williams on the 19 December 1913 with regard to Williams‟s 
 poem „La Flor‟ he warns, „Your syntax still strays occasionally from the simple order of natural speech‟.21  
In a Preface (dated 1914) for Lionel Johnson‟s Poetical Works Pound writes: 
Now Lionel Johnson cannot be shown to be in accord with our present doctrines and ambitions. 
His language is a bookish dialect, or rather it is not a dialect, it is a curial speech, and our aim is 
natural speech, the language as spoken. We desire the words of poetry to follow the natural 
order. We would write nothing that we might not say actually in life—under emotion.22 
 
This advocacy of a style stripped of artifice and geared towards a communicative functionality is, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, a penchant of Wordsworth‟s also. Moreover, in his essay „A Retrospect‟, 
Pound echoes Wordsworth further, advising aspiring poets to: 
Use no superfluous word, no adjective which does not reveal something. Don‟t use such 
expressions as “dim lands of peace”. It dulls the image. It mixes an abstraction with the 
concrete. It comes from the writer‟s not realising that the natural object is always the adequate 
symbol.
23
 
 
Even W. B. Yeats saw some value in this approach when he said that Pound „helps me to get back to the 
definite and concrete, away from modern abstractions‟.24  
In „How to Read‟ Pound laments the advent of „the loose use of words‟ 25 that appeared during the 
Renaissance and which replaced what he saw as the more precise language of the medieval period: 
What the renaissance gained in direct examination of natural phenomena, it in part lost in 
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losing the feel and desire for exact descriptive terms. I mean that the medieval mind had little 
but words to deal with, and it was more careful in its definitions and verbiage. It did not define 
a gun in terms that would just as well define an explosion, nor explosions in terms that would 
define triggers.
26
 
 
Furthermore, in the same essay, he writes:  
One “moves” the reader only by clarity. In depicting the motions of the “human heart” the 
durability of the writing depends on the exactitude. […] It is as important for the purpose of 
thought to keep language efficient as it is in surgery to keep tetanus bacilli out of one‟s 
bandages.
27
  
 
On Rimbaud he says, „In Rimbaud the image stands clean, unencumbered by non-functioning 
words‟.28  In The A B C of Reading, he writes: „Good writers are those who keep the language 
efficient. That is to say, keep it accurate, keep it clear‟.29  Also, in the same book he praises Homer‟s 
descriptive verity: 
The sheer literary qualities in Homer are such that a physician has written a book to prove that 
Homer must have been an army doctor. (When he describes certain blows and their effect, the 
wounds are said to be accurate, and the descriptions fit for coroner‟s inquest.)30 
 
Additionally, he says that Catullus is in some ways better than Sappho is „for his economy of words‟.31  
Whilst admitting Ovid‟s unevenness as a writer Pound, nevertheless, recognises  that: „He is clear. His 
verse is as lucid as prose‟.32  In „A Retrospect‟, the first two of Pound‟s three principles of poetry are: 
1. Direct treatment of the “thing” whether subjective of objective.  
2. To use absolutely no word that does not contribute to the presentation.33 
 
These principles are echoed in his letters such as the one to publisher Harriet Monroe in October 1912: 
This is the sort of American stuff that I can show here and in Paris without its being ridiculed. 
Objective—no slither; direct—no excessive use of adjectives, no metaphors that won‟t permit 
examination.
34
 
 
In addition to his three principles of poetry in „A Retrospect‟ are his three categories of poetry in „How to 
Read‟. The first he calls Melopeia where the words are charged with a musical property „over and above 
their plain meaning‟.35  The second is Phanopeia, which corresponds to the commonsense notion we have 
of imagination: „a casting of images upon visual imagination‟.36  The third is Logopeia that „employs words 
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not only for their direct meaning‟ but also for „ironical play‟.37 The first category relies upon sound 
(internal/external), the second on vision (internal), and the third on semantics. All three are essential to 
poetry. Yet, Pound seems to have reservations about the last when he calls it a „most tricky and 
undependable mode‟.38  This is presumably because its possibilities for „ironical play‟ allow for a less 
precise hermeneutic. 
However, it was not always this way with Pound, as the following passage from Paul Smith‟s Pound 
Revised makes clear:  
What I think principally emanates from late-nineteenth-century verse, and what Pound‟s early 
work reduplicates, is precisely a concern for the artifice of poetic production and an ensuing 
respect for the autonomy of the language of poetry: both of these elements enter Pound‟s 
writing in a much more solid and formative manner than do any of the superficial elements that 
the critics point to. Whereas these early stylistic and thematic influences have most often been 
extirpated (or considerably refined) by the time of the Cantos, what does remain as an upshot 
for Pound‟s entire creative output is the question of the condition and status of autonomous 
poetic language.
39
 
 
And he cites Pound‟s „Cino‟ as „a poem overtly concerned with the terms of its own production‟ 40 saying 
that the poem‟s language, „is allowed to be aware of itself and of its many layers and registers within the 
poem‟s genesis—aware, indeed, of its whole role in the production of meanings‟.41  Smith points out that 
Swinburne‟s „refusal to allow writing to be subservient to the expression of poetic reflection and 
impression‟ was influential on early Pound 42: 
What the young Pound learned from him, then, can be said to lie precisely in this trenchant 
attitude to the very materiality of writing, its activity.
43
  
 
Pound‟s lesson from Swinburne, then, far from being an overt thematic one, resides in the 
recognition of the materiality of language and its tendency to break the barriers of that view of 
poetry which wishes to see language as simply a vehicle.
44
 
 
The reflexive strain in his early writings lays great emphasis on the particular qualities of poetic 
language and poetic technique—on the materiality of language and general poetic procedures.45 
 
Smith‟s general contention is that by 1915 Pound suppressed his „recognition of the primacy of poetic 
materiality‟,46 preferring instead to redevelop „a notion of the master craftsman (with both words of the 
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phrase carrying their weight) in order to defuse the power of poetic materiality‟.47  Smith says: 
It is with the distinctions that this new category allows him that Pound begins to redefine poetry 
so that materiality will finally not distort substance—in other words, to build a stronger vehicle 
for whatever substance the poet might wish to communicate.
48
 
 
Smith explains this sea change in the following way: 
 
The early poems had obviously served as an arena for experimentation […]. But the fate of 
most of this early work was excision from the canon, on the grounds that such writing can say 
„nothing in particular‟. […] And so in his Imagist and Vorticist periods he embarks upon a 
programme designed to efface the power of the signifier and replace it with a controlled and 
mastered language—one which supposedly can come into unambiguous contact with the truth 
of the world.
49
 
 
In conclusion, Smith says: 
 
Pound‟s Imagism, then, relies on a belief that a certain technique in language will allow 
language to embody the world and become efficiently denotative, capable of reproducing an 
external origin quite simply. As David Simpson puts it, this involves a „realist‟ poetry which 
„stands in an authoritarian relationship to its readers. It demands reception, it does not invite or 
necessitate interpretation‟.50 
 
It would appear, then, according to Smith, that Pound‟s participation in “the revolution of the word” was 
motivated by a desire for his poetry to be accepted within the traditional literary canon of the day. 
Consequently, he abandoned his earlier mode of writing in favour of that which he recognised as more 
acceptable to this literary establishment. Any such writing, of course, would have to deny the materiality of 
language, preferring instead to focus on language‟s denotative aspect—an aspect that, as Simpson infers, 
results in a poetics grounded in an autocratic denial of hermeneutic plurality.  
Perhaps Pound‟s rejection of poetic artifice was also due to his reading of Ernest Fenollosa‟s Essay on 
the Chinese Written Character.
51
  In The A B C of Reading, Pound  says that Fenollosa was attempting to 
„explain the Chinese ideograph [ideogram] as a means of transmission and registration of thought‟.52  In 
doing so he, 
got to the root of the matter, to the root of the difference between what is valid in Chinese 
thinking and invalid or misleading in a great deal of European thinking and language.
53
 
 
Pound expresses European thinking as follows: 
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In Europe, if you ask a man to define anything, his definition always moves away from the 
simple things that he knows perfectly well, it recedes into an unknown region, that is a region 
of remoter and progressively remoter abstraction.
54
 
 
In contrast to this,  
 
Fenollosa emphasises the method of science, „which is the method of poetry‟, as distinct from 
that of „philosophic discussion‟, and is the way the Chinese go about it in their ideograph or 
abbreviated picture writing.
55
  
 
The Chinese ideograph unlike the Egyptian method of using „abbreviated pictures to represent sounds‟ 56 
uses, 
abbreviated pictures AS pictures, that is to say, Chinese ideogram does not try to be the picture 
of a sound, or to be a written sign recalling a sound, but it is still the picture of a thing; of a 
thing in a given position or relation, or of a combination of things. It means the thing or the 
action or the situation, or quality germane to the several things that it pictures.
57
 
 
In this way Fenollosa, 
 
was telling how and why a language written in this way simply HAD TO STAY POETIC; 
simply couldn‟t help being and staying poetic in a way that a column of English type might 
very well not stay poetic.
58
 
 
An obvious objection to Fenollosa‟s theory is that it is truer of visual art than literature. Pound unwittingly 
hints at this when he writes: „This is nevertheless the RIGHT WAY to study poetry, or literature, or 
painting. It is in fact the way the more intelligent members of the general public DO study painting‟.59  
However, another objection can be found. G. C. Jaggs draws our attention to Smith‟s main criticism of 
Pound that he quotes from the same book by Smith to which I refer above: 
Language for [Pound] has the innate ability to close the gap between its signifier and its 
signified and so refer directly to the referent … the fundamental Poundian metaphor … 
assumes that language is co-extensive, analogous and co-operative with the natural world. This 
… is thereby reductive of language and/or the natural world to a tautology: the signifier is 
limited, chained not to another signifier but to the functional expression of the natural world.
60
 
 
Pound‟s erstwhile colleague T. E. Hulme, as well as seeing the twentieth century as spawning a new 
classical movement, also elevated the position of the object via the process of accurate visual description: 
albeit without the excesses to which Pound was prone.
61
  In his essay „Romanticism and Classicism‟, 
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Hulme criticizes romantic poets for not considering that „accurate description is a legitimate object of 
verse‟.62  In addition, he regards the language of poetry as different to that of prose in that poetic language 
is, 
a visual concrete one. [. . .] It always endeavours to arrest you, and to make you continuously 
see a physical thing, to prevent you gliding through an abstract process.
63
   
 
Furthermore he says, „The new verse resembles sculpture rather than music; it appeals to the eye rather than 
the ear‟; 64 and in poetry „each word must be an image seen, not a counter‟ (Hulme‟s emphases).65  The new 
poetry „depends for its effect […] on arresting the attention, so much so that the succession of visual images 
should exhaust one‟.66 
In The True Voice of Feeling, Herbert Read says that to Hulme „the poetic activity was in the nature of a 
physical or physiological act‟. Read then quotes him regarding poetic composition:  
Think of sitting at that window in Chelsea and seeing the chimneys and the lights in the dusk. 
And then imagine that by contemplation this will transfer itself bodily on to paper.
67
 
 
Read then summarises Hulme‟s main position: 
What is there first, said Hulme, is the world in its concreteness, evident to the senses: the 
physical phenomena. The poet seizes these, finds their verbal equivalence, and the rest—
beauty, significance, metaphysical reverberations—is there as an intrinsic grace.68 
 
Read notes Michael Roberts‟s observation that Hulme‟s ideas were influenced by Nicolas Cusanus. Read 
quotes Roberts as saying:  
It is easy to see how much Hulme derived from Cusanus, either directly or through Scheler. 
Hulme‟s […] conception of fancy (phantasia) as a faculty  that compares and equates sense 
impressions, […] are found in Cusanus.69 
 
Furthermore, in Romantic Image, Frank Kermode says that for Hulme, 
poetry is bad when it directs the attention away from the physical uniqueness and oneness of 
the image. […] Whether the poem is good or not depends upon the accuracy of the 
representation, and upon that alone.
70
 
 
Kermode says that Hulme‟s theory, 
makes a show of being in opposition to Romantic imprecision […] but in fact  it is 
fundamentally a new statement of the old defence of poetry against positivism […]. It is a 
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revised form of the old proclamation that poetry has a special access to truth.
71
 
 
Read also noted the continuance of Hulme‟s ideas with those of the Romantics especially with regard to 
Coleridge. Of Hulme‟s statement that „the form of the poem is shaped by the intention‟, Read says that this 
„shows the continuity or community of thought in Hulme and Coleridge‟.72  
Shortly, I will be looking at the empiricist tendencies in the poetry of Edward Thomas but before doing 
so, I would like to briefly discuss Georgian poetry in light of what has been said so far. That many of the 
Wordsworthian poetic tenets are present in Georgian poetry is apparent from contemporary reviews of the 
debut anthology of Georgian poetry. In Georgian Poetry 1911-1912, R. Ellis Roberts says of the poets 
included in this anthology that „they all are agreed in this one supreme point, an intense interest in external 
things, an intense feeling for their reality and importance‟.73  A. C. Henson says of the poets that they are 
„watching life, feeling, seeing, recording‟.74  Edmund Gosse notes appropriately: 
There seems to be traceable in most of these poets a conviction, or a vague belief, that Nature 
as seen in the external world and the mind of Man as cultivated within the human individual 
are parallel to an extent which may be partly discerned by our own senses, so far as these are 
quickened by imagination and sympathy.
75
  
 
Furthermore, one anonymous reviewer (in the course of his review of the anthology) defines poetry in terms 
that echo “the egotistical sublime”, while also using the familiar vocabulary of empiricist writing: 
„incidents‟ „objects‟, „integrity‟ and „sincerity‟: 
A state of the poet‟s own mind is always the real subject of a poem; incidents and objects are 
only the terms in which it is expressed, and the completeness with which we enter into the 
mind of another largely depends on our confidence in the integrity of his vision and the 
sincerity of his words.
76
 
 
The same reviewer notes with approval the descriptiveness evident in the poems of T. Sturge Moore which 
appear in the anthology: 
He writes for artists, and they are few; but anyone with a literary sense, though he may be 
jarred occasionally by what seems an infelicitous word, can feel the distinction of his 
descriptive passages.
77
 
 
In addition, he applauds Lascelles Abercrombie for the „hurrying vigour of his descriptions‟.78  He rounds 
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off his review with the following on Wilfrid Wilson Gibson: 
„The Hare‟ and „Devil‟s Edge‟ are fine poems. He combines perfectly felicitous descriptions of 
Nature, never strained, observed by an eye which loves things as they are, with an intensity of 
mood, which raises these poems to the level of admirable poetry.
79
 
 
From these reviews, we can see that Georgian poetry possesses much continuity with Wordsworthian 
poetics. Moreover, according to C. K. Stead Georgian poetry can be seen as paving the way for Modernism. 
In an attack on David Daiches, Stead writes: 
Mr Daiches, like so many critics of the past twenty years, has seen the Georgians through 
spectacles provided for him by the later, more vigorous movement led by Pound and Eliot. The 
suggestion is that the Georgians set themselves against the natural development of modern 
poetry: in fact they were its precursors.
80
 
 
This is echoed to some extent by John Wain who sees aspects of Georgian poetry as potentially  “modern”: 
I believe that if the First World War had not happened the new idiom in English poetry would 
have been a development of Georgianism. The seeds were there: the honesty, the dislike of 
cant, the „selection from the real language of men‟, the dissatisfaction with a narrow tradition 
of poetry laid down by the literary Establishment and enforced by teachers and anthologists.
81
 
 
It is interesting to note here that the requirements for a modern poetry are almost exactly those that are 
required to write Wordsworthian poetry. Both statements by Stead and Wain, in their own way, imply a 
Georgian continuity with both Wordsworth and Modernism. As I demonstrated earlier in this chapter, this 
continuity is founded on a Wordsworthian poetic. That both Georgian and Modernist principles can be such 
happy bedfellows suggests that any perceived significant differences between them are only apparent.  
Further support for the continuance of the empiricist strain in Modernist practices can be found in 
Andrew Motion‟s The Poetry of Edward Thomas where he views Thomas‟s poetry as foreshadowing in a 
more discreet manner innovations made more explicit in Modernist works.
82
  Motion sees Thomas as 
writing, „slightly to the left of centre—drawing much from the Georgians but also anticipating the 
Modernists in several important respects‟.83  He argues that, „the Imagists‟ juxtaposition of miniature 
fragments, and the Modernists‟ generous use of collage and montage, both find their discreet counterpart in 
his [Thomas‟s] poems‟.84  Motion then goes into an analysis of Thomas‟s poem „The Long Small Room‟, 
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saying of this poem that it is, 
typical of the way in which he [Thomas] refers to a variety of objects with such quick clarity 
that orthodox pictorial and narrative techniques are replaced by what one of his earliest 
reviewers called „disconnected impressions‟.85 
 
Here is the poem: 
The long small room that showed willows in the west  
Narrowed up to the end the fireplace filled,  
Although not wide. I liked it. No one guessed  
What need or accident made them so build.  
 
Only the moon, the mouse, and the sparrow peeped  
In from the ivy round the casement thick.  
Of all they saw and heard there they shall keep  
The tale for the old ivy and older brick.  
 
When I look back I am like moon, sparrow, and mouse  
That witnessed what they could never understand  
Or alter or prevent in the dark house.  
One thing remains the same--this is my right hand  
 
Crawling crab-like over the clean white page,  
Resting awhile each morning on the pillow,  
Then once more starting to crawl on towards age.  
The hundred last leaves stream upon the willow.
86
 
 
Motion notes that „the sense of insecurity and isolation conveyed here [in this poem] in visual terms 
appears elsewhere [in other poems] in linguistic ones‟.87  That the visual is foregrounded in this poem is 
obvious but Motion fails to direct us to examples of the latter (the linguistic terms) in Thomas‟s other 
poems.  
Motion also acknowledges the retrograde tendencies inherent in Modernist poetry—tendencies that 
arguably have their genesis in Romantic roots. Quoting Amy Lowell‟s six attributes of Imagist poetry, listed 
in her anthology Some Imagist Poets, Motion writes: 
The fact that these aims are sufficiently indeterminate to describe not only Thomas but a wide 
variety of authors suggests that strict Imagists were not espousing entirely new principles, but 
isolating a number of old ones and thereby making them seem unfamiliar. Imagism, in other 
words, is a matter of selection and amplification. The same can also be said of full-fledged 
Modernism, which shares many of its strategies.
88
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Indeed, Thomas approved of Pound‟s Personae because it contained „no golden words shot with meaning; a 
temperate use of images and none far fetched‟.89  Thomas‟s praise for what can only be described as poetic 
conservatism confirms the unbroken link between the old and the “new” poetic, which Pound and Lowell 
failed to recognise. It is appropriate that such praise should come from a poet whose poetic aesthetic 
prompted him to write in defence of it: „A poem of the old kind has a simple fundamental meaning which 
every sane reader can agree upon; above and beyond this each one builds as he can or must‟.90  As we have 
seen, Pound would have agreed with such a view.  
Moreover, in his review of Robert Frost‟s collection North of Boston Thomas praises it for what are 
essentially Wordsworthian qualities: 
These poems are revolutionary because they lack the exaggeration of rhetoric, and even at first 
sight appear to lack the poetic intensity of which rhetoric is an imitation. Their language is free 
from the poetical words and forms that are the chief material of secondary poets.
91
 
 
Indeed, this review could have been written by Pound himself such is its conformity to Pound‟s poetic 
dicta. The continuity of the Wordsworthian legacy in Frost is so apparent that Thomas has little difficulty in 
recognising it: „Mr Frost has, in fact, gone back as Whitman and as Wordsworth went back, through the 
paraphernalia of poetry into poetry again‟.92  The Wordsworthian belief that prose is the proper form for 
poetry is implied in Thomas‟s criticism of Swinburne—which also has echoes of organicism:  
He was one of those … who seem to shape their thought in order that it may fit a certain 
favourite type of sentence instead of allowing the thought to govern the form of the sentence.
93
 
 
Thomas‟s penchant for poetry that is in actuality prose fiction is indicated by Philip Hobsbaum in Tradition 
and Experiment in English Poetry: 
Thomas will often act out his feelings in terms of story, scene and character, rather than state it 
in his own person. And this brings him close to the writings of the finest poetic realists—
Wordsworth, for example, whose best work is in narrative form, and is akin to the great 
nineteenth-century novelists, themselves the heirs of Shakespeare.
94
  
 
Motion‟s recognition of  Thomas‟s sensual handling of objects as being to some extent similar to that of  
the Imagists, and Thomas‟s Wordsworthian-like penchant for plain words (along with his approval of 
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Pound‟s Personae) demonstrates further the continuity between Wordsworthian poetic precepts and certain 
empirical strands within Modernism.  
Turning to Robert Frost, we see a poet whose poetic traditionalism was much admired by Pound and 
Lowell. As Philip L. Gerber in his biography of Frost notes, Lowell even sought to include him among the 
Imagists.
95
  Yet at the same time, 
The Georgian poets, with their emphasis upon the pastoral […] received Frost in a friendly 
embrace. He became relatively close to Wilfrid Wilson Gibson and Lascelles Abercrombie and 
to a number of younger poets, particularly Edward Thomas.
96
 
 
That Frost was able comfortably to straddle both the Modernist and Georgian camps further confirms the 
Modernist project‟s connection to the past, as does Frost‟s broad appeal across all borders. Of this 
Lawrence Thompson, in his essay „Robert Frost‟s Theory of Poetry‟, writes: 
Poets so diverse in method as Ransom, MacLeish, and Hillyer revealed their obligation to 
Frost‟s poetry in their early work. And in 1936 an English edition of his Selected Poems was 
issued with introductory essays by a curious foursome: W. H. Auden, C. Day Lewis, Paul 
Engle, and Edwin Muir.
97
  
 
Thompson explains the reason for this appeal was that his poetry „from the beginning, caught fresh vitality 
without recourse to the fads and limitations of modern experimental techniques‟.98 Furthermore, Frost is 
seen by Robert Faggen in his edition of  The Cambridge Companion to Robert Frost as being influential on 
later poets such as Richard Wilbur, Seamus Heaney and Paul Muldoon.
99
   Frost‟s stylistic connection to 
Wordsworth is indicated by Faggen‟s remark that Frost „cultivated an ingeniously sophisticated use of 
colloquial speech, giving new life to the ancient tradition of pastoral poetry‟.100  Moreover, in doing this, he 
„realized what Wordsworth had proposed, “to adopt the very language of men”‟.101 
Gerber also notes Frost‟s links to the Wordsworthian tradition, as manifested in his similarities with the 
neo-romantic American poet William Cullen Bryant. Like Wordsworth, Bryant, „looked upon nature with 
typical nineteenth-century romantic eyes, discerning in woods and sky an authentic healing power, a 
spiritual inspiration‟.102  In addition, both he and Frost used „natural things as a springboard for poetry‟.103  
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Gerber points out the similarities in the poetry of Frost and Bryant by placing examples of it side by side. 
He demonstrates that in „A Winter Piece‟ and „Birches‟ (by Bryant and Frost respectively) the treatment of 
the ice storm is remarkably similar. To do justice to Gerber‟s comparison I will cite both poetic examples in 
full. Firstly, the section from „A Winter Piece‟: 
                              Come when the rains 
Have glazed the snow, and clothed the trees with ice; 
While the slant sun of February pours 
Into the bowers a flood of light … 
Look! The massy trunks 
Are cased in pure crystal, each light spray, 
Nodding and tinkling in the breath of heaven, 
Is studded with its trembling water-drops, 
That stream with rainbow radiance as they move. 
But round the parent stem the long low boughs 
Bend, in a glittering ring, and arbors hide 
The grassy floor. Oh! you might deem the spot 
The spacious cavern of the virgin mine, 
Deep in the womb of earth—where the gems grow, 
And the diamonds put forth radiant rods and bud 
With amethyst and topaz … 
                                     But all shall pass away 
With the next sun. From numberless vast trunks, 
Loosened, the crashing ice shall make a sound 
Like the far roar of rivers, and the eve 
Shall close o‟er the brown woods as it was wont.104 
 
Now, from Frost‟s „Birches‟: 
 
                           Often you must have seen them 
Loaded with ice on a sunny winter morning 
After a rain. They click upon themselves 
As the breeze rises, and turn many-colored 
As the stir cracks and crazes their enamel. 
Soon the sun's warmth makes them shed crystal shells 
Shattering and avalanching on the snow-crust—  
Such heaps of broken glass to sweep away 
You'd think the inner dome of heaven had fallen. 
They are dragged to the withered bracken by the load, 
And they seem not to break; though once they are bowed 
So low for long, they never right themselves: 
You may see their trunks arching in the woods 
Years afterwards, trailing their leaves on the ground 
Like girls on hands and knees that throw their hair 
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Before them over their heads to dry in the sun.
105
 
 
Gerber notes in these passages the similarity of subject matter along with, „the similarity of treatment, with 
its mixture of realism and imagination, and the evocation in some instances of parallel imagery‟.106  He also 
notes Frost‟s similarities to Henry David Thoreau. Thoreau was a significant influence on Frost whose 
favourite book was Walden: 
Within a circle not so very much broader in diameter than Walden, Robert Frost discovered the 
world with which one typically associates him, most of what he created from its materials had 
been suggested by Thoreau long before: compare Thoreau‟s description of the thaw in „Spring‟ 
with Frosts „A hillside Thaw‟. The subjects are the same; so also are the author‟s approaches.107 
 
As is well known, Thoreau was a friend and “pupil” of Ralph Waldo Emerson who, like Wordsworth, was 
interested in the vitality of nature. Emerson, who had met Wordsworth, shared his opinion that poets were 
better able to understand and to commune with nature than the “ordinary” person could. As well as 
admiring Thoreau, Frost also admired Emerson. In „Frost as a New England Poet‟, Lawrence Buell points 
out that Frost was particularly fond of Emerson‟s poem „Monadnoc‟. The following passage from the poem, 
Buell says, would have especially appealed to him for its „Wordsworthian commendation of peasant speech 
as the vital force behind good poetry‟108: 
Now in sordid weeds they sleep, 
In dulness [sic] now their secret keep; 
Yet, will you learn our ancient speech, 
These the masters who can teach. 
Fourscore or a hundred words 
All their vocal muse affords; 
But they turn them in a fashion 
past clerks‟ or statesmen‟s art or passion. 
I can spare the college bell, 
And the learned lecture, well; 
Spare the clergy and libraries, 
Institutes and dictionaries, 
For that hardy English root 
Thrives here, unvalued, underfoot. 
Rude poets of the tavern hearth, 
Squandering your unquoted mirth, 
Which keeps the ground and never soars 
While Jake retorts and Reuben roars; 
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Scoff of yeoman strong and stark,  
Goes like bullet to its mark; 
While the solid curse and jeer 
Never balk the waiting ear.
109
 
 
As the Modernist experiment became the recognised literary orthodoxy, techniques of reading literature 
compatible to Modernist tenets developed. One such was the New Criticism, which was designed to analyse 
a poem in terms of its formal and intrinsic qualities (or “self-sufficiency”) as opposed to its biographical 
and historical context. Under such examination, much of Romantic poetry came to be seen as deficient. 
Perhaps in an effort to distance Wordsworth‟s poetry from such criticism, certain critics sought to 
emphasise his empiricist aspects over that of the transcendentalist. I. A. Richards (whose writings are 
regarded as having established the foundations of New Criticism) in Principles of Literary Criticism allows 
for a favourable evaluation of the empiricist strain in Wordsworth. His view on the nature of the “poetic 
experience” makes possible a defence for realist poetry. Richards  is critical of A. C. Bradley‟s view of the  
“poetic experience” as being „an end in itself‟ and „worth having on its own account‟.110 Richards sees this 
view as insisting upon „a severance between poetry and what, in opposition, may be called life‟.111 For 
Richards, poetry is primarily communicable: „It may be experienced by many different minds with only 
slight variations. That this should be possible is one of the conditions of its organization‟.112  Moreover, he 
warns that we must preserve poetry from contamination and from the „irruptions of personal 
particularities‟.113   
This view of poetry as unequivocal communication of experience, features predominantly in his ideas on 
what constitutes “bad art” (to use his term). He says that, „sometimes art is bad because communication is 
defective, the vehicle inoperative‟.114   To illustrate his point he cites a poem called „The Pool‟: 
Are you alive? 
I touch you. 
You quiver like a sea-fish. 
I cover you with my net. 
What are you—banded one? 115 
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Of this, he says: 
Not the brevity only of the vehicle, but its simplicity, makes it ineffective. The sacrifice of 
metre in free verse needs, in almost all cases, to be compensated by length. The loss of so much 
of the formal structure leads otherwise to tenuousness and ambiguity.
116
 
 
He concludes that, „the experience evoked in the reader is not sufficiently specific. […]  The reader here 
supplies too much of the poem‟.117 
Another poem that he cites to illustrate bad art is „Friendship after Love‟ by Ella Wheeler Wilcox:  
After the fierce midsummer all ablaze  
        Has burned itself to ashes, and expires  
        In the intensity of its own fires,  
There come the mellow, mild, St. Martin days  
Crowned with the calm of peace, but sad with haze.  
        So after Love has led us, till he tires  
        Of his own throes, and torments, and desires,  
Comes large-eyed friendship: with a restful gaze,  
He beckons us to follow, and across  
       Cool verdant vales we wander free from care.  
        Is it a touch of frost lies in the air?  
Why are we haunted with a sense of loss?  
       We do not wish the pain back, or the heat;  
       And yet, and yet, these days are incomplete.
118
    
 
In this instance, Richards‟s complaint is with the execution of the poem‟s main themes rather than its 
effectiveness as a vehicle of communication. In commending the poem‟s effectiveness as unequivocal 
communication Richards says that it „reproduces the state of mind of the writer very exactly‟.119  He echoes 
the point in his Practical Criticism where, among his list of ten “difficulties” of criticism, the third and 
fourth deal with imagery and mnemonic irrelevances respectively. With regard to the former Richards says: 
But images are erratic things; lively images aroused in one mind need have no similarity to the 
equally lively images stirred by the same line of poetry in another, and neither set need have 
anything to do with any images which may have existed in the poet‟s mind. Here is a 
troublesome source of critical deviations.
120
 
 
Of mnemonic irrelevances he writes: 
These are misleading effects of the reader‟s being reminded of some personal scene or 
adventure, erratic associations, the interference of emotional reverberations from a past which 
may have nothing to do with the poem.
121
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The first half of Practical Criticism details the results of a survey Richards conducts with his students. 
His method was to hand out sheets of poems (withholding their authorship) to these students and to ask 
them to write detailed reports on what they thought of these poems. The poems are numbered 1 to 13. Of  
poem 11, he received this response from one of its readers: 
Outside of the mood, I felt no real personal connection, no personal emotion. If they had been 
my words winging on, or my closest friend‟s—if  he had alluded to my death, or let me apply it 
so—I should have felt it more deeply (Richards‟s emphasis).122  
 
Whilst Richards acknowledges the validity of such a response he is cautious as to its universal applicability: 
The dangers are that the recollected feelings may overwhelm and distort the poem and that the 
reader may forget that the evocation of somewhat similar feelings is probably only a part of the 
poem‟s endeavour.123 
 
His remedy to such responses is to encourage a Wordsworthian mode of poetic writing: 
The only corrective in all cases must be a closer contact with reality, either directly, through 
experience of actual things, or mediately through other minds which are in closer contact. If 
good poetry owes its value in a large measure to the closeness of its contact with reality, it may 
thereby become a powerful weapon for breaking up unreal ideas and responses (Emphasis 
added).
124
 
 
F. L. Lucas, in  Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal, notes that romantic writing, rather than being 
engaged upon the “wonderful” or “mysterious” (as Pater, Watts-Dunton and others thought 125), is replete 
with realist descriptions: 
Hugo, it will be recalled, justified Romanticism as, […] a return to reality; because real life 
perpetually mingles hornpipes and funerals to compose its ironic „Satires of Circumstance‟. 
[…] What, again, could be more realistic than the low life in Scott‟s romances, or the carpets 
rising along the gusty floor in The Eve of St Agnes? […] Similarly with the minute realism of 
Pre-Raphaelite painting. It was, in fact, this love  of the Romantics for realistic décor and 
setting, furniture and local colour, that provided one source of Naturalism in the later novel.
126
 
 
In addition, Lucas cites Byron‟s call for greater contact with reality: „The great object of  life is sensation, to 
feel that we exist, even though in pain‟.127  Of this Lucas says, „that Byronic cry is the keynote of one 
Romantic career after another‟.128 
While it is true that Lucas recognises the importance of the “dream element” underpinning   much of 
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Romanticism  („The Romantic is in fact, like Joseph, a “dreamer”‟; 129  „Romantic literature is a dream-
picture of life‟;130  „Romanticism is not, in Goethe‟s phrase, “disease”. It is intoxicated dreaming‟.131),  he 
emphasises the reality upon which this dreaming is grounded. Indeed, „dreams themselves can be at times 
only too realistic‟,132 and, like a nightmare, „be vividly realistic at moments‟.133  Lucas concludes: 
Romanticism is only partly opposed to Realism; its true enemy is the hackneyed and humdrum 
present, […] Snatches of realism remain very welcome to Romantic sensationalists, […] Thus 
Romantic diction shows fondness not only for the romantically remote, in place and time, but 
also for the realistic.
134
 
 
With regard to Wordsworth in particular Lucas writes: „While Coleridge, Keats, and Morris revived words 
long and hoary and moss-grown, Wordsworth, on the contrary, copied the actual speech of  “huts where 
poor men lie”‟.135 Lucas illustrates this with some lines from Wordsworth. The lines are from his The Blind 
Highland Boy: 
A Household Tub, like one of those, 
Which women use to wash their clothes 
136
 
 
Lucas notes that for Coleridge this description may have been a little too trite thus prompting him to 
persuade Wordsworth to change them to:   
A shell of ample size, and light 
As the pearly car of Amphitrite, 
   That sportive dolphins drew.
137
 
 
Consequently, Wordsworth‟s colourless and empiricist observation is transformed into language that is 
more vibrant.  
In addition, Lucas is critical of the transcendentalist strain in Coleridge‟s poetic criticism because 
„transcendental mysticism may not be altogether helpful in building critical theories‟.138  And of 
Coleridge‟s distinction between Fancy and Imagination Lucas says, „It still seems to me, then, unnecessary 
to assume two distinct “faculties”, Fancy and Imagination‟.139  And: 
I doubt if a distinction often so debatable and terms so hazy can in any case be of much 
practical use. Coleridge‟s whole theory seems to me an example of that barren type of 
classification so dear to those who believe that if they can invent a few transcendental pigeon-
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holes, the Holy Spirit of poetry will descend to nest in them.
140
 
 
Lucas also regards as nonsense Coleridge and Wordsworth‟s dispute over poetic diction, and he is critical 
of its celebration by critics as, „the most magnificent piece of critical writing in the English language‟.141 He 
writes: „And it seems to me a poor service to the young, especially, to hold up these pages of rambling as a 
masterpiece of hard thought‟.142 He concludes by saying: 
Coleridge suits admirably those persons with religious instincts who want not critics but 
mystagogues; who care not for the truth of what they are told, but for its tune.
143
  
F. R. Leavis was also critical of transcendentalism—at least with regard to its potential to damage 
Wordsworth‟s reputation in light of New Criticism. In Revaluation he steers Wordsworth away from 
accusations of mysticism towards the more grounded practice of liberal humanism: 
Wordsworth, we know, is the „poet of Nature‟, and the associations of the term “Nature” here 
are unfortunate, suggesting as it does a vaguely pantheistic religion-substitute. […] But 
Wordsworth himself, […] proposes something decidedly different when he stresses „the Mind 
of Man‟ as „My haunt, and the main region of my song‟.144 
 
Leavis regards him as so far removed from the mystical life that his poetry can act as instruction to daily 
commonplace living: 
[Wordsworth] stands for a distinctly human naturalness; […] A poet who can bring home to us 
the possibility of such a naturalness should today be found important. In Wordsworth‟s poetry 
the possibility is offered us realized—realized in a mode central and compelling enough to 
enforce the bearing of poetry upon life, the significance of this poetry for actual living.
145
 
 
That his poetry should enable this derives from his early upbringing, „in a congenial social environment, 
with its wholesome simple pieties and the traditional sanity of its moral culture, which to him were 
nature‟.146  This early nurturing was able to produce a man who „was, on the showing of his poetry and 
everything else, normally and robustly human‟.147  Leavis says that Wordsworth‟s reputation as a mystic 
and the „current valuation‟ of his greatness is due largely to the „visionary moments‟ and „spots of time‟.148  
He acknowledges that Wordsworth, himself, placed value on the visionary aspect of his verse but thinks it 
important to examine the significance he assigns to it. Leavis then cites the following from Book II of The 
Prelude: 
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                                and at that time  
Have felt whate'er there is of power in sound  
To breathe an elevated mood, by form  
Or image unprofaned; and I would stand,  
Beneath some rock, listening to sounds that are  
The ghostly language of the ancient earth,  
Or make their dim abode in distant winds.  
Thence did I drink the visionary power. 
I deem not profitless these fleeting moods  
Of shadowy exultation: not for this,  
That they are kindred to our purer mind  
And intellectual life; but that the soul,  
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt  
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense  
Of possible sublimity, to which, 
With growing faculties she doth aspire,  
With faculties still growing, feeling still  
That whatsoever point they gain, they still  
Have something to pursue.
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Leavis, while admitting that the passage is philosophically vague, nevertheless, tries to recuperate it from 
any transcendentalist taint by drawing our attention away from its vagueness and towards the „sober verse‟ 
in which these ineffable experiences are presented.
150
  Moreover, having glossed over this 
transcendentalism Leavis refers to the eighteenth-century poet Mark Akenside to root Wordsworth in a pre-
transcendentalist tradition: 
How strong are the eighteenth-century affinities to this verse Mr. Nichol Smith brings out 
when, in his introduction to The Oxford Book of Eighteenth Century Verse, he quotes a piece of 
Akenside and suggests rightly that it might have passed for Wordsworth‟s. Wordsworth‟s roots 
were deep in the eighteenth century. To say this is to lay the stress again—where it ought to 
rest—on his essential sanity and normality.151 
 
This placing of aesthetic value upon the empirical and humanistic aspects of Wordsworth  is also 
reflected in Raymond Williams‟s Culture and Society 1780-1950, where his positive valuation of the 
socially concerned aspect of Wordsworth is worth noting. In this book he writes: 
We may usefully remind ourselves that Wordsworth wrote political pamphlets [and that this 
activity] essentially related to a large part of the experience from which the poetry itself was 
made.
152
 
 
Moreover, he sees the new ideas of Romanticism emanating from „a larger system of ideas in European 
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thinking as a whole‟.153  For Williams, this system of ideas is essentially humanistic for the reason that the 
influence of such humanists as Rousseau and Schiller can be traced back to it. 
154
  In addition, he says that, 
„In England, these ideas that we call Romantic have to be understood in terms of the problems in 
experience with which they were advanced to deal‟.155  Even the Wordsworthian notion of the poet as 
privileged seer and conduit of special insights to the masses is seen by Williams as essentially an aspect of 
Platonic moralism in that it can be traced back to the Socratic definition of the poet as outlined in Plato‟s 
Ion.
156
  This moralism is the main function of Wordsworth‟s poetry and Williams draws our attention to a 
passage in the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads where Wordsworth attacks those,   
who talk of Poetry as of a matter of amusement and idle pleasure; who will converse with us as 
gravely about a taste for poetry, as they express it, as if it were a thing as indifferent as a taste 
for rope-dancing, or Frontiniac or Sherry. 
157
 
  
Williams sees the full implications of Wordsworth‟s ideas on the role of the poet as „deeply and generally 
humane‟.158 
Two other critics who see in Wordsworth‟s poetic output a social and moral agenda are T. S. Eliot and 
Nicholas Roe. Recognition of this can be seen in Eliot‟s lecture „Wordsworth and Coleridge‟, which 
appears in his The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism. Eliot sees the humanism of Wordsworth as the 
primary purpose of his poetry. He cites an 1801 letter that Wordsworth wrote to Charles James Fox 
(accompanying a copy of Lyrical Ballads) expressing Wordsworth‟s social concerns:  
Recently by the spreading of manufactures through every part of the country, by the heavy 
taxes upon postage, by workhouses, houses of industry, and the invention of soup shops, etc., 
superadded to the increasing disproportion between the price of labour and that if the 
necessaries of life, the bonds of domestic feeling among the poor, as far as influence of these 
things has extended, have been weakened, and in innumerable instances entirely destroyed.
159
 
 
Of  this Eliot says: 
Wordsworth was not merely taking advantage of an opportunity to lecture a rather disreputable 
statesman and rouse him to useful activity; he was seriously explaining the content and purpose 
of his poems: without this preamble Mr. Fox could hardly be expected to make head or tail of 
the Idiot Boy or the sailor‟s parrot. You may say that this public spirit is irrelevant to 
Wordsworth‟s greatest poems; nevertheless I believe that you will understand a great poem like 
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Resolution and Independence better if you understand the purposes and social passions which 
animated its author; and unless you understand these you will misread Wordsworth‟s literary 
criticism entirely.
160
 
 
In The Politics of Nature, Roe suggests that Wordsworth‟s humanistic agenda was to some extent born 
out of the failure of the French Revolution to deliver its utopian promises. The disappointment resulting 
from this failure had negative consequences for the role of the transcendental in poetry because „after the 
revolutionary Terror of 1793-4, nature could never again answer as a transcendent ideal that entirely 
“displaced” history‟.161 Consequently, „any appeal to nature as a transcendent category would reflect upon 
the moral, social and historical realities of the day‟.162  In response to Marjorie Levinson‟s claim that 
Wordsworth‟s greatest poetry excludes sociopolitical themes that had occupied him less than a decade 
earlier, Roe writes: 
Far from “erasing” sociopolitical contexts, the philosophical poetry written by Wordsworth in 
spring and summer 1798 seeks to affirm that „nature and the language of the sense‟ may inform 
„moral being‟ to the good of society as a whole. […] The strength of this poetry is not its denial 
of history, but the gravity with which it answers  „What man has made of man‟ with „acts / Of 
kindness and love‟.163 
 
Moreover, Roe links the revolutionary events of the 1790s to the „childish poetry of experience‟ as 
evidenced particularly in Wordsworth‟s „We are Seven‟ and „Anecdote for Fathers‟.164  What links these 
poems to the revolutionary events of the 1790s is that they are the result of Wordsworth‟s response to „the 
British terror directed at the reformists from 1792 onwards: the spy network, the treason trials, the threat of 
exile or execution “for opinion”.165  This repression „initiated Wordsworth‟s quest for an inviolable source 
of  renewal‟ that was  to be found principally in „the experience of the eternal unfallen Adam, the child, and 
ultimately in the glimpses of his own past life that constitute the „spots of time‟ in The Prelude‟.166  
With particular reference to „We are Seven‟ and „Anecdote for Fathers‟, Roe says: 
As the children of „We are Seven‟ and „Anecdote for Fathers‟ had set the adult to school, so 
Wordsworth was drawn to the childhood horizon of his own life as a possible source for an 
understanding of his own more recent experiences.
167
 
 
After an analysis of the bird-snatching episode in the earlier part of The Prelude, Roe concludes that the, 
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memory of guilt associated with bird-trapping overlaps with Wordsworth‟s later involvement 
in the events of the French Revolution. The two memories are simultaneous, merged together 
to imply a pattern in childhood and adult life in which overwhelming expectation is self-
deceiving, self-betrayed. And the ultimate cause of that betrayal is the tragic delinquency of 
human nature. […] For Wordsworth in The Prelude this self-awareness was the melancholy 
lesson of revolution, although it generated his affirmative realisation that the histories of 
personal and political dislocation may be reconciled in an imaginative continuity.
168
 
 
For Roe, Wordsworth‟s revolutionary experience „informs the imaginative radicalism of  his greatest poetry 
written between 1798 and 1805‟.169  It is the word “experience” as used here that locates Wordsworth‟s 
revolutionary poetry further within the empiricist camp. 
M. H. Abrams sees Wordsworth in transcendentalist terms. Nevertheless, Abrams‟s argument that there 
was a breach between classicism and romanticism that allowed for a more personal poetic utterance does 
not preclude the importance of the empiricist strain. In The Mirror and the Lamp, he says that before the 
Romantics poetry was not an end in itself but had some didactic purpose, one of the foremost being to 
entertain the reader through the imitation of nature.
170
  After this, 
the stress was shifted more and more to the poet‟s natural genius, creative imagination, and 
emotional spontaneity, […]. As a result the audience gradually receded into the background, 
giving place to the poet himself, and his own mental powers and emotional needs, as the 
predominant cause and even the end and test of art.
171
 
 
This predominance of the poet‟s concerns Abrams calls the “expressive theory” which he defines as: 
The internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating under the impulse of 
feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet‟s perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings.
172
 
 
This had important implications for poetic language: 
Of  the elements constituting a poem, the element of diction, especially figures of speech, 
becomes primary; and the burning question is, whether these are the natural utterance of 
emotion and imagination or the deliberate aping of poetic conventions. The first test any poem 
must pass is no longer, „Is it true to nature?‟ or „Is it appropriate to the requirements either of 
the best judges or the generality of mankind?‟ but a criterion looking in a different direction; 
namely, „Is it sincere? Is it genuine? Does it match the intention, the feeling, and the actual 
state of mind of the poet while composing?‟ 173 
 
For the poet‟s feelings to be expressed adequately poetic language had to become more “true  to life”, more 
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concordant with the facts of emotional experience. Poetic language that formerly relied upon convention for 
its affects was deemed too generalised and unspecific for this new task.  
The  “expressive theory” requires poetic language to function as mimesis of the poet‟s thinking 
processes rather than mimesis of nature. This new emphasis upon the poet enables   the poetic work to give 
„the reader insights into the mind and heart of the poet himself.‟174  The value of a poem, therefore, is 
contingent upon the sincerity of the poet‟s utterances and less upon the poem‟s effect upon the audience: 
There is, in fact, something singularly fatal to the audience in the romantic point of view. Or, in 
terms of historical causes, it might be conjectured that the disappearance of a homogenous and 
discriminating reading public fostered a criticism which on principle diminished the 
importance of the audience as a determinant of poetry and poetic value.
175
 
 
To illustrate this poet-centred conceptualisation of poetry Abrams cites Coleridge from his 1818 lecture „On 
Poesy or Art‟: 
[Art is] the mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature and man. It is, therefore, the power of 
humanising nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the 
object of his contemplation.
176
 
 
However, it should not be assumed here that the presentation of an “actual state of mind” is incompatible 
with the empiricist strain in Romantic writing. 
With particular regard to Wordsworth, Wordsworth‟s statement that poetry is the spontaneous overflow 
of powerful feelings is viewed by Abrams as indicating that the locus of poetic inspiration is within, rather 
than without the poet. The result of this is that, 
the focus of attention is upon the relation of the elements of the work to his [the poet‟s] state of 
mind, and the suggestion, underlined by the word „spontaneous‟, is that the dynamics of the 
overflow are inherent in the poet and, perhaps, not within his deliberate control.
177
 
 
Here Abrams has “mystified” the poetic process as recounted by Wordsworth. However, as I mentioned in 
chapter one, there are serious doubts as to the reliability of Wordsworth‟s explanations regarding his poetic 
modus operandi. From that chapter it will be recalled that  on some occasions he knowingly appropriated 
phrases from his sister‟s journals and inserted them into his poetry. It should be noted that Dorothy made no 
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claims to poetic inspiration when she composed these phrases; she merely recorded  what she had seen on 
country rambles into her journals. As far as it is possible to discern these descriptions had no other 
inspiration than the objects that they describe. Dorothy certainly did not experience powerful feelings, 
spontaneous or otherwise, at the time of composition; therefore it is unlikely that these phrases are imbued 
with anything transcendental. In light of this fact, it is odd that these descriptive phrases should have been 
so readily appropriated by Wordsworth given his supposed criteria for poetry as being the consequence of a 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.  
Abrams cites the following statement by Wordsworth and argues that it is not, despite appearances, a 
confirmation for the empiricist view of Wordsworth: „I have at all times endeavoured to look steadily at my 
subject‟.178  Of this he writes: 
This statement is often taken to be no more than a recommendation for objective accuracy and 
particularity. Wordsworth‟s „subject‟, however, is not merely the particularised object of the 
sense, any more than it is in the neo-classic ideal.
179
 
 
In addition, he quotes Wordsworth‟s preface to Poems (1815) to further the case: 
Throughout, objects … derive their influence not from what they are actually in themselves, but 
from such as are bestowed upon them by the minds of those who are conversant with or 
affected by those objects.
180
  
 
The key phrase here is: „bestowed upon them‟. As I mentioned in chapter two, with regard to his passive 
stance in the face of nature, Wordsworth did not merely take the objects of nature as he found them and 
present them precisely as such. To a certain extent, he “modified” them. In that chapter, I discussed in 
particular Wordsworth‟s passivity in relation to the use of the word “create” in The Prelude, arguing that it 
would be erroneous on the bases of the existence of this word in that poem to assume that Wordsworth did 
not take a passive stance. I mentioned that his use of the word was not to be confused with the common 
understanding of it: to make or cause to be or to become. Rather, in The Prelude he is calling for something 
more modest. I discuss lines 254-60 of Book II and conclude that the child rather than unreceptively 
perceiving the world around him is able to “create” or make “present” what would otherwise be imprecise 
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and unstructured incoming sense data. This “creative activity” was seen to function as a means to a more 
accurate perception of inert matter. Consequently, nothing new is created and reality is not proved 
untrustworthy. All that occurs is that objects have had „bestowed upon them‟ a clearer sense of their 
actuality.
181
  
In order to illustrate the idea of an object that has had the mind of the poet at work on it Abrams cites 
Hazlitt‟s essay „On Poetry in General‟. In this essay, Hazlitt quotes the following from Cymbeline, Act II: 
… The flame o‟ th‟ taper 
Bows toward her, and would under-peep her lids 
To see the enclosed lights …182 
 
Of this Hazlitt says, „This passionate interpretation of the motion of the flame to accord with the speaker‟s 
own feelings, is true poetry‟.183  But is it really? Yes, if a sort of defamilarization were the sole measure of 
what poetry should be. Abrams says of Coleridge that he was most concerned, „with the problem of how the 
poetic mind acts to modify or transform the materials of sense without violating truth to nature‟.184 Not 
„violating truth to nature‟ seems a high price to pay if it can only reward us with lines such as those just 
quoted from Cymbeline. Coleridge‟s call to “animate” the inanimate surely only draws more attention upon 
the object, however cleverly executed.  
René Wellek in „Romanticism Re-examined‟ takes a largely empiricist view of Wordsworth. 
Transcendentalism in Wordsworth cannot be taken at face value if the following statement by Wellek is 
considered: 
What is called romanticism in England and on the Continent is not the literal vision of the 
mystics but the concern for the reconciliation of subject and object, man and nature, […]185 
 
Wellek then cites Paul de Man‟s analysis of Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Hölderlin‟s writings about the 
Swiss mountains in de Man‟s essay „Structure intentionelle de l'image romantique‟ to demonstrate  „the 
peculiar paradox of the romantic poet‟s nostalgia for the object‟.186  De Man writes: 
Sometimes romantic thought and poetry seem about to surrender so completely to the nostalgia 
for the object that it becomes difficult to distinguish between object and image, between 
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imagination and perception, between expressive and constitutive language and mimetic and 
literal language.
187
 
 
Wellek says: 
De Man thinks of passages in Wordsworth and Goethe, Baudelaire and Rimbaud, where the 
„vision becomes almost a presence, a real landscape‟. But he argues that even the most extreme 
believer in the magic of language, Mallarmé, never doubted the intrinsic ontological primacy of 
the natural and earthly object. But  the attempt of language to approach the ontological status of 
the object fails. Contradicting his statement a few pages before, de Man concludes that we have 
misunderstood these poets if we call them “pantheists” while „they are probably the first writers 
who, within the Western Hellenic and Christian tradition, have in their poetic language 
questioned the ontological primacy of the sensible object‟. Though de Man seems to waver on 
the issue of the romantics‟ precise view of nature, he strongly corroborates our central theme. 
The reconciliation of art and nature, language and reality is the romantic ambition.
188
 
 
In his essay „The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanticism‟, Northrop Frye concurs 
with much of Abrams‟s view of Romanticism. With regard to the “internal made external”, Frye argues that 
because of Rousseau‟s influence there was a shift away from thinking of God as the ultimate creative force 
towards the idea that man now occupied this role: 
The basis of civilisation is now the creative power of man; its model is the human vision 
revealed in the arts. […] the sources of creative power are now located in the mind‟s internal 
heaven, the external world being seen as a mirror reflecting and making visible what is 
within.
189
  
 
Therefore, in Romantic poetry, „the emphasis is not on what we have called sense, but on the constructive 
power of the mind, where reality is brought into being by experience‟.190  Frye says that one of the results of 
this is that, 
the Romantic poets sought to defy external reality by creating a uniformity of tone and mood. 
[…] Such a poetic technique is, psychologically, akin to magic, which also aims at bringing 
spiritual forces into reality through concentration on a certain type of experience.
191
 
 
For these reasons, 
Romanticism is difficult to adapt to the novel, which demands an empirical and observant 
attitude; its contribution to prose fiction is rather, appropriately enough, a form of romance. In 
the romance the characters tend to become psychological projections, and the setting a period 
in a past just remote enough to be re-created rather than empirically studied.
192
 
 
Frye adds: 
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The poet has always been supposed to be imitating nature, but if the model of his creative 
power is in his mind, the nature that he is to imitate in now inside him, even if it is also 
outside.
193
 
 
Nevertheless, with particular regard to Wordsworth, Frye does acknowledge that he is still informed by 
much of pre-Rousseauian ideas of „nature as an objective order‟ and nature as landscape.194 
In From Classic to Romantic, W. J. Bate views the Romantics from an empirical perspective. He notes: 
Critics of the later eighteenth century frequently insisted that resemblances must never be too 
exact in art. […] Similarly, in poetry, metaphors must not be too close, nor descriptions too 
detailed.
195
 
 
Bate says the reason for this is that: 
Much of aesthetic pleasure, said Adam Smith, is determined by the very „degree of disparity 
between the imitating and the imitated object‟: imitation fruits and flowers, for example, please 
far less than a mere picture of them, and painted statues have less appeal than unpainted ones. 
By summoning up an active response of imagination and feeling, moreover, an augmented 
vitality of realization is made possible.
196
 
 
As we have seen, Wordsworth departed from this precept drastically. Bate also makes another important 
observation:  
Classicism does not subscribe, therefore, to the belief that man‟s feelings and responses are 
themselves inherently good—a belief which was to underlie at least some romantic 
assumptions towards the close of the eighteenth century.
197
 
 
Bate further says that if art is to give expression to the subjective emotions of the poet then it becomes 
„difficult to draw the line between what is valid and what is not‟.198  The assumption that the personal 
poetic utterance is itself of artistic value is accepted unquestioningly by both Abrams and Frye. As we also 
saw, such a stance is able to justify empiricist writing by arguing that the expressive outpourings of the poet 
must necessarily particularise and be unambiguous in order for their authenticity to be recognised. 
However, Bate says that „Subjectivism in one form or another is perhaps an inevitable companion of 
extreme empiricism‟.199 In addition, he sees this need to particularise as growing out of British 
associationism, which  „exerted a far stronger immediate influence on criticism by its emphasis on the 
particular‟.200     
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We have also seen how Wordsworth‟s attraction to the objective world in part grew out of his 
understanding of Hartley‟s associationism. Bate uses the term „sympathy with the inanimate‟ to express this 
sort of identification with nature.
201
 He observes this identification with objects operating in Keats who 
„could almost project himself into a moving billiard-ball‟.202  Moreover, Bate notices that even with regard 
to such abstract concepts as “feeling” and “thinking” Wordsworth cannot help but amalgamate them with 
perception: „Wordsworth tended to apply the term “feeling” to a state of comparatively vivid awareness, 
and “thought” to a later and vestigial “representative” of that awareness‟.203  Of  such a process,„perceptions 
and ideas are capable of becoming melted, so to speak, into this crucible of imaginative and emotional 
response‟.204 Yet, the imagination that is alluded to is, „hardly to be confused with revery [sic] or rank 
illusion‟.205  The term “imagination” was traditionally connected „with direct sensory experience‟ and was 
applicable by many romantic critics „to almost the entire associational capacity of the mind, when it is 
employed in any non-abstract endeavour‟.206  Moreover, „the expression and character of the particular 
itself might thus become an objective goal for imaginative grasping‟.207  Bate adds, „If English romantic 
criticism was cognizant of the universal, it tended to regard the universal as attainable only through the 
particular‟.208  Most early-nineteenth-century critics used the term, 
as means of implying a broader and more intense awareness and employment of experience 
than can be achieved by analytical enumeration or by the artificial postulation of separate 
categories and concepts.
209
 
 
These critics thought they had,„found an appropriate term in “imagination”; […] to postulate a faculty 
which is at all times acutely aware, […] of the empirically concrete‟.210  The conversion of abstract ideas 
into sense impressions is, Bate says, a British assumption prevalent in English romantic criticism.
211
   
Harold Bloom in The Visionary Company similarly takes an empiricist reading of Wordsworth. Bloom 
emphasises the fact that far from being caught up in the transcendental, for Wordsworth „the earth is 
enough‟.212  Wordsworth‟s imagination is, „like Wallace Stevens‟ Angel Surrounded by Paysans: not an 
angel of heaven, but the necessary angel of earth, as, in its sight, we see the earth again, but cleared‟.213  
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This lucidity is, according to Bloom, a result of alert perception: 
Wordsworth writes his poetry as a commentary upon Nature. […] Ordinary perception is then a 
mode of salvation for Wordsworth, provided that we are awake fully to what we see.
214
  
 
For Wordsworth, this sort of perception enables him to discover more readily the true reality beneath 
surface objects: 
For the visual surfaces of natural reality are mutable, and Wordsworth desperately quests for a 
natural reality that can never pass away. That reality, for him, lies just within natural 
appearance, and the eye made generously passive by Nature‟s generosity is able to trace the 
lineaments of that final reality.
215
 
 
This desire for immutable reality grows out of his love of nature „for its own sake alone‟.216  Nature gives 
„beauty to the poet‟s mind, again only for that mind‟s sake‟.217  This relationship between mind and matter 
is „exquisitely fitted, each to the other.218  
Turning to Bloom‟s analysis of „Tintern Abbey‟, we see his further de-emphasising the transcendental. 
He quotes the following passage from the poem: 
                             that blessed mood, 
In which the burthen of the mystery, 
In which the heavy and the weary weight 
Of all this unintelligible world, 
Is lightened:—that serene and blessed mood, 
In which the affectations gently lead us on, — 
Until the breath of this corporeal frame 
And even the motions of out human blood 
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul: 
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things.
219
  
 
Of this he says: 
 
This is not mysticism but, rather, a state of aesthetic contemplation. All contemplation of 
objects except the aesthetic is essentially practical, and so directed toward personal ends. The 
poet‟s genius frees contemplation from the drive of the will, and consequently the poet is able 
to see with a quiet eye.
220
  
 
He quotes another passage from the same poem: 
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                                a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought 
And rolls through all things.
221
  
 
He writes: 
 
It is a laziness of our imaginations that tempts us to call this vision mystical, for the mystical is 
finally incommunicable and Wordsworth desires to be a man talking to men about matters of 
common experience. The emphasis in Tintern Abbey is on things seen and things remembered, 
on the light of sense, not on the invisible world.
222
  
 
He further demystifies Wordsworth (whilst at the same time illustrating the last point: „… things 
remembered, on the light of sense, not on the invisible world‟) in his analysis of the following from The 
Prelude: 
                                      in such strength 
Of usurpation, when the light of sense 
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed 
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode, 
There harbours; whether we be young or old, 
Our destiny our being‟s heart and home, 
Is with infinitude, and only there; 
With hope it is, hope that can never die, 
Effort, and expectation, and desire, 
And something evermore about to be.
223
  
 
Bloom writes: 
 
Even here, in a passage bordering the realm of the mystical, the poet‟s emphasis is naturalistic. 
Imagination usurps the place of the baffled mind, and the light of sense momentarily goes out: 
that is, the object world is not perceived. But, and this proviso is the poet‟s, the flash of greater 
illumination that suddenly reveals the invisible world is itself due to the flicking light of 
sense.
224
  
 
Here Bloom demonstrates clearly that any semblance of a transcendental aspect to Wordsworth‟s poetry is 
ultimately dependent upon sense impressions. Bloom‟s judgement on Wordsworth‟s theory of poetry is that 
it is „a theory of description‟.225  He adds: 
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The language of description is employed by him both for the external world and for himself; if 
he will not analyse Nature, still less will he care to analyse man. The peculiar nakedness of 
Wordsworth‟s poetry, its strong sense of being alone with the visible universe, with no myth of 
figure to mediate between ego and phenomena, is to a surprisingly large extent not so much a 
result of history as it is of Wordsworth‟s personal faith in the reality of the body of Nature.226  
 
Philip Hobsbaum, who was a major influence on late twentieth-century British poetry,  takes an 
empiricist stance on Wordsworth. In his Tradition and Experiment in English Poetry, he notes 
Wordsworth‟s „unwavering gaze‟227 and compares the 1805 and 1850 versions of The Prelude—favouring 
the 1805 version because it „exhibits a preternatural keenness of eye and ear‟.228  He cites the following 
samples from this version: 
             and lo! 
The Moon stood naked in the heavens, at height 
Immense above my head … 
 
Far, far beyond, the vapours shot themselves, 
In headlands, tongues, and promontory shapes, 
Into the sea, the real sea … 
 
Meanwhile, the Moon looked down upon this show 
In single glory, and we stood, the mist 
Touching our very feet … 229 
 
He says of these lines: „Here the concrete particulars of the summer night assume startling urgency as they 
impinge upon the young traveller‟s mind‟.230  However, in the later Prelude these particulars, for 
Hobsbaum, have been somewhat muted and are less visually plausible: 
The „vapours‟ of the early version are in flux—they „shot themselves / In headlands, tongues 
and promontory shapes‟. But, in the later version, they appear as „solid vapours stretched / In 
headlands, tongues …‟. Now this is a complete impossibility, since the vapours cannot be solid, 
and, if they were, could not be stretched—and, if they could be stretched, they would hardly 
stretch into forms as various as those of headlands, tongues and promontories. Such images as 
these could only be appropriate to something flexuous and evanescent.
231
 
 
Here, Hobsbaum‟s criticism rests on his view of poetic language as being primarily for the purposes of 
accurate visual description. This sort of criticism also extends to the following lines from the 1805 Prelude: 
             The full-orbed Moon, 
Who, from her sovereign elevation, gazed 
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Upon the billowy ocean …232 
 
For Hobsbaum these lines „give us no idea of how things looked to the young Wordsworth‟.233  He adds: 
These verbal points are not small ones, even in the local context of a single episode; and, 
multiplied as they are throughout the revised Prelude, they serve to blur and dissipate the sharp 
impressions of the original.
234
 
 
These criticisms contrast with his favourable comments on the emphasis of observation evident in the 
Discharged Soldier passage in Book IV of the 1805 Prelude: 
[The passage‟s] sharp, detached details never lapse into catalogue: what fuses them together is 
the sense of man‟s vulnerability and loneliness. And it is Wordsworth‟s greatness that he can 
make so static a mode as description—description, moreover, of a stationary object—develop 
in the manner of narrative. This effect of development is partly owing to the poet‟s sense of the 
beholder: we are keenly aware of Wordsworth himself watching the old man.
235
  
 
With Regard to „The Ruined Cottage‟, Hobsbaum notes that it shares with The Prelude „the accurate 
observation of detail‟.236  So much so, that of the following passage from „The Ruined Cottage‟, 
                       At the door arrived 
I knocked, and when I entered with the hope 
Of usual greeting Margaret looked at me 
A little while, then turned her head away 
Speechless, and sitting down upon a chair 
Wept bitterly …237 
 
Hobsbaum can say, „The action is as graphic as that of a stage play‟.238  Of the returning visit of the pedlar 
to the cottage in „the wane of summer‟, when the cottage displays signs of decay, Hobsbaum notes that the 
detail is „sharp and accurate‟.239  Also the lines, 
                      And, stranger, here 
In sickness she remained, and here she died, 
Last human tenant of these walls.
240
 
 
prompt Hobsbaum to write: „The graphic simplicity is characteristic and supreme: no embellishing 
metaphors are required here. The observed facts speak for themselves […]‟.241 Hobsbaum concludes his 
analysis of Wordsworth‟s poetry by complimenting it for its “novelistic” character and dependency upon 
experience: 
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The poems I have discussed brought something new to literature. They show, for instance, a 
handling of narrative vastly superior to anything since Shakespeare and the medieval poets; and 
an aspect of narrative unknown even to these great narrators—the concentration upon a single 
experience until all its implications are drawn out of it. In many respects, these poems unite the 
virtues of prose and poetry—clarity and definition on the one hand, emotional heightening and 
dramatic rhythm on the other.
242
 
 
Jerome McGann, in The Romantic Ideology, also takes an empiricist approach to  Romantic poetry:  
Romantic poetry, “reflects”—and reflects upon—those individual and social forms of human 
life which are available to the artist‟s observation, and which are themselves a part of his 
process of observation.
243
 
 
He also praises Raymond Williams‟s liberal humanist criticism for its conformity to Heinrich Heine‟s 
criticism, which refuses to „set the ideological materials of poetry free from their concrete historical 
environments.‟244 McGann writes: 
Williams is an important critic partly because he understands the central place which historical 
and ideological facts occupy in the experience we call poetry and the products we call poems. 
Much of his strength as a critic lies in his ability to save those materials for poetry without at 
the same time transforming them into abstract or trans-historical ideas.
245
 
 
McGann is also cognisant of the material and sensuous aspects of Wordsworth‟s „The Ruined Cottage‟ 
where „Armytage, poet, and reader all fix their attention on a gathering mass of sensory, and chiefly 
vegetable, details‟.246 And in the „Intimations Ode‟ McGann notes Wordsworth‟s emotional dependency 
upon the object: 
The poem‟s problem emerges when Wordsworth recognises that his sense of a universal joy—
his insight into the life of things—has resulted in his loss of the concrete and particular. […] 
These things are gone, and Wordsworth fears—despite his own reiterated convictions—that 
their departure will signal the passage of „the glory and the dream‟ as well.247 
 
As can be seen from the preceding digest of poetic criticism, the empiricism favoured by Wordsworth as 
his modus operandi has been acknowledged by most of the major literary critics of the twentieth century, 
even those who principally view him in transcendentalist terms. I would now like to look at the artistic 
ramifications of this Wordsworthian influence upon late twentieth-century poetry. One of the consequences 
of this influence upon poetic practice during that period is that it allowed for an anti-connotative view of 
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poetic language to become predominant. This predominance was facilitated in Britain in the late 1950s by 
the rise of  the poetic coterie known as The Movement. Similarly to the antipathetic reactions of early 
modernist critics to the “excesses” of later Romantic poetry, the Movement reacted against what they 
considered the extreme “romanticism” of the New Apocalypse poets of the 1940s. 
The Movement critics were mostly critical of the non-empiricist characteristics of New Apocalypse 
poetry. Referring to the New Apocalypse period, Robert Conquest, in his Introduction to his influential 
anthology of Movement poetry, New Lines, says that „the debilitating theory that poetry must be 
metaphorical gained wide acceptance‟.248 This statement clearly signals Conquest‟s anti-connotative view 
of poetic language. In contrast to New Apocalypse poetry, Conquest welcomes the emergence in the late 
1940s and early 1950s of  poets who, „have been progressing from different viewpoints to a certain unity of 
approach, a new and healthy general standpoint‟.249  The poetry that these poets write is, „free from both 
mystical and logical compulsions and—like modern philosophy—it is empirical in its attitude‟.250 
Moreover, like so much poetry motivated by an empiricist aesthetic, it values clear meanings and there is a 
„refusal to abandon a rational structure and comprehensible language‟.251  This poetry has influences from 
W. B. Yeats, Robert Graves and Edwin Muir, especially with regard to visual perception: 
It is a question not merely of technical influence, but of the example of these poets‟ unabashed 
and untheoretical eye to the visual and emotional events, which their sometimes eccentric 
views cannot obscure.
252
 
 
The Movement spawned empiricist poets such as Philip Larkin, Kingsley Amis, D. J. Enright, John Wain, 
Elizabeth Jennings, Donald Davie and Ted Hughes.  
Philip Hobsbaum was also closely linked with the Movement. While studying at  Cambridge University, 
Hobsbaum (a former student of  F. R. Leavis) was introduced to the poetry of Larkin by Thom Gunn who 
had recently graduated from Trinity College. He also met Peter Redgrove at Cambridge who urged him to 
start a poetry group, which he did in his London flat in late 1955. This gathering became known as The 
Group and attendees at these meetings included Ted Hughes, George MacBeth, Peter Porter, Peter 
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Redgrove, Edward Lucie-Smith, Rosemary Joseph, Julian Cooper, and Martin Bell. When Hobsbaum had 
to leave London in 1959 to study for a PhD at Sheffield University under William Empson, Lucie-Smith 
took over running the London meetings until its disbandment  in 1965, due to ever increasing numbers that 
made the original purpose of the meetings difficult to accomplish. Meanwhile, Hobsbaum was a lecturer at 
Queen's University, Belfast, where he had formed a branch of the Group there. Attendees included Seamus 
Heaney, Michael Longley, Edna Longley, and Derek Mahon. Heaney was very much an admirer of Robert 
Frost, and Edna Longley an admirer of Edward Thomas. As we have seen, both Thomas and Frost were 
predominately empiricist poets. Heaney was seen as something of a rising star within this group. This is 
noted by Ulster poet James Simmons who says, „In those old gatherings under the auspices of Philip 
Hobsbaum in Belfast it was obvious that Seamus was being groomed for stardom‟.253 Hobsbaum was 
instrumental in getting Heaney‟s first collection of poetry published by Faber & Faber. In Seamus Heaney: 
The Making of a Poet, Michael Parker writes: 
Hobsbaum introduced Seamus and Marie Heaney to Edward Lucie-Smith at a dinner party […] 
and, on returning to London, Lucie-Smith sent some of Heaney‟s poems to Karl Miller [a 
friend of Thom Gunn], who accepted three for The New Statesman. „Digging‟, „Scaffolding‟ 
and „Storm on the Island‟ appeared on 4 December 1964. Then in January 1965 he [Heaney] 
received a letter from Charles Monteith of Faber & Faber, asking for a manuscript.
254
 
 
Although the Group asserted it had no unified poetic agenda as such, an indication of its poetic aims can 
be discerned from the sorts of poets it nurtured (most obviously Heaney) and the poetic values asserted by 
Hobsbaum himself. The first thing that is noticeable about Hobsbaum‟s poetic is its objection to the 
suggestiveness and lack of plot in T.S. Eliot‟s poetry. In Tradition and Experiment in English Poetry he 
writes: 
If we suggest Langland, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Eliot are among our greatest 
poets, it is the last-named that appears to be the wild card in the pack. All the others had a high 
regard for plot and logic that carries them through the aesthetic variability of their poetry. Eliot, 
on the other hand, seems to work rather by suggestion, qualitative progression, evocative 
catalogue.
255
 
 
The idea that suggestiveness in poetry is a shortcoming is most peculiar indeed. His criticism of  Eliot 
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extends to what he sees as the negative influence on English poetry of  Eliot‟s use of  the American idiom: 
„Some damage was done to English verse by too close an imitation in the 1930s of the American idiom as 
evidenced in such poets as Eliot and Pound‟.256  Hobsbaum also sees a disparity between Eliot‟s American 
writing-style and traditional English poetic writing practice. Although Hobsbaum does not see this in itself 
as necessarily negative, the implication is that American modernism is largely a geographical and cultural 
entity, unable 
to successfully function within an English milieu:  
Again, Eliot‟s work exhibits the characteristic American qualities of free association or 
phanopoeia and autobiographical content. English verse, however, has been at its best as 
fiction: an arrangement of what is external to the poet to convey the tension or release 
within.
257
 
 
This poetic “nationalism” is also expressed more explicitly, and with some frustration in the following: 
I would never deny that Eliot and Pound, who derive much from Whitman, are fine poets. But 
is it not time to insist that they are fine American poets? And that therefore the influence they 
may be expected to have on English poets is limited? 
258
 
 
This appears a most extraordinary and insular (not to say irrational) approach to art. If Hobsbaum really 
believes that Eliot and Pound are fine poets then why must this talent not be allowed to function in 
England? How can one admit to value in a form of art yet insist that it is a value that is worthless outside of 
the cultural conditions which spawned it?  
Hobsbaum makes further statements as to the unsuitability of “American” modernism for the English 
reader: 
Whitman‟s abstractions and random collocations have a raw life of their own, a form even 
through their formlessness; and this has remained highly characteristic of American poetry ever 
since. The Waste Land (1922) is, indeed, a heap of broken images: this is its meaning, and, to 
some extent, its distinction. But that kind of writing has never worked well in England.
259
 
 
Hobsbaum then goes on to say that the influence of Eliot had a negative effect on W. H. Auden‟s poetry. 
Up until his discovery of Eliot, Hobsbaum claims, Auden‟s early poetry had certain affinities with Thomas 
Hardy. Hobsbaum quotes some lines from a poem Auden wrote as a youth, „The Carter's Funeral‟: 
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Sixty odd years of poaching and drink 
And rain-sodden wagons with scarcely a friend, 
Chained to this life; rust fractures a link, 
           So the end …260 
 
After quoting the above lines without purposely indicating who wrote them, Hobsbaum writes: 
Who wrote this, for example? […] Hardy? Edward Thomas? In fact, it is the earliest Auden—
Auden before the influence of Eliot. And I do not think that it is accidental that this gifted poet 
showed himself at the very first in the direct line of Hardy and the war poets; that is to say, in 
the mainstream of English poetry. But in the absence of any strong direction—Hardy was very 
old and the war poets had not survived—English poetry became Americanised, and the result 
was the brilliant obscurity of Auden‟s first (1930) volume.261 
 
However, despite Hobsbaum‟s reservations as to the poetry of the later Auden, it must be noted that 
Auden is particularly problematic with regard to his actual placement in the history of modernist 
development. While it is true that his later work did diverge from the Hardian aesthetic, it is not altogether 
clear as to the degree of this deviation. Certain pre-modernist characteristics are still discernable in his 
poetic style. This is pointed out by J. Williams in Twentieth-Century British Poetry, who also sees a parallel 
in Auden‟s use of traditional English with Wordsworth‟s project to instil the „language really used by men‟ 
into poetry.
262
  Williams writes: 
Parallels with the evolution of Romanticism over and against the hegemony of classicism 
suggest themselves, in particular the use of traditional English rather than Augustan, Latinate 
forms.
263
 
 
Williams also echoes Geoffrey Thurley in seeing Auden‟s poetic motivation rooted in a quest for self-
knowledge. In this respect Auden has, 
affinities with the early Romantics. Like them, his work evolved initially from a sense of 
personal identity defined in the context of a small circle of friends and family, not of society as 
a national concept.
264
 
 
Furthermore, he shared the romantic notion that „it was the poet in person who addressed the reader from 
the page‟.265  
Whatever the case may be, Hobsbaum viewed Auden as having negative modernist tendencies and he 
laments English poetry‟s loss of a national character and Auden‟s “misspent” talent: 
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The renaissance of the 1930s rested largely on the shoulders of one man: W. H. Auden. And, as 
we have seen, he himself had ignored his earliest influences and embarked upon a misdirected 
course. […] Modern poetry was to be obscure, condensed, fantastic in diction, freed from logic. 
[…] the revolution ended in Dylan Thomas and the New Apocalypse, when poetry in England 
ceased to mean anything even to an educated reader.
266
 
 
A near-remedy to this state of affairs was the Movement: 
The poems of the Movement were self-contained, formal, and sought to be unrhetorical. Like 
most schools of poetry, the Movement proved too constricting for its more talented members. 
[…] But the Movement was a necessary spring-cleaning whose real achievement may have 
been to arouse interest in a number of poets of the 1930s who had been unjustly neglected.
267
 
 
As mentioned earlier Seamus Heaney was a protégé of Hobsbaum and it is perhaps reasonable to assume 
that Heaney‟s poetic may owe something to this fact. Heaney has been much praised over the years, 
particularly with his election to the Professorship of Poetry at Oxford University in 1989 and culminating in 
his winning a Nobel Prize for literature in 1995. However, his critics have asserted that his poetic style is 
essentially anachronistic—a throwback to pre-modernist concerns. Perhaps the most perceptive criticism of 
him is that of Al Alvarez, which is cited in James Fenton‟s The Strength of Poetry: 
If Heaney really is the best we can do, then the whole troubled, exploratory thrust of modern 
poetry has been a diversion from the right true way. Eliot and his contemporaries, Lowell and 
his, Plath and hers had it all wrong: to try to make clearings of sense and discipline and style in 
the untamed, unfenced darkness was to mistake morbidity for inspiration. It was, in the end, 
mere melodrama, understandable perhaps in the Americans who lack a tradition in these 
matters, but inexcusable in the British.
268
 
 
Although such considerations may be value-laden, they do indicate the way in which Heaney may be linked 
to the opinions of his mentor, Hobsbaum, despite the high opinion he came to have of Lowell. As I will 
attempt to show in the following pages, Heaney places great value on poetry that is dependent upon sense 
impressions. For instance, he praises the use of the authorial “I” in Yeats‟s poetry because, „it is brilliantly 
and concretely at one with the eye of the poet as retina overwhelmed by the visual evidence of infinity and 
solitude‟.269 
The influence of Wordsworth on Heaney is well known. Hugh Haughton notes that  „the Lake Poet‟s 
texts haunt Heaney more radically than those of any other poet‟,270 and though „Heaney‟s early poems do 
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not directly echo Wordsworth, his criticism of the 1970s hitches them unforgettably to the Wordsworthian 
star‟.271  Also: 
It was very much as an Irish follower of Wordsworth that Heaney first presented himself as a 
poet-critic. In critical discussions such as „Feeling and Words‟ (1974) and „The Making of 
Music‟ (1978), Heaney not only re-created Wordsworth in his own image but forged a poetic 
image of himself out of Wordsworth.
272
 
 
Furthermore: 
 
Heaney‟s sustained encounter with the Romantic poet during the 1970s played a crucial part in 
the forging of his discursive identity as a major poet, not only in the essays of Preoccupations 
(1980), which did so much to shape public perception of his work, but in the autobiographical 
poems of North (1975), Stations (1975), and the „Glanmore Sonnets‟ of Field Work (1979).273 
 
Additionally: 
 
In his introduction to The Essential Wordsworth (1988), Heaney calls the Lake Poet‟s 
achievement „the most securely founded in the canon of native English poetry‟ since Milton‟s. 
He declares him „an indispensable figure in the evolution of modern writing, a finder and 
keeper of the self-as-subject, a theorist and apologist whose Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802) 
remains definitive‟.274 
 
Wordsworth‟s penchant for writing apologia for his poetry is also apparent in Heaney who  
„has used critical prose as a powerful instrument in helping define the terms through which his own work 
can be understood. In readings, essays, interviews and lectures, he has proved himself […] an eloquent self-
promoter of his own art‟.275  Moreover, he is „not only an unreconstructed admirer of the English Romantic 
poet but an avowed heir to the Wordsworthian defence of poetry‟.276  
Similarly to Wordsworth, Heaney also sees the value of poetry as having to do with its functionality as 
an educative process in service to humanistic and ethical concerns. In his 1989 inaugural lecture on having 
been elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford University he said: 
Professors of poetry, apologists for it, practitioners of it, from Sir Philip Sidney to Wallace 
Stevens, all sooner or later have to attempt to show how poetry‟s existence at the level of art 
relates to our existence as citizens of society—how it is “of present use”.277 
 
This “present use” is closely associated with politics, as can be seen when he says: 
The truth is, the purer and more concentrated a poet‟s faculties and the more aligned within his 
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sensibility the poles of politics and transcendence, then the simpler and more distinct will be 
something that we might call the poetic DNA pattern.
278
 
 
Moreover, Heaney readily admits to humanist leanings when he says, „I am still enough of a humanist to 
believe that poetry arises from the same source as that ideal future which Derek Mahon, in his poem „The 
Sea in Winter‟, envisages‟.279  Additionally, Heaney shows his deference to Wordsworth‟s emphasis on 
poetry as a vehicle for unambiguous content by  saying that, „as Wordsworth once said, our subject is 
indeed important‟.280  
Later he says that, „the best poetry will not only register the assault of the actual and quail under the 
brunt of necessity; it will also embody the spirit‟s protest against all that‟.281 The interesting thing here is 
that Heaney views the „assault of the actual‟ as a given, independent of poetic linguistic invention and 
creativity.  His vaguely phrased qualification to this assertion („it will also embody the spirit‟s protest 
against all that‟) can be taken less seriously since such a “protest” is absent from his own poetry. (Shortly, I 
will discuss one possible reason why Heaney makes frequent use of qualification and oblique justifications 
to account for the descriptiveness apparent in his poetry.) Heaney also alludes (via Emerson—a  “pupil” of 
Wordsworth) to the Wordsworthian ideal that poetry should comprise self-reflection: 
The poet—as representative man, as representative woman—this Emersonian figure then 
comes under the strain of bearing witness in his or her own life to the plane of consciousness 
established in the poem.
282
 
 
Turning to Heaney‟s poetry, we can see that it is characterized by his use of accurate descriptions 
(Ciarán Carson refers to him as „a writer with the gift of precision‟) of the quotidian in rural settings.283  
This, he has in common with Georgian poetry with its, „country cottages, old furniture, moss-covered barns, 
rose-scented lanes, apples and cherry orchards‟. 284  Such is the accuracy of Heaney‟s descriptiveness that it 
prompts  J. W. Foster to write in The Achievement of Seamus Heaney: 
Not only are Heaney‟s poems about manual work on the farm—ploughing, planting, 
harvesting, horse-shoeing—but they are themselves manuals on how the work is actually done. 
It is amusing, for instance, to set „Churning Day‟ beside E. Estyn Evan‟s account of churning in 
Irish Heritage (1942) and Irish Folk Ways (1957).
285
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Moreover, this reliance upon descriptive accuracy lends to the charge that his poetry is readily 
paraphrasable. In „Seamus Heaney—from Major to Minor‟, R. Caldwell says, „there is too often the feel 
with his poetry that the paraphrase is the end of the matter: there is little of the multifaceted richness of 
suggestion that invites one to probe further‟.286 
Heaney is perhaps famous for his aversion to the idea that poetic language can be suggestible and 
connotative. This can be seen in Heaney‟s critique of Dylan Thomas in  The Redress of Poetry (based on a 
series of lectures he delivered as Oxford Professor of Poetry) where he says that Thomas „continued to 
place a too unenlightened trust in the plasticity of language‟.287  What he means by the word 
“unenlightened” is unclear. Is he referring to a Wordsworthian transcendentalist ideal that Thomas has 
failed to emulate? Alternatively, is he being merely subjectively pejorative? In any case, his point is clear. 
For Heaney, poetry is primarily concerned with language as unequivocal communication. In his critique of  
Thomas‟s poem „Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night‟, Heaney calls this unequivocal communication 
“knowledge”. He praises Thomas‟s poem for delivering a clear message: 
The poem does not begin with words, as the young Thomas too simply insisted that poetry 
should, but it moves towards them. And it is exactly the sensation of language on the move 
towards a destination in knowledge which imbues „Do Not Go Gentle‟ with a refreshing 
maturity.
288
 
 
Here we can see how Heaney not only admonishes the „young Thomas‟ for his assumed poetic naiveté, 
but also infers from the poem‟s “clarity of meaning” that Thomas has achieved the necessary poetic 
maturity, a maturity that has enabled him to make his meanings clear in order to „move towards a 
destination in knowledge‟ that does not „begin with words‟ (i.e. linguistic creativity). Heaney‟s use of the 
term “knowledge” is significant because it has a resonance with Wordsworth‟s belief in the „poetic 
experience as a form of knowledge‟.289  His reservations about poetic language extend also into his opinion 
of poetic artifice. Of  Thomas‟s use of it, he says that „the demand for more matter, less art, does inevitably 
arise‟.290  Elizabeth Bishop, however, has his approval because „she never allows the formal delights of her 
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art to mollify the hard realities of her subjects‟.291 
However,  Heaney appears to want his cake and eat it when he says, „Poetry cannot afford to lose its 
[…], joy in being a process of language as well as a representation of things in the world‟.292  His 
empiricism is unavoidably evident in this statement. However, his about-face on the nature of poetic 
language is puzzling. Certainly, in the Oxford lecture mentioned above Heaney is suspicious of linguistic 
ingenuity: 
And  yet, limber and absolved as linguistic inventiveness may seem in poetry,  it is not disjunct 
from or ever entirely manumitted by the critical intelligence. If it appears to be so, that may 
simply mean that there is none of said intelligence available in that particular quarter.
293
 
 
Here, Heaney places reason above artifice and content before form. Words are to be subservient at all times 
to specific and conventional meanings. There is little room here for the joy poetry evokes by „being a 
process of language‟. Could the turnaround perhaps indicate that Heaney realizes that his poetic modus 
operandi is beginning to lose currency in the more progressive circles of academic poetic discourse and that 
to fully safeguard his posthumous poetic reputation he has to enable future critics of his work to capably 
defend his reputation against charges that he is merely a nature poet? Yet, his continual wariness of the 
linguistic and formal properties of a poem is still very much evident. This can be seen in his cautious praise 
of Thomas: 
Thomas came through with a poem in a single, unfumbled movement, one with all the 
confidence of a necessary thing, one in which again at last the fantasy and extravagance of the 
imagery and diction did not dissipate themselves or his theme.
294
 
 
Heaney can be seen here, again, elevating poetic content over poetic language. This would seem to bring in 
to question his sincerity in saying that poetry cannot afford to lose its „joy in being a process of language‟.  
His preoccupation with content and clarity of meaning is also evident in his reference to a line from John 
Clare‟s, „Mouse‟s Nest‟. The line is: „With all her young ones hanging at her teats […]‟; and Heaney says 
of it: „“Hanging on” would have had certain pathetic, anthropomorphic associations that would have 
weakened the objective clarity of the whole presentation‟.295  He praises Clare for avoiding the more 
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impressionistic phrase “hanging on” in favour of the more visually accurate  „hanging at‟ that Clare does 
use. For Heaney, to sanction ambiguity in a poem would mean endangering the poem‟s Wordsworthian 
potential for the representation of mundane phenomena. He thinks it a good thing of Clare‟s „Mouse‟s Nest‟ 
that „there is an unspectacular joy and totally alert love for the one-thing-after-anotherness of the world‟.296 
However, he is aware that this approach to poetry needs defending. Consequently, in an attempt to do this 
(and also to justify his own poetic writing) he claims that there is more than mere description in Clare‟s 
poetry: 
Just because Clare‟s poetry abounds in actualities, just because it is full of precise delightful 
detail as a granary is full of grains, does not mean that it is doomed to pile up and sink down in 
its own materiality.
297
 
 
He illustrates this with reference to the cesspool in the „Mouse‟s Nest‟, which embodies, for Clare, 
not only the reality of all such places as places, with distinct characters and histories, but also 
their value as a set of memories and affections at the back of his mind. There is dreamwork 
going on here as well as photography.
298
 
 
Yet, for this to be the case there would surely be no need to admit to the photographic elements of such 
poetry as existing in the first place. To admit such, and then deny their actual affects on the reader in favour 
of an assumed “dreamwork” in operation seems pointless. If a poem is not photography, then that will be 
apparent and will not need an apology.  
Heaney excuses Clare for certain stylistic faults („lines repeating and intersecting with the trajectory of 
other lines‟299) because accurate observation underlies them:  
This is why the “ands” and “whens” and self-contained couplets and end-stopped movement of 
the lines do not irk as they might. They are clearly a function of the perception rather than a 
fault of execution. […] They are both a prerequisite and consequence of one kind of accuracy 
and immediacy.
300
 
 
By apologizing for the descriptive nature of Clare‟s poetry (and, elsewhere, poetry like it) Heaney is in 
effect apologizing for his own poetry. This is indicated in his following statement: 
The poet who would be most the poet has to attempt an act of writing that outstrips the 
conditions even as it observes them. The truly creative writer, by interposing his or her 
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perception and expression, will transfigure the conditions and effect thereby what I have been 
calling “The Redress of Poetry”.301 
 
One cannot help but sense that he regards himself too much as „the poet who would be most the poet‟. 
Here, he apologizes for descriptive poetry by claiming that (in his case at least) it is not merely descriptive. 
He claims that the descriptive poet‟s perceptions and expressions (although he is not specific as to what he 
means by the latter) will transform in some sense the appearance of objects described. Blake Morrison and 
Andrew Motion in the Introduction to their anthology The Penguin Book of Contemporary British Poetry 
unwittingly indicate that for Heaney transforming an object‟s appearance is achieved through 
defamiliarisation.
302
  Concerning his poem „The Grauballe Man‟ they write:  
As Heaney‟s eye ranges over the anatomy it transforms skin and bone to a clutter of inanimate 
things: the wrist to „bog oak‟, the heel to a „basalt egg‟, the mortal wound to a „dark elderberry 
place‟, and so on.303 
 
It should be pointed out that defamiliarisation is dependent upon vision in order to revive our awareness of 
objects that have become over-familiar through constant exposure to them. To this extent, it is the servant 
of empiricist writing. Seen in this light, Heaney‟s transfigurations are not as transcendental as perhaps he 
would have us believe.  
Heaney figures largely in Morrison and Motion's anthology. Morrison and Motion are mainstream poets, 
both believe in the transparency of language and the communicative aspects of poetry. Indeed, Morrison 
was responsible for an apologia for Movement poetry (The Movement: English Poetry and Fiction of the 
1950s) and Motion is Britain‟s Poet Laureate. Given these mainstream credentials, it is to be expected that 
the anthology would include mostly empiricist poetry. Therefore, it is odd that Morrison and Motion claim 
that the anthology marks in some sense a continuation of the spirit of High Modernism. It is this attempt by 
Morrison and Motion to “rebrand” the anthology‟s descriptive poetry as non-descriptive, in order to suggest 
that the descriptive aspects of the poetry are merely apparent rather than actual, that I will deal with now.   
In the Introduction, Morrison and Motion claim that the poets in this volume „show greater imaginative 
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freedom and linguistic daring than the previous poetic generation‟.304   They also add that, „The new spirit 
in British poetry began to make itself felt in Northern Ireland during the late 1960s and early 70s‟.305  This 
is undoubtedly referring to the Belfast branch of the Group run by Hobsbaum at Queen‟s University. We 
can be confident of this because several  of  this group‟s attendees are included in this anthology: Seamus 
Heaney, Derek Mahon and Michael Longley.
306
  As we have seen, their mentor, Philip Hobsbaum, was 
critical of Eliot, Pound, and Modernism in general. In addition, I have shown that his protégé, Heaney, is a 
poet who believes in truthfulness and clarity in poetic utterances. It is curious, therefore, that Morrison and 
Motion describe the poets in the anthology as displaying „a literary self-consciousness reminiscent of the 
modernists‟.307  While it is true that the anthology‟s empiricist assumptions are modernistic, it would not be 
accurate to credit much of the poetry as particularly exemplifying a literary self-consciousness (or a 
postmodernist playfulness, for that matter). In any case, the claimed for innovativeness of this is 
emasculated by Morrison and Motion when they qualify it by saying of the poets: „[…] this does not imply 
that their work is frivolous or amoral‟.308  With this caveat, we have an echo of a liberal humanist view of 
poetry as having to have “worth”, “value” and so on. 
The poets in this anthology are praised by Morrison and Motion for „making the familiar strange 
again‟.309 As mentioned earlier with regard to Heaney, the practice of defamiliarisation is dependent upon 
vision as its aim is to refresh our perception of the world and to focus our attention on its objects. To this 
extent, it is operates empirically. Another point worthy of praise for Morrison and Motion is the outlook,  
which expresses itself, in some poets, in a preference for metaphor and poetic bizarrerie to 
metonymy and plain speech; in others it is evident in a renewed interest in narrative—that is, in 
describing the details and complexities of (often dramatic) incidents. [These poets are] not 
poets working in a confessional white heat but dramatists and story-tellers.
310
 
 
There are several points to be noted about this passage. Firstly, the term „poetic bizarrerie‟ is left undefined 
by Morrison and Motion, who also fail to cite examples of it in this anthology. Therefore, I will regard it as 
a red herring.  Secondly, a preference for metaphor is hardly novel, Ted Hughes was heavily dependent on 
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it. Thirdly, metonymy is a legitimate poetic device and one that is non-empiricist; however, Morrison and 
Motion also fail to cite instances of it in the anthology‟s poetry. Fourthly, the use of narrative and plain 
speech in poetry to describe dramatic events is something that, as we have seen, Edward Thomas, Robert 
Frost and Philip Hobsbaum would advocate. As an apologia for this anthology‟s poetic operating 
procedures, this passage leaves much to be desired.  
What is most telling about the anthology‟s Introduction is its emphasis upon visual perception and the 
act of witnessing. Morrison and Motion point out that most of the poets have developed procedures 
„designed to emphasize the gap between themselves and their subjects‟; and that these poets are „not 
inhabitants of their own lives so much as intrigued observers, not victims but onlookers‟.311  The poet who 
most embodies this in the anthology is Craig Raine, whose “Martian” poetry typifies the poetic outlook of 
the anthology‟s Introduction with regard to its championing of visual perception, simile and 
defamiliarisation. Morrison and Motion apologise for Martian poetry by claiming that far from its being the 
cold, arid, visually-based entity that it is usually taken for it is in actuality imbued with emotion: „It would 
be wrong to think that the Martians‟ ingenuity prevents them from expressing emotion: their way of looking 
is also a way of feeling‟.312   However, like most of the assertions made by Morrison and Motion in this 
Introduction, it is not instanced by textual examples or any other evidence—it is to be taken on faith. 
In this chapter, I have sought to trace the development of  “Wordsworthian empiricism” in the various 
critical readings of Wordsworth in the twentieth century. In doing so, I have suggested that such readings of 
Wordsworth (even those that viewed him principally in transcendentalist terms) tended to spotlight his 
empiricism. Consequently, such empiricism came to be seen by the majority of  that century‟s poets as 
having a value in and of itself to the extent that it became widely regarded as the best model for poetic 
composition. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Empirical and Non-Empirical Identifiers 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will show how the influence of Wordsworthian empiricism has manifested itself in 
twentieth-century poetry and how this has limited the hermeneutical value of the poetry concerned. 
Later in the chapter, I will look at various uses of language that allow poetry to disengage itself from 
Wordsworthian empiricism and to generate a non-empiricist sort of poetry. In The Making of the 
Reader, David Trotter notes a concern „written into the recent history of American, English and Irish 
literature‟: namely „the disappearance of the Common Reader‟.1  He sees this concern as having 
particularly affected poets more than others because „their art is felt to be peculiarly at odds with 
modern civilization‟.2  At one time, the widely shared grammar of the Common Reader was so secure 
that „he or she could convert a wide range of linguistic sequences into literary structures and meanings 
without hesitation‟.3  He cites F. R. Leavis as saying that this situation was „a homogenous culture 
[which contained] one predominant pervasive ethos, grammar and idiom‟.4  Trotter adds that „the reader 
born  into a homogenous culture develops a linguistic and a literary “grammar” at one and the same 
time; to make sense of the culture is to make sense of the literature which it has produced and which 
confirms it‟.5 For Leavis, the Industrial Revolution that had destroyed this cultural homogeneity, 
replacing the shared community of citizens and readers with aggregated groupings, both isolated and 
internally divided.
6
  In such a situation, cultural homogeneity was replaced by confusion and 
relativism.
7
   Trotter quotes Leavis‟s exasperated question in light of this state of affairs: „By what 
standards, what criteria, what principles can we bring order into our reading?‟8   Trotter comments, „It 
seemed to Leavis, as it has to many others before and since, that the stable and easily identifiable 
Common Reader had given way to an anonymous crowd of uncommon readers, each loyal to a tiny sect 
or to himself alone‟.9  The important thing about Common Readers was that they were easily 
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identifiable. Because the poet and reader had been schooled to respond, as Trotter puts it, to the „same 
signals of limited variety‟ it was likely that a poem was read for the “right” reasons—the reasons for 
which it had been written.
10
 As the numbers of readers grew larger, „the identity of the individual reader 
could no longer be known or deduced‟.11  
The significance of this to our discussion of Wordsworth becomes apparent when we recognize that 
this plurality of readership worried him, because he believed he had important philosophical insights 
that could only be appreciated by the right audience. His attitude towards the “wrong” audience can be 
seen in the following: 
Wordsworth insisted that his work would not have any effect on those who „do not read 
books‟ but „merely snatch a glance at them that they may talk about them‟; such people 
were clearly incompetent, and the poems would make no effort to capture their idle 
glances.
12
 
 
This tacit desire to communicate with a discriminating readership can be viewed as a further affirmation 
of Wordsworth‟s empiricist poetic aims. By wishing to limit communication to a select audience, he is 
acknowledging that whatever he has to say is of such value that its overt meaning cannot be allowed to 
fall into the hands of readers who may misinterpret him. He is signalling that his poetry is content 
driven and that this content can be successfully communicated through poetic language. As we saw in 
an earlier chapter, Wordsworth particularly sought to use poetry to communicate his moral and social 
philosophy to an educated readership; the quoted passage merely emphasises this. The legacy of his 
desire to communicate “important” content through poetic language can be found in much of the poetry 
written since his time. Whilst I recognise that not all poetry since then is “philosophical” in the sense 
that Wordsworth‟s poetry is, there are certainly linguistic elements in the majority of it that Wordsworth 
would appreciate as being beneficial to a clearer communication between poet and reader. With this in 
mind, I would now like to turn to the main purpose of this present chapter. 
The view that has been expressed throughout this thesis is that the influence of Wordsworth‟s 
empiricist poetic aesthetic on twentieth-century poetry has been largely negative. That is to say that it 
has become the received standard by which poetic writing is to be measured. This standard is evident in 
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certain effects of language that I call Empirical Identifiers because of the ways in which they encourage 
exegetical closure through their functioning as referents to phenomena. It is my view that these 
Empirical Identifiers owe their existence in large part to Wordsworth‟s theory of poetics. Because of 
this, I think it appropriate to examine, in this chapter, their effect on poetic composition in the twentieth 
century. I will also look at their opposites, which I call Non-Empirical Identifiers because of the ways in 
which they invite readers to participate in the creation of individual meaning and significance from 
language. These Identifiers, by enabling a ready recognition of empirical and non-empirical writing 
procedures in poetry, may prove useful as diagnostic devices for future criticism.  
Aside from suggesting some further critical tools that may be of use to criticism there is also the 
possibility that this undertaking will have artistic value in that it may encourage the individual reader to 
ultimately decide upon the meaning of a poetic text, either unconsciously or by volition. By “volition” I 
mean the conscious determination of the reader to decide upon any one of a number of associations the 
words and phrases of any given sentence suggest, and to choose this particular association as the 
constituent of meaning despite its being the less obvious or appropriate choice (in comparison to the 
others) given the complete denotative meaning the sentence‟s lexis implies. This sort of practice is 
possible because the poetic text is arguably without intentionality: both in the sense of having no 
meaning inherently, and of the impossibility of its having an authorial intent conferred upon it.  
Empirical Identifiers 
By Empirical Identifiers, I mean those aspects of a poem that function as controlling agents to limit 
ambiguity and increase the possibilities for closure. There are seven of these in all:  
1. Paraphrasable Sentences. 
2. Grammatical Syntax. 
3. Conventional Punctuation. 
4. Sense-Data Descriptions of Events and Objects. 
5. Absence of Ellipsis. 
6. Absence of Metonymy. 
7. Use of Simile and Metaphor. 
 
The first three do not inhibit plural interpretation by themselves but do so only when used in 
conjunction with the four remaining ones. It is these four I would like now to discuss. I will deal with 
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the former three as the need arises during the course of this discussion. 
Empirical Identifier No. 4:  
Sense-Data Descriptions of Events and Objects 
 
Sense-data descriptions of events and objects attempt to make knowable that which cannot be known. 
Delineating the objects of perception using language is bound to be a failed enterprise if it is motivated 
by the desire to make the experience, or “essence”, of these objects more palpable (and hence 
knowable) than perception alone can render them. In a passage on Locke, which appears in J. P. Ward‟s 
Wordsworth’s Language of Men, it is explained that Locke doubts the ability of language to express the 
“essences” of objects:    
Locke argues that „the greatest parts of words are general‟. But we never apprehend the 
general as sense experience. We only apprehend the particular, and this therefore has to be 
expressed verbally not in single words but in their combination. Thus „tree‟ is general but 
„tall red tree‟ is more particular and nearer to what might be an actual experience. But if the 
total reality is a continuous single substance, as science seemed now to have confirmed, it 
follows that no particular substance has an „essence‟ unique to itself, and therefore no word 
can be expressing such an essence. Rather, says Locke, it is the general abstraction that 
expresses the only „essence‟ there can be, namely, the essence of the species. But, as said, 
we can never sense that general essence. We can never sense the only thing the word can 
express.
13
 
 
Empirical Identifier No. 5:  
Absence of Ellipsis 
 
An absence of ellipses while not inhibiting indeterminacy of meaning, nevertheless, greatly reduces the 
possibility of it occurring. In Robert C. Holub‟s Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction, the 
importance of “gaps” in a text and their relation to indeterminacy is discussed in a section on the 
phenomonologist Roman Ingarden who, 
considers the literary work to be a purely intentional or heteronomous object, i.e. [...] 
dependent on an act of consciousness. It consists of four layers or strata, each of which 
affects the others, and two distinct dimensions. [...] What is particularly important for 
Ingarden‟s theory of cognition of the literary work is the notion that these layers and 
dimensions form a skeleton or „schematized structure‟ to be completed by the reader. [...] 
The objects represented in a literary work exhibit „spots‟ or „points‟ or „places‟ of 
indeterminacy [...]. All objects, according to phenomenological theory, have an infinite 
number of determinants, and no act of cognition can take into account every determinant of 
any particular object. But while a real object must have a particular determinant—a real 
object cannot be merely colored; it must have a particular color—the objects in a literary 
work, because they are intentionally projected from meaning units and aspects, must retain 
some degree of indeterminacy. For example, if we read the sentence, „The child bounced 
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the ball‟, we are confronted with a myriad of „gaps‟ in the represented object. Whether the 
child in this case is 10 or 6 years old, whether it is male or female, brown or white, 
red-haired or blond—all of these features are not contained in this sentence and thus 
constitute „gaps‟ or points of indeterminacy.14 
 
From this we can gather that if even non-elliptical sentences contain indeterminate gaps then certainly 
elliptical sentences will guarantee them. 
Empirical Identifier No. 6:  
Absence of Metonymy 
 
Metonymy is the replacement of one word for another with which it is associated. Examples are: “The 
press” for the news media, and “The Crown” for the monarchy. Metonymy operates through a 
connectedness to a thing rather than a resemblance to it. For instance, the metonym “The press”, which 
stands for news media, derives from the fact that a printing press creates newspapers; and the metonym 
“The Crown”, standing for the monarchy, derives from the crown that royalty historically wore. 
Metonymy is not used to transfer qualities to things, as is the case with metaphor; instead metonymy 
transfers an entire set of associations that may or may not be essential to the meaning.  
Absence of metonymy is indicative of empiricism‟s attempts at a confirmation of reality: 
confirmation being rendered via sense-data descriptions of phenomena and experiences. Metonymy is 
not dependent upon sense-data descriptions but on the production of abstractions from particulars. 
Abstractions are mental formulations of associated ideas independent of sense-data and relying, instead, 
upon language‟s ability to connote meaning without reference to signifieds.   
Empirical Identifier No. 7:  
Use of Simile and Metaphor 
 
Simile and, to a lesser extent, metaphor are contingent upon a recognition of comparisons. In the 
former, the comparison is explicit, in the latter it is implied. Both are dependent upon vision and the 
rendering of the objects of vision into language. Ted Hughes says of these devices: 
It is one of those curious facts that when two things are compared in a metaphor or a simile, 
we see both of them much more distinctly than if they were mentioned separately as having 
nothing to do with each other […] You are forced to look more closely […] How is a 
dragonfly like a helicopter? 
15
 
 
The question „How is a dragonfly like a helicopter?‟ can only be asked if one assumes that the metaphor 
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representing the dragonfly is, indeed, representing a dragonfly and not some other creature or thing. 
That such an assumption is made indicates the restrictive nature of metaphor as an agent of 
indeterminacy, and demonstrates its effectiveness as a device that encourages closure and draws 
attention away from the syntactical to the referent. We see this also in Kate Rhode‟s „Out of Water‟: 
Not far away a man fishes, 
shirtless and glimmering. 
 
He spreads his small net 
as a waiter casts his cloth 
deftly, with one smart flick. 
It comes back shaking with life, 
 
Silver beads in a fancy choker 
16
 
 
Here the comparison of the fishing net with the waiter‟s cloth renders both more palpable. The use of 
defamilarization on the image of the fish in the net achieves the same result.  
An Example and Analysis of Empiricist Poetry  
The following is an account of Anthony Easthope‟s analysis of Edward Thomas‟s, „Adlestrop‟:  
  Yes, I remember Adlestrop— 
  The name, because one afternoon 
Of heat the express-train drew up there 
Unwontedly. It was late June. 
 
The steam hissed. Someone cleared his throat 
No one left and no one came 
On the bare platform. What I saw 
Was Adlestrop—only the name 
 
And willows, willow-herb, and grass, 
And meadowsweet, and haycocks dry, 
No whit less still and lonely fair 
Than the high cloudlets in the sky. 
 
And for that minute a blackbird sang 
Close by, and round him, mistier, 
Farther and farther, all the birds 
Of Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire.
17
 
 
Easthope sees the poem‟s opening as confronting the speaker with a disturbing sense of a separation 
between the accustomed unity of subject and object: 
At first, when the train stops and there is no sign of life on the bare platform, the speaker 
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feels a little crisis of subjectivity, as though meaning has dropped out of his world leaving 
him separated from it, facing only writing, a name, Adlestrop.
18
 
 
This „crisis‟, though, is soon dispelled by his experiencing natural phenomena as being connected with 
his own feelings. Seeing the willows, grass and meadows as, 
 No whit less still and lonely fair 
 Than the high cloudlets in the sky  
 
The disconnection between subject and object is now restored: and he is able to confirm both his 
independent existence and that of phenomena.  For Easthope, „Adlestrop‟, 
represents an „I‟ who is coherent and self-possessed, a unified subject,  secure in its ability 
to affirm „I remember‟, „I saw‟. The speaker does have a moment of loss—silence except 
for hissing steam, emptiness, the strange writing—but this is quickly recuperated into 
imaginary plenitude [...]. And though the language of the poem is elaborate at certain points 
(„Unwontedly‟, „No whit‟, „cloudlets‟) this does not interfere with the overall clarity of the 
statement—initial hesitations and hiatuses are overcome in the fluent syntax and confident 
tone of the ending. This is a speaker who is sure that language can represent the real.
19
 
 
Easthope‟s methodology is to draw attention to the suppressed existential insecurities that he believes 
motivate the sort of poetic aesthetic subscribed to by Thomas. Easthope‟s hypothesis implies that the 
speaker of this sort of poetry assumes a natural harmonious unity between subject and object, which is 
ordinarily in operation, but that occasionally a „crisis of subjectivity‟ is experienced which causes the 
speaker to feel separated from his physical surroundings. Consequently, this produces a fear that the 
union between subject and object may be illusory. This anxiety is alleviated only when the speaker more 
fully experiences the natural phenomena surrounding him.  We see some aspect of this in what I said in 
chapter one concerning Wordsworth‟s childhood need to physically touch the natural objects around 
him in order that he would not lose grip with reality and be forced into an uncomfortable solipsism. 
The Functioning of Empirical Identifiers 
I will use Simon Armitage‟s poem „Night Shift‟ to illustrate how Empirical Identifiers function. This 
poem appears in The New Poetry edited by Michael Hulse, David Kennedy and David Morley:  
Once again I have missed you by moments;  
steam hugs the rim of the just-boiled kettle,  
 
water in the pipes finds its own level.  
In another room there are other signs  
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of someone having left: dust, unsettled  
by the sweep of the curtains; the clockwork  
 
contractions of the paraffin heater.  
For weeks now we have come and gone, woken  
 
in acres of empty bedding, written  
lipstick love-notes on the bathroom mirror  
 
and in this space we have worked and paid for  
we have found ourselves, but lost each other.  
 
Upstairs, at least, there is understanding  
in things more telling than lipstick kisses:  
 
the air, still hung with spores of your hairspray;  
body-heat stowed in the crumpled duvet.
20 
 
This poem contains all of the Empirical Identifiers: paraphrasable sentences, grammatical syntax, 
conventional punctuation, sense-data descriptions of events and objects, absence of ellipses, absence of 
metonymy and the use of metaphor.  
It is similar to „Adlestrop‟ in that the speaker is confronted with the sense of a separation between the 
unity of subject and object. He fears his self-identity diminishing without the physical presence of his 
partner. To remedy this he recreates her presence by alluding to her through sense-data descriptions of 
objects she has recently come into contact with: the steam on the rim of the recently switched-off kettle; 
the unsettled dust caused by the „sweep of the curtains‟; written lipstick notes on the bathroom mirror; 
the scent of her hairspray; the duvet retaining her body heat. These things are indexes of her actual 
presence elsewhere, and confirm the speaker‟s existence as a separate identity both from her and these 
objects. It is this comforting knowledge that enables the speaker to reconnect the subject with the 
object. Here is how the Empirical Identifiers each relate to this poem. 
Empirical Identifier No. 1:  
Paraphrasable Sentences 
 
The poem consists entirely of paraphrasable sentences. Here is a paraphrase of it: 
You have just left the building. So recently, in fact, that the kettle still has steam on its rim 
after just being switched off. However, this is not the only sign that your departure has been 
recent: in the other room, the dust is still floating about from the action of the curtains you 
opened. Similarly, the heater you have just turned off makes a noise, as it cools, like the 
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regular ticking of a clock.  
 
For weeks now we have not spent much time together because we work at different times. 
And because of this inconvenient arrangement we have to sleep and wake at different times, 
which means that when I wake you are not in the bed with me.  
 
The only way we can communicate is by leaving messages of our love for each other 
written using your lipstick (lipstick: because lipstick is a symbol of romance—isn‟t it?) on 
the bathroom mirror. Moreover, isn‟t it ironic that in this home of ours (one that we have 
worked and paid for) we have each gained self-knowledge but, sadly, lost a certain intimacy 
of each other?  
 
Nevertheless, back to what I was saying before: about the objects I am looking at which 
represent your physical existence in this room and, by implication, your continuing 
existence elsewhere. For example, the scent of your hairspray still lingers, and the bed is 
still warm from the heat of your body. These things remind me of us making love and  are, 
therefore, more sensuous indicators of our physical relationship than are the lipstick 
messages I have already mentioned. 
 
Paraphrasable sentences are not exclusive to mainstream twentieth-century poetry; most poetry up 
until the first decade of that century exhibited them to varying degrees. That Wordsworth‟s poetry did 
similar, should not, however, be held as a particular criticism of him as given the pre-Modernist period 
in which he wrote such a practice was probably unavoidable. I say “probably” because its avoidance 
was not out of the question as the following lines from Blake‟s „The Book of Thel‟ may demonstrate: 
The eternal gates‟ terrific porter lifted the northern bar: 
Thel enter‟d in & saw the secrets of the land unknown. 
She saw the couches of the dead, & where the fibrous roots 
Of every heart on earth infixes deep its restless twists: 
A land of sorrows & of tears where never smile was seen.
21
 
 
                                                                                                         (103-7) 
Whilst these lines are not inevitably immune to paraphrase, they make obvious their difference with the 
opening lines from Wordsworth‟s „Daffodils‟: 
I wandered lonely as a cloud 
That floats on high o‟er vales and hills, 
When all at once I saw a crowd, 
A host, of daffodils; 
Beside the lake, beneath the trees, 
Fluttering and dancing in the breeze.
22
 
 
                                                                                        (1-6) 
A simple paraphrase of these lines is: 
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I walked along, alone like an isolated cloud in the sky, when I suddenly saw some yellow 
daffodils blowing in the breeze, under the trees next to the lake. 
 
Similarly, the following stanza from his poem, „The Waggoner‟, 
 
„Tis spent—this burning day of June! 
Soft darkness o‟er its latest gleams is stealing; 
The buzzing dor-hawk, round and round, is wheeling,— 
That solitary bird 
Is all that can be heard 
In silence deeper far than that of the deepest noon! 
23
 
                                                                             
                                                                             (1-6) 
 
can be paraphrased as follows: 
 
This hot June day is over and night is drawing in. Only the vibrating trill of a single nightjar 
circling in the sky breaks the profound silence. 
 
Such an exercise in paraphrase would be difficult with non-empiricist poetry. 
Empirical Identifier No. 2:  
Grammatical Syntax 
 
The grammar and sentence structure is conventional, and places the communication of content above 
any stylistic or formal considerations. If the grammar were not conventional, meaning would become 
plural as can be seen in the following lines from „Into the Day‟ by J. H. Prynne: 
Who does we reign our royal house 
is roofed with fateful slates.
24 
 
These lines begin with the words „who does‟ which immediately puts us into questioning mode, but the 
next word, „we‟, draws our attention to the grammatical inappropriateness of the preceding word, 
„does‟, in its location between „who‟ and „we‟. We have been led to expect a question but the 
grammatically incorrect syntax has frustrated this expectation. We are left instead with a language 
which rather than denoting a position of enquiry relies, instead, on connotation for this effect. This sort 
of  “question” belongs to neither an ontological nor an epistemological enquiry (both products of 
empirical reasoning) but to an enquiry that is syntactical rather than referential.  
Similarly, „our royal house is roofed with fateful slates‟ although syntactically correct contain the 
juxtaposition of „fateful‟ with „slates‟, two words not usually associated or combined with each other. 
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This cannot be said of „roofed‟ and „slate‟ which often share the same collocation. If  the  word „fateful‟ 
had not been included there would be little room for plurality of meaning. The word „slates‟ would 
mean solely roofing materials. It is the juxtaposition of „fateful‟ and „slates‟ that produces the plurality. 
A few of the dictionary definitions of the word „slate‟ are: 1) a fine-grained rock that can be easily split 
into thin layers and is used as a roofing material. 2) a roofing tile of slate. 3) a writing tablet of slate. 4) 
a dark grey colour. 5) a list of candidates in an election. „Slate‟ is, thus, rich in connotation. The 
addition of „fateful‟ enables two of these meanings to become appropriate. For example, it is quite 
possible to have a fateful dark grey colour—as in the sense of an omen. So, too, is it possible to have a 
fateful group of electoral candidates.  
If  we were to choose this latter image for one of the meanings of „fateful slates‟ we could make it fit 
into the rest of the sentence (if it can rightly be called one) by opening up the meanings of  „our  royal 
house is roofed with‟. This is simple, as the idea of electoral candidates enables „royal house‟ to connote 
a political arena of some sort as suggested by the word „house‟ (The Houses of Parliament or The White 
House, for instance). The word „roofed‟ connotes a „covering over‟—a protection of some sort as in the 
image of a bird‟s wing covering and protecting its young. If we take this as our connotation, then one of 
the many meanings of „our royal house is roofed with fateful slates‟ could be: „Our political system is 
protected from tyranny by its processes of electing political candidates who are under oath (fated) to 
guarantee this freedom from tyranny‟.  
The same sort of exegesis can be performed even with lines that are grammatically sparser, such as 
the following: 
I a egg  
I a waffle  
I broken 
the better to live 
25
 
 
For example, if we look at the words „egg‟, „waffle‟, „broken‟ and „better to live‟ it is possible to free-
associate from each one. From „egg‟, we can get to “delicate”, or “clever” (as in “egg-head”) or “baby” 
(as in “chicklet”). „Waffle‟ has another meaning apart from a food; it also means: “Pause or hold back 
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in uncertainty or unwillingness”. „Broken‟ can mean, “broken physically” or “broken emotionally”, the 
word can also mean: “interrupt”. „Better to live‟ can mean “able to live”, “more fit to live” or “more 
worthy of life”  
My interpretation of these lines is: “I am an unborn baby (egg). I sense my mother's uncertainty about 
having me (waffle). I hope she does not abort me (broken). I am worthy of life (better to live). 
Consequently, from a set of ungrammatical phrases it is possible to confer a depth of meaning. Such 
interpretations as given in the above two examples would be difficult with lines that were grammatically 
syntactical, as are, for instance, the following from Wordsworth‟s, „The Idle Shepherd-Boys‟: 
The valley rings with mirth and joy; 
Among the hills the echoes play 
A never ending song, 
To welcome in the May. 
The magpie chatters with delight; 
The mountain raven‟s youngling brood 
Have left the mother and the nest; 
And they go rambling east and west 
In search of their own food; 
Or through the glittering vapours dart to 
In very wantonness of heart.
26
 
 
                                                      (1-11) 
 
Empirical Identifier No. 3:   
Conventional Punctuation 
 
Every comma, semi-colon, and full stop is in the “right” place. If the punctuation were not conventional, 
the poem would be more amenable to plural interpretation. I will use as an example lines nine and ten 
from Helen Kidd‟s „The Paper City‟: 
Hills in the West fumbling the sky over 
a damp moulder of ground where marsh spooks stand.
27
 
 
I will quote Kidd‟s own analysis of these lines in relation to their flexibility of meaning and 
punctuation:  
Similarly, punctuation can impose a straight-jacket on meaning, whereas removing it can 
allow a lexical item to spill over into an entirely different or ambiguous usage, thus 
deepening the poem‟s field of association. For example „over‟ in line nine [...] can be read 
to refer back into its own line as meaning „all over the sky‟ or it can connect with line ten as 
„over a damp moulder of ground‟. By placing it at the end of the line it effects a double 
 
 
 
 
176 
movement, backwards, as I have said, and also forward, operating as an open link with the 
following line.
28 
  
Empirical Identifier No. 4:  
Sense-Data Descriptions of Events and Objects 
 
The use of description is essential in the speaker‟s attempt to reconnect subject and object. 
Confirmation of phenomena independent of perception is required for full mental equilibrium. To this 
end, detail is important. It is not sufficient that there is steam on the kettle: the steam has to „hug‟ the 
„rim‟. It is also essential to tell us that the kettle has just boiled. This attention to detail is designed to 
drive home the idea that precision in description is a means to a direct knowledge of phenomena. The 
speaker is almost obsessive in his need to confirm this: „the clockwork / contractions of the paraffin 
heater‟, „lipstick love-notes on the bathroom mirror‟, „the air, still hung with spores of your hairspray‟. 
This concentration on precision echoes a stanza from Frank O‟Hara‟s „Cambridge‟: 
 
It is still raining and the yellow-green cotton fruit 
looks silly round a window giving out on winter trees 
with only three drab leaves left. The hot plate works, 
it is the sole heat on earth, and instant coffee. I  
put on my warm corduroy pants, a heavy maroon sweater, 
and wrap myself in my old maroon bathrobe.  
 
O‟Hara was considered by many critics to be an innovative poet, reacting against descriptive realism in 
poetic writing, however in this stanza, at least, this is not the case. What we see here is descriptive prose 
that leaves little to the reader‟s imagination. In contrast to this, let us look at some song lyrics, one by 
Leonard Cohen and two by Bob Dylan. In Cohen‟s „Night Comes On‟ from the album Various 
Positions, we have this verse: 
I said mother I‟m frightened, 
the thunder and the lightening, 
I‟ll never get through this alone. 
She said I‟ll be with you, 
my shawl wrapped around you, 
my hand on your head when you go. 
And the night came on, 
it was very calm. 
I wanted the night to go on and on 
but she said go back, 
go back to the world. 
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Unlike O‟Hara, Cohen is not averse to generalising. Consequently, this verse is pregnant with 
interpretative possibilities. From the beginning of this verse, ambiguity is allowed to operate in that we 
cannot be certain if the speaker is addressing his actual biological mother or whether  “mother” is a 
metaphor for God or “Mother Nature”. Similarly, we cannot be sure whether the thunder and lightening 
that frightens him is literal or metaphorical. The imprecision surrounding his fear serves to enrich 
listeners‟ experience of the song and allows them to decide for themselves the precise nature of this 
“fear”. Moreover, this imprecision allows for numerous enquiries. The speaker‟s mother tells him that 
she will be with him when he goes. Where is he going? Is he going into the fearful situation represented 
by the thunder and lightening? Is this situation an existential experience analogous to what Christian 
contemplatives have referred to as “the dark night of the soul”? Is the “night” in „the night came on‟ 
also metaphorical? Perhaps, it stands for a feeling of comfort and reassurance brought about by the 
knowledge that his biological mother/God/Nature is with him in some sense. If so, does he want it to 
continue? He probably does but something tells him to „go back to the world‟. Who tells him this: the 
“mother” figure or the “night” (whatever the latter represents)? That this verse can invite such questions 
indicates its superiority to the O‟Hara stanza quoted earlier.  
Similar ambiguities and the questions they prompt can be found in the following verse from  Dylan‟s 
„Changing of the Guards‟ from the album Street Legal: 
Fortune calls. 
I stepped forth from the shadows, to the marketplace, 
Merchants and thieves, hungry for power, my last deal gone down. 
She‟s smelling sweet like the meadows where she was born, 
On midsummer‟s eve, near the tower.  
 
Like Cohen, Dylan is not afraid to generalise. He is also unafraid to mix poetic registers, instances of 
which are his use of archaic-sounding phrases such as „I stepped forth‟, „smelling sweet like the 
meadows‟ and „on midsummer‟s eve‟ alongside the more demotic „last deal gone down‟. This adds a 
linguistic variety whilst paying homage to his poetic inheritance. The verse states at its beginning that 
„fortune calls‟, but we are not told for whom. Is it for the speaker? Is it for the listeners? Is it for 
humanity in general? Dylan leaves the choice up to us. The verse then introduces a persona with „I 
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stepped forth from the shadows‟ but this persona is not developed or elaborated upon, and we are left 
guessing as to its identity. Even the word „shadows‟ (so vague that Pound surely would have frowned 
upon it) leaves open innumerable interpretive possibilities. Furthermore, phrases such as „merchants and 
thieves‟, and „hungry for power‟, not only function as specific symbols for corruption, decay and 
amorality, but as more general statements about the nature of the human condition.  In addition, more 
questions are prompted by the figure of the woman. Who is the woman who is „smelling sweet‟? How 
is she like the meadows? Why is the word „meadows‟ plural—how can she be born in more than one 
meadow? Is the meadow a meadow? If not what does it symbolise? What is the tower—is that symbolic 
also?   
Similarly with Dylan‟s song „The Wicked Messenger‟, more questions are raised than answered. The 
first verse is: 
There was a wicked messenger 
from Eli he did come,  
with a mind that multiplied 
the smallest matter.  
When questioned who had sent for him, 
he answered with his thumb,  
for his tongue it could not speak, but only flatter. 
 
We note immediately the presense of ambiguity with the line: „from Eli he did come‟. We are not told if 
Eli is a place or a person. The name has biblical connotations and can easily be a person. In the Old 
Testament Eli was the judge and high priest of Israel and although loyal to God, his reluctance to 
remove his two corrupt sons from the priesthood resulted in disgrace.  Dylan‟s lack of indication as to 
whom or what Eli is allows us to perhaps see a biblical reference in the name. If we take the name as 
referring to the biblical Eli then we have to ask the question: If the messenger was sent by Eli (who was 
a faithful servant of God) why is he seen as wicked? Is it because his mind „multiplied the smallest 
matter‟ (possibly meaning he was neurotic), or that his „tongue it could not speak, but only flatter‟ 
(possibly meaning he was a liar)? Are these common human failings sufficient grounds for someone to 
be designated as wicked? Alternatively, perhaps the messenger is wicked because there is a crudity 
about him—he „answered with his thumb‟ (he gave the finger, perhaps?). For want of detailed 
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information, we simply do not know.  
Still more mysterious is the line: „When questioned who had sent for him‟. This alludes to the 
possibility that perhaps Eli is not a person but a place since whoever sent for the messenger was 
requesting it from another geographical location than the one the messenger inhabited. If Eli is a person, 
then Eli would have been the one who sent him—there would be no need for a second person to request 
it.  
With the second verse we have: 
He stayed behind the assembly hall, 
it was there he made his bed. 
Oftentimes he could be seen returning, 
until one day he just appeared 
with a note in his hand which read, 
„The soles of my feet, I swear they‟re burning‟. 
 
From the first two lines of this verse, we obtain the impression that the people of the community he has 
entered have shunned him, which has forced him to live in less than hospitable surroundings. There is 
irony in this, in that his bed is behind the assembly hall—a place that one often associates with the 
(usually friendly) gathering of a community, yet he has been isolated. With the line: „Oftentimes he 
could be seen returning‟, more questions are prompted. From where is he returning? Is it from Eli (be it 
a place or person)? What is the reason for the frequency of his trips to and from the community? Is he 
on some secret errand—if so, for whom? When he does return from one of his trips Dylan describes it 
as: „until one day he just appeared‟—no one has seen him returning on this occasion. The note he is 
carrying which reads: „The soles of my feet, I swear they‟re burning‟, seems ominous. Does it indicate 
some sort of eternal judgment and damnation for him and/or the community? The final verse is: 
Oh, the leaves began to fallin‟ 
and the seas began to part,  
and the people that confronted him were many. 
And he was told but these few words 
which opened up his heart 
„If you cannot bring good news, then don‟t bring any‟. 
 
The first two line of this verse have apocalyptic connotations. The falling leaves evocative of decay and 
death and the parting seas connoting massive geological and meteorological upheavals redolent of End 
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Time prophesies. Such is the message that he delivers to the community that he is confronted by them 
with the words: „If you cannot bring good news, then don‟t bring any‟. All this is very different from the 
descriptiveness of the following stanza from Wordsworth‟s „Resolution and Independence‟: 
There was a roaring in the wind all night; 
The rain came heavily and fell in floods; 
But now the sun is rising clam and bright; 
The birds are singing in the distant woods; 
Over his own sweet voice the Stock-dove broods; 
The Jay makes answer as the Magpie chatters; 
And all the air is filled with pleasant noise of waters.
29
 
 
                                                                                                                   (1-7) 
As I have attempted to demonstrate, the songs „Night Comes On‟, „The Changing of the Guards‟ and 
„The Wicked Messenger‟ utilise vagueness and ambiguity to allow the listener to create highly 
individualised interpretations. This is not possible with poetry that conforms to the traditions in 
contemporary poetry exemplified by Seamus Heaney. 
Empirical Identifier No. 5:  
Absence of Ellipsis 
 
The nearest thing to ellipsis is the omission of the word “and” after the word „hairspray‟ in the 
following lines: 
The air, still hung with spores of your hairspray; 
body-heat stowed in the crumpled duvet. 
 
However, it would be more accurate to describe these lines as asyndetic rather than elliptical. To give a 
demonstration of what the effect of these lines would be if ellipsis were present is difficult, principally 
because ellipsis is something that, ideally, has to be incorporated into the syntactical structure during 
composition, and not after. To simply delete words from these lines to illustrate my point would be to 
render them examples of asyndeton or paratactaxis. 
Empirical Identifier No. 6:  
Absence of Metonymy 
 
There is no metonymy in the poem. 
 
 Empirical Identifier No. 7:  
Use of Simile and Metaphor 
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The poem makes use of metaphor as in „steam hugs‟, in the line „steam hugs the rim of the just-boiled 
kettle‟. This use of metaphor links the signifier („kettle‟) inextricably with the signified (kettle), thus, 
inhibiting connotation. „Hugs‟ is also used to personify the steam and kettle and to draw attention to the 
speaker‟s “un-hugged” state. 
Non-Empirical Identifiers  
The constituents of non-empiricist poetry that distinguish it from empiricist poetry, I will refer to as 
Non-Empirical Identifiers. They are: 
  1.  Multiple Registers (e.g. archaism, rhetoric, cliché). 
  2.  Intertextuality.  
  3.  Incoherent Syntax and Sentence Structures.  
  4.  Novel Word Juxtapositions.   
  5.  Abstraction. 
  6.  No Distinct Ego or Poetic Persona.
 
  
  7.  No Philosophical Discursiveness.  
  8.  Unconventional Punctuation. 
  9.  Use of Ellipsis. 
 10. No Metaphors.  
 
It is not necessary for every Non-Empirical Identifier to be present in a poem for the poem to be 
classified as non-empirical. However, the more of these identifiers a poem has the more it can be 
classified in such a way.  
The Functioning of Non-Empirical Identifiers 
 
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 1: 
Multiple Registers 
 
An example of a poem that contains some of the Non-Empirical Identifiers is Veronica 
Forrest-Thomson‟s „The Garden of Proserpine‟. In this poem, we find examples of the use of multiple 
registers, particularly in close juxtaposition:  
And, O, many-toned, immortal Aphrodite, 
Lend me thy girdle. 
You can spare it for an hour or so 
Until Zeus has got back his erection.
30
 
 
Here we see the use of the rhetorical device of apostrophe, which is now considered archaic but was 
frequently used in elegiac and epic poetry to invoke the presence of the dead or that of a muse. Here it 
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serves a similar function, as the goddess of love, Aphrodite, is summoned to assist the speaker in 
matters of love. The syntax of the first two lines is noticeably archaic, containing words such as, 
„many-toned‟, „immortal‟, „thy‟, „girdle‟ and the single capitalised letter „O‟. This is in sharp contrast 
with the second two lines with their twentieth-century colloquial register and comic bathos.  
The juxtaposition of these two discordant registers draws attention to the artifice involved in their 
construction, and connects the Elizabethan concept of courtly love to its modern equivalent of 
unrequited love, which is being alluded to by the use of the girdle, with its associations of sexuality, 
seduction and denial. The speaker (whom I will make into a female) is calling upon Aphrodite to rectify 
her loveless situation by conferring upon her the power of sexual attraction. Other juxtapositions of 
discordant registers in the poem are: 
I lie alone. I am aweary, aweary, 
I would that I were dead. 
Be my partner and you‟ll never regret it.31 
 
In lines one and two we have the archaism, and in line three the colloquialism. Interestingly, the register 
of  the first line is redolent of  lines written by Elizabethan male poets. Such lines as „Come, Sleep!, O 
Sleep!, the certain knot of peace‟, and „Weep no more, nor sigh, nor groan‟ by Philip Sidney and John 
Fletcher, respectively, have the same jaded response to life that is discernable  in „I lie  alone. I am 
aweary, aweary‟. The colloquial third line with its modern contraction („you‟ll‟) produces more bathos. 
As well as mixed registers there is a mixture of archaic and non-archaic vocabulary and phraseology. 
Among the archaic are: „the moon is sinking‟, „Pleiades‟, „gods‟, „Aphrodite is also Persephone‟, „queen 
of love and death‟. The non-archaic include: „time runs on she said‟, „stick together‟, they make a strong 
combination‟, „so just make him love me again‟, „you good old triple goddess of tight corners‟, „and 
leave me to deal with gloomy Dis‟, „we all know better‟, „love kills people and the police can‟t do 
anything to stop it‟. 
It should be pointed out here that although Forrest-Thompson uses the above devices to some effect, 
her actual poetic aesthetic is, surprisingly, empiricist. She still regards the text as the ultimate arbiter of 
meaning, hence her criticism of David Gascoyne‟s „The Rites of Hysteria‟ as being meaningless 
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because, „the formal levels exercise no control, so that one cannot tell how the external world is filtered 
through the language of the poem‟.32 Moreover, whilst accepting the fact that readers will inevitably use 
their imaginations with regard to their appreciation of the text, in the following statement she qualifies 
the degree to which imagination is to be used: 
The reader must, of course, use his imagination; that is what poetry is for. But he must use 
it to free himself from the fixed forms of thought which ordinary language imposes on our 
minds, not to deny the strangeness of poetry by inserting it in some non-poetic area: his 
own mind, the poet‟s mind, or any non-fictional situations.33 
 
By setting up a dubious opposition between „poetry‟ and so-called „non-poetic areas‟ she is redefining 
poetry as that which can only operate textually. In this sense her poetic has similarities to New 
Criticism.  
Returning to the matter in hand, John Ashbery is also notable for his use of conflicting registers. In 
„How Much Longer Will I Be Able to Inhabit the Divine Sepulcher...‟ the opening stanza repeats the 
neo-Romantic utterance of the poem‟s title while extending it into rhetorical query: „How much longer 
will I be able to inhabit the divine sepulcher / Of life my great love?‟ We then have a surreal-like 
semi-philosophical enquiry into whether,  
dolphins plunge bottomward 
To find the light? Or is it rock 
That is searched? Unrelentingly?
34
 
 
To this is appended the hipster/cowboy demotic sullenness of „Huh‟.35  The resultant effect of this 
mixture of discourses is to disorient the reader sufficiently to enable recognition of this disorientation 
tactic in process and, thereby, allow the reader to re-engage with the text on its own terms. Inevitably, 
this means that readers are forced to create meanings from the indeterminate and contextually dissonant 
linguistic signs presented to them. 
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 2: 
Intertextuality 
 
Another Non-Empirical Identifier is the use of intertextuality. Among the most celebrated instances of 
this are T. S. Eliot‟s The Waste Land, and Ezra Pound‟s Cantos. Before them, Alfred Lord Tennyson 
and Mathew Arnold both referred to other texts. Tennyson‟s Maud draws heavily on Hamlet, while 
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Arnold‟s Empedocles attempts to „debunk the influence of Keats in contemporary philosophical poetry‟ 
by „creating a failed “hero” as his protagonist, who is Keatsian in many of his concerns and in many 
aspects of his character‟.36  We can see intertextuality, also, in the fifth stanza of William Blake‟s „The 
Tyger‟: 
When the stars threw down their spears 
And watered heaven with their tears: 
Did he smile his work to see? 
Did he who made the Lamb make thee? 
 
Of  these lines Michael Ferber says: 
The „When‟ clause tells of strange cosmic events but tells of them as if they must already be 
familiar to us; they are the setting or background to the main business of the stanza. But 
what are these events? They suggest a war in heaven, and the best-known story of a war in 
heaven is Milton‟s in Paradise Lost. Are the stars, then, the rebel angels, now defeated and 
weeping over their loss? Since that rebellion was the prime act of evil in the world, are we 
to take it as not only simultaneous with, but equivalent to, the creation of the Tyger? 
37
 
 
As Ferber suggests this stanza seems to be using Paradise Lost as its intertext. He later suggests, also, 
that Blake‟s „The Sick Rose‟, similarly, alludes to Paradise Lost. With this poem Blake „has reimagined 
the Fall, when a serpent entered the Garden to seduce Eve, and death entered the world‟.38  Ferber then 
quotes the speech from Paradise Lost (Book IX, lines 900-1) that Adam makes when he learns what has 
happened to Eve:  
How art thou lost, how on a sudden lost, 
Defac‟t, deflow‟r‟d, and now to Death devote? 39 
 
A moral parallel between Eve and Blake‟s Rose is then suggested: „We no sooner think of  Eve, 
however, when we wonder if the Rose herself is in any way at fault‟.40 
In the works of Eliot, Pound, Tennyson, Arnold and Blake, intertexts are used as exegetical reference 
points, recognition of which is required by the reader before there can be a forward movement in 
aesthetic appreciation. The intertext is made to function metaphorically as an extra-textual referent. 
However, apart from this usage, intertextuality can also function metonymically.  
In the Forrest-Thomson poem cited already, „The Garden of Proserpine‟, mythical and literary figures 
are mentioned. Aphrodite, Zeus, Pleiades, Dis, Sappho, Shakespeare, Swinburne, Tennyson, Eliot, 
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Sophocles, Euripides and Aeschylus are all brought into play. However, it is unimportant whether the 
reader knows who they are. It is enough that they appear. They function as intertextual metonymic 
ciphers to be appropriated by the reader for his or her own personal exegesis. If the reader is aware that 
Aphrodite is the goddess given by Zeus in marriage to Hephaestus, or that Dis is the Roman name for 
Hades, the god of the underworld, all well and good. However, it is not essential information. 
In another context, Roland Barthes says in „The Death of the Author‟ that a text is, „not a line of 
words releasing a single [...] meaning but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none 
of them original, blend and clash‟.41 „The reader‟, he says, „is the space on which all the quotations that 
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text‟s unity lies not in its origin but in 
its destination‟.42  In light of this, the use of intertextuality can be seen as the systematic outworking of 
this more general observation about language and texts.  
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 3:  
Incoherent Syntax and Sentence Structures  
 
In this section, I will use the word “incoherent” to characterize the mainstream evaluation of non-
empirical poetry since most readers will understand it in this context.
43
 Such poetry displays the 
presense of ego/s and voice/s in a fragmented and discontinuous form. Incoherent syntax and sentence 
structure is evidenced in Clark Coolidge‟s „On Induction of the Hand‟: „There is a wrench that a certain 
staring at / while balancing humours we call words in state pours wings / of edgy fondness bound 
useless in calm of lucidity down the / chute of the sentence‟. 44  It is also present in Tom Mandel‟s „Say 
Ja‟: „I wanted to increase / them singing aphasic their / song certain, the turnstiles / left open to leap 
over / which these gloomy pens / and stalls so full‟.45   Sentences such as these and the phrasal 
juxtapositions they consist of „not only suggest unexpected relations‟, as Charles Bernstein says in his 
essay „Semblance‟, „but induce reading along ectoskeletal and citational lines‟.46   The result of which is 
that „the operant mechanisms of meaning are multiplied and patterns of projection in reading are less 
restricted‟.47  This would not be so with more grammatical sentence patterns which, as Bernstein says, 
allow the accumulating references to enthral the reader by diminishing diversions from a 
constructed representation. In this way, each word‟s references work in harmony by 
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reinforcing a spatiotemporal order conventionalized by the bulk of writing practice that 
creates the „standard‟. „The lamp sits atop the table in the study‟—each word narrowing 
down the possibilities of each other, limiting the interpretation of each word‟s meaning by 
creating an ever more specific context.
48
 
 
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 4: 
Novel Word Juxtapositions 
 
Novel Word Juxtapositions can be found in Jack Kerouac‟s „211th Chorus‟: „quivering meat / 
conception‟, 49 and in his „The Thrashing Doves‟: „all the balloon of the shroud on the floor‟; 50 in Allen 
Ginsberg‟s Howl: „hydrogen dukebox‟, „starry / dynamo in the machinery of night‟ and „supernatural 
darkness‟; 51 in Tom Clarke‟s „You (I)‟: „siege / engines‟; 52  and in John Ashbery‟s „Leaving the 
Atocha Station‟: „perfect tar grams nuclear world bank tulip‟.53  They can also be found in Blake‟s 
Milton („freezing hunger‟, „eternal tables‟); 54  and  his The Book of Urizen („the caverns of  his jointed 
spine‟).55   These word combinations result in elliptical breaks between juxtapositions of words not 
normally collocated and which allows for the possibility of meaning. It operates similarly to 
Eisenstein‟s theory of cinematic montage  where, 
the emphasis is on a dynamic juxtaposition of individual shots that calls attention to itself 
and forces the viewer consciously to come to conclusions about the interplay of images 
while he or she is also emotionally and psychologically affected in a less conscious way. 
Instead of continuity, Eisenstein emphasized conflict and contrast, arguing for a kind of 
Hegelian dialectic, where each shot was a cell and where a thesis could be juxtaposed by an 
antithesis, both achieving a synthesis or significance which was not inherent in either 
shot.
56
 
 
Similarly, William Empson‟s comment on the juxtaposition of two statements („Swiftly  the years, 
beyond recall. / Solemn the stillness of this spring morning‟.) that are only loosely related. These two 
statements generate for Empson a discussion of the relationship and interpretation of the words „swiftly‟ 
and „stillness‟. Commenting on their contradictory character, he says: 
Lacking rhyme, metre, and any overt device such as comparison, these […] two statements 
are made as if they were connected, and the reader is forced to consider their relations for 
himself. The reason why these facts should have been selected for a poem is left for him to 
invent; he will invent a variety of reasons and order them in his own mind.
57
 
 
Later on he quotes a newspaper headline: „Italian Assassin Bomb Plot Disaster‟ 58 and says that it is,  
a very effective piece of writing, quite apart from the fact that it conveys its point in a form 
short enough for large type. It conveys it with a compactness which gives the mind several 
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notions at one glance of the eye (Emphasis added).
59
  
 
This ability of the compactness of Novel Word Juxtapositions to give „the mind several notions at one 
glance of the eye‟ is the basic element that distinguishes poetry from prose.  
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 5: 
Abstraction 
 
Another feature of non-empiricist writing is that of abstraction, by which I mean those phrases and 
image combinations that are too generalised and indeterminate to be strictly referential. These are not to 
be confused with Empson‟s “sleeping” or “subdued” metaphors but are similar to what he refers to as 
„ambiguity by vagueness‟, citing an instance of it („Brightness falls from the air‟) in Thomas Nashe‟s 
Summer’s Last Will and Testament.60   An example of abstraction can be seen in Blake. In  „To the 
Muses‟ the phrase  „chambers of the sun‟, in the first stanza, do not specifically refer to anything. The 
phrase „chambers of the East‟ in the previous line, however, does. It refers to the cavernous areas 
located near the mythical Mount Ida, (represented in line one as „Ida‟s shady brow‟) the place from 
which the gods watched the battles around Troy. It could also refer to the mountain in Crete where Zeus 
was said to have been born. The phrase „chambers of the sun‟ does not allow for closure in this way. 
The word „sun‟ (a source of light) has no connection semantically with the word „chambers‟ (a source of 
darkness). Furthermore, the sun is noted for its lack of vacuity, unlike caverns.  
Modern instances of this can be found in T. S. Eliot‟s „The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock‟: „I know 
the voices dying with a dying fall‟;  „There will be a time to murder and create‟; and „Time to turn back 
and descend the stair‟.61  Also, in the following passage from The Waste Land: 
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow  
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,  
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only  
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,  
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,  
And the dry stone no sound of water. Only  
There is shadow under this red rock  
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),  
And I will show you something different from either  
Your shadow at morning striding behind you  
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;  
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.  
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                                                                                                              (19-30) 
 
Whilst this passage does use concrete nouns (roots, branches, rubbish, rock, etc.) their resultant affect is 
connotative rather than sensory. Their inclusion within generalized statements  allows the reader some 
leeway in interpretation—hence the many different readings of this poem by critics.  Had Eliot intended 
the passage to be merely a visual and sensory description of objects; such varied readings would not be 
possible. Indeed, Eliot ensured that readers understood the poem as being non-descriptive by including 
detailed footnotes explaining the allusions.
62
  For example, as is well known,  „Out of this stony 
rubbish‟ is not a literal description of something he has seen. It is a reference to John Donne‟s 
Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: „[...] and now the whole house is but a handful of sand, so much 
dust, and but a peck of rubbish, so much bone‟ (XVIII). Similarly, „And the dead tree gives no shelter, 
the cricket no relief‟ is from the following verse from Ecclesiastes: 
Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way, and the 
almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail: 
because man goeth to his long home, and the mourners go about the streets. Or ever the 
silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at the fountain, 
or the wheel broken at the cistern. Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the 
spirit shall return unto God who gave it. (12:5-7) 
 
What Eliot has achieved by mixing the concrete with the abstract is to enable the concrete to operate 
connotatively.  Unlike Simon Armitage‟s „Night Shift‟ referred to earlier, the passage is not meant to 
faithfully represent a world seen through the eyes of one person.  
In Edward Dorn‟s „An Idle Visitation‟: „the footstep in the flat above‟; „the girl you left  / in Juarez‟; 
and „The mission / bells are ringing in Kansas‟.63  This last quotation particularly illustrates the point: 
the speaker cannot, unless he has psychic abilities, know that the mission bells are ringing in Kansas, 
therefore, the verity of this statement cannot be derived from sensual experience. This leaves open two 
possibilities as to how he has acquired this information. The first is that he knows what time the mission 
bells ring each day (or week) and is therefore able, by looking at his watch, to deduce that they are 
ringing as he speaks. The second is that he is not referring to the actual mission bells ringing in actual 
Kansas but to the “idea” of „mission bells ringing in Kansas‟. In other words, he has conceptualised the 
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mission, the bells and Kansas: extracted them from their actual geographical, temporal and referential 
contexts and emptied them of a referential signification. Similarly, in Ashbery‟s „The Skaters‟ the 
personification of the weather („The wind points to the advantages of decay‟ is used to conjoin an image 
(„the wind points‟) with abstraction („the advantages of decay‟) in such a way that both the image and 
the abstraction cancel each other out as coherent statements, thus, inhibiting referential signification.
64
 
Abstraction is also present in Emily Dickinson. In Dickinson: The Modern Idiom, David Porter says 
of her use of the abstract phrase „Dome of Abyss‟ in poem 291: 
Abstract expressionist artists since Kandinsky have sought representations of this sort of 
experience that unknowably is. Materialization of incipient abstract forms occurs in 
Jackson Pollock‟s poured paintings, where he abandoned the brush [...], and in the motifless 
shapes of Robert Motherwell, Franz Kline, and Mark Rothco. [...] With Dickinson‟s „Dome 
of Abyss‟ we stand at a comparable threshold of both verbal and figurative consciousness. 
The variant readings show us the poet attempting to haul instinctual feelings into language 
and thus into consciousness.
65
 
 
The importance of abstraction for non-empirical writing has unfortunately been underemphasized both 
in mainstream and (even allowing for the poets mentioned) in certain avant-garde poetics: it being 
considered, perhaps, a sign of stylistic naiveté.   
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 6: 
No Distinct Ego or Poetic Persona 
 
In relation to this point I can do no better than to quote Easthope‟s observation concerning the presence 
of an ego in the following excerpt from Eliot‟s The Waste Land:  
   Unreal City, 
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn, 
A crowed flowed over London Bridge, so many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many. 
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled, 
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet. 
Flowed up the hill and down King William Street, 
To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours 
With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine. 
There I saw one I knew, and stopped him crying: „Stetson! 
„You who where with me in the ships at Mylae! 
„That corpse you planted last year in your garden, 
„Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year? 
„Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed? 
„Oh keep the Dog far hence, that‟s friend to men, 
„Or with his nails he‟ll dig it up again! 
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„You! hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!‟ 66 
 
                                                                                                              (60-76) 
 
Of this Easthope says:  
 
Although there is an „I‟ that ego is a point in a process, not fixed in any definite relation to 
London, Dante, the Punic wars (during which the battle of Mylae was fought in 260 BC) 
and Webster‟s play, The White Devil (from which the warning about the dog is culled); the 
whole address to Stetson is unexplained and insufficiently motivated; meaning is dislocated 
across syntactical oppositions. Crucially, a reader is left undecided whether this is said or 
cited, whether a voice is represented speaking or there is rather a verbal collage from Dante, 
Vergil („Mylae‟), Jacobean drama and (in the last line here) Baudelaire. We are forced to 
become aware of the text as text, the materiality of the signifier based in phonemic 
difference, which is the necessary prior condition of all meaning.
67
 
 
Eliot himself sought this effect when he said:  
The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical 
theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a 
„personality‟ to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a 
personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected 
ways.
68
 
 
This is almost echoed by Barthes when he says that it is language, „which speaks, not the author; to 
write is, through a prerequisite impersonality [...] to reach that point where only language acts, 
“performs”, and not “me”‟.69 
Non-Empirical Identifier No. 7:  
No Philosophical Discursiveness  
 
Discursiveness  (specifically in relation to its poetic manifestation rather than within its philosophical 
framework) is a mimesis of thought processes and is, therefore, empiricist. Although it could be argued 
that in much of postmodern poetry these thought processes  present themselves as plural and 
discontinuous, nevertheless, the lexical aspects (abstract nouns etc.) of discursiveness disallow 
connotation despite the discourse‟s fragmented appearance. What can be conveyed via discursiveness in 
all its forms (recollection, rumination, speculation and confessional) could be rendered more concisely 
with highly concentrated imagery and Novel Word Juxtapositions. In Eliot‟s view poetry is „something 
over and above, and something quite different from, a collection of psychological data about the minds 
of  poets, or about the history of an epoch‟.70 
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As earlier chapters have suggested, discursiveness came to full fruition with Wordsworth,  as can be 
seen in this extract from „Tintern Abbey‟: 
                                        That time is past, 
And all its aching joys are now no more, 
And all its dizzy raptures. Not for this 
Faint I, nor mourn nor murmer; other gifts 
Have followed; for such loss, I would believe, 
Abundant recompense. For I have learned 
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing often-times 
The still, sad music of humanity 
71
 
        
                           (83-92) 
 
Every phrase is intended to propel the reader‟s understanding forward to the next phrase so that enough 
semantic information can be gathered to enable hermeneutic closure. Meaning is produced 
retrospectively, i.e. after having read the passage. The “message” of the passage is more important than 
the individual semantic elements that comprise it and consequently the passage is captive to the logic of 
uninterrupted statement. 
Examples of this can be seen even in more experimental modern works such as in Ashbery‟s The 
Picture of Little J. A. in a Prospect of Flowers: 
Yet I cannot escape the picture 
Of my small self in that bank of flowers: 
My head among the blazing phlox 
Seemed a pale and gigantic fungus. 
I had a hard stare, accepting 
Everything, taking nothing, 
As though the rolled-up future might stink 
As loud as stood the sick moment 
The shutter clicked. Though I was wrong, 
Still, as the loveliest feelings 
72
 
     
This is essentially a Wordsworthian transcription of a memory intermingled with philosophical 
rumination. Similarly, in Prynne‟s „Frost and Snow, Falling‟ we find this: 
So that when the snow falls again the earth 
becomes lighter and lighter. The surface con- 
spires with us, we are its first born. Even 
in this modern age we leave tracks, as we 
go. And as we go, walk, stride or climb 
out of it, we leave that behind, our own 
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level of contemplation of the world 
73
 
 
There is little in this that distinguishes it from the tradition of philosophically reflective poetry.  
That discursiveness is so amply evident in experimental works could be regarded as nothing more 
than the use of it ironically: in the sense that these instances of it are used to defamiliarise the 
transparency of such discourse as it is presented in poetry that is more conventional. This may be so, but 
I am not sure whether irony (and, for that matter, defamilarization) is totally divorced from an empiricist 
aesthetic, in that its effect is dependent upon readers recognising its presence. That irony can be 
recognised indicates that ambiguity is absent (or severely limited), and that closure is intended: the poet 
intends the reader to recognise the irony, and the reader responds by obeying. How else could irony 
operate without this tacit agreement between poet and reader?  
The last three Non-Empirical Identifiers (Unconventional Punctuation, Use of  Ellipsis,  and No 
Metaphors) have already been touched upon in previous sections  
Poetry as Mental Activity  
In The Reader, the Text, the Poem Louise Rosenblatt says, „The poem, then, must be thought of as an 
event in time. It is not an object or an ideal entity. It happens during a coming-together, a 
compentration, of a reader and a text‟.74  She later elaborates:  
The reading of a text is an event occurring at a particular time in a particular environment at 
a particular moment in the life history of the reader. The transaction will involve not only 
the past experience but also the present state and present interests or preoccupations of the 
reader. This suggests the possibility that printed marks on a page may even become 
different linguistic symbols by virtue of transactions with different readers. Just as knowing 
is the process linking a knower and a known, so a poem should not be thought of as an 
object, an entity, but rather as an active process lived through during the relationship 
between a reader and a text.
75
 
 
For the poem to be experienced as an event in time, the importance of mental activity, or 
“internalisation”, in the reader cannot be overestimated. By internalisation I mean that part of the 
reader‟s response that is able, through conscious decision, to minimise the relevance of the text in the 
hermeneutical process.
76
 This can be readily achieved with poetry containing Non-Empirical Identifiers 
but is difficult to achieve with poetry in which the artifice (in the form of certain extra-lexical 
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ingredients—such as the visual and acoustic) is foregrounded at the expense of semantic elements. Such 
poetry inhibits internalisation and is „concerned only with representing its own mechanisms‟.77 
These elements of artifice are, however, non-empirical but they are so only in the same way as 
abstract painting and music. Like these, they are non-semantic and, as such, they preclude an exegetical 
response that is distinct from the hermeneutical procedures employed in the reception of 
non-representational visual art and music. In „The Dollar Value of Poetry‟ Charles Bernstein advocates 
a poetics that is grounded in experiences that are released in the reading: a „nongeneralzable residue that 
is specific to each particular experience‟. In this sense, then, poetry is seen as being untranslatable and 
unparaphrasable for „what is untranslatable is the sum of all the specific conditions of the experience 
(place, time, order, light, mood, position, to infinity) made available by reading‟.78  Bernstein sees this 
untranslatability   as being misunderstood by advocates of „certain “concretist” tendencies, who see in 
radical concrete procedures the manifestation of untranslatability at its fullest flowering‟79.  As 
Bernstein, stresses „what is not translatable is the experience released in the reading‟.80  He goes on to 
say that „in so far as some “visual poems” move toward making the understanding independent of the 
language it is written in, i.e., no longer requiring translation, they are, indeed, no longer so much writing 
as works of visual art.
81
  In „Words and Pictures‟, he emphasises the linguistic and semantic criteria 
necessary for any aesthetic of viewer/reception theory to be plausible: „visual experience is only 
validated when accompanied by a logico-verbal explanation‟.82  For Bernstein, then, as he says in 
„Thought‟s Measure‟, „there is meaning only in terms of language‟.83 
Furthermore, he is well aware of the dangers of too much foregrounding of artifice when he writes in 
„Artifice of Absorption‟:  
In my poems, I 
frequently use opaque & nonabsorbable 
elements, digressions & 
interruptions, as part of a technological 
arsenal to create a more powerful 
(“souped up”) 
absorption than possible with traditional, 
& blander, absorptive techniques. This is a 
precarious road because insofar 
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as the poem seems 
overtly self-conscious, as opposed to internally 
incantatory or psychically 
actual, it may produce 
self-consciousness in the reader in such a way as to 
destroy his or her absorption by theatricalizing 
or conceptualizing the text, removing 
it from the realm of an experience engendered 
to that of a technique 
exhibited.
84
 
 
Bernstein welcomes internalisation. Without it, it is impossible for poetry to be experienced as an event 
in time. However, he does tend to view „the semantic field as incorporating non-lexical features of a 
poem‟.85 While I agree with incorporation in principle, in practice it is psychologically problematical for 
most readers. This is perhaps why such poetry is deemed “difficult”.  
The formal qualities of a poem are, of course, important but only indirectly: in that they facilitate the 
inner ear‟s appreciation of the poem‟s sonorous qualities. They do not contribute overmuch 
semantically. The only thing of importance is the mental activity experienced by the reader. The 
reader‟s attention should not be focused on the poem‟s structure or its rhetorical devices but, rather, 
should be concentrated on the resonance produced by the semantic qualities of the lexis. Only in this 
way, then, can the poem be fully experienced as mental activity. It must be remembered that a poem is 
“heard” primarily in the mind. All that we are able to glean from a poem is conveyed through the poems 
semantic operation. To argue that the formal qualities of the text facilitate a semantic response is to rely 
too heavily on an aesthetic theory that is more appropriate to the visual arts.  
Conclusion 
The classification and identification of Empirical and Non-Empirical Identifiers enables readers to 
become conscious of the procedures used to limit exegesis, and to inhibit reader participation in the 
interpretive process. Recognising this enables the reader to subvert these mechanisms, thereby, making 
conscious and controllable, reading strategies that would ordinarily function unconsciously. Such 
unconscious strategies are outlined as follows:  
The reader brings to the text his past experience and present personality. Under the 
magnetism of the ordered symbols of the text, he marshals his resources and crystallizes out 
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from the stuff of memory, thought, and feeling a new order, a new experience, which he 
sees as the poem. This becomes part of the ongoing stream of his life experience, to be 
reflected on from any angle important to him as a human being.
86
 
  
To use this process consciously enables the creation of individual meaning and significance for the 
reader. Robert Sheppard touches on this when he writes with regard to the poetry of Lee Harwood: 
A poem is not thus primarily self-expressive. It is objective, and only completed by the 
reader, though here Harwood does not have in mind the ideal reader of recent reader-
response theorist, one “constituted” or “implied” by the text, but the multitude of readers 
who actually do engage with the poem-catalyst; it causes various changes within different 
readers without itself altering its objective form.
87
 
 
The various reader-response theories that Sheppard alludes to are in actuality only stating more 
explicitly, and in a more specialist vernacular, what has always been the basic operating procedures of 
many poets, and even songwriters. With particular regard to the latter, the following statement by the 
songwriter Neil Young is illuminating: 
The way I do things is I give enough facts to make people get a feeling—and then they can 
associate their own lives with these images that make it seem to apply directly to them. Like 
the song was written for them. They can‟t believe it‟s so directly and obviously about their 
life. That‟s because it‟s not so specific that it eliminates them.88 
 
There is a psychological basis for this reader-oriented approach. Rosenblatt makes this clear when she 
quotes the psycholinguist Eric Wanner as saying in his article „Do We Understand Sentences from the 
Outside-In or from the Inside-Out?‟ that the „listener makes an active contribution to what he hears and 
understands, and it is this contribution which makes the problem of comprehension both difficult and 
interesting‟.89 
The main thrust of this chapter has essentially been advocating a return to generalization and 
imprecision in poetic practice. Apart from the artistic reasons that motivate this it can be argued on 
financial grounds also. The diminishment in poetry volume sales over the past 50 or so years is, I 
believe, due to the increasingly empiricist mode of writing that has found favour during this period.  To 
obstruct the ambiguity inherent in language is to obviate the natural instincts of human beings to make 
sense of themselves and their experiences. If one looks at the poetry of children and the so-called “bad” 
poetry of adults, for instance, one finds it replete with imprecision. Contemporary poetry fails to sell in 
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vast numbers because it leaves little to the imagination and disallows a personal interpretative 
interaction with the text. Its prose-like quality, which is excessively similar to prose fiction, leaves the 
reading public faced with a choice: to read poetry, or to read a novel. They generally opt for the latter 
because they perceive it as more value for money.  
Ideally, each reader should be permitted the fundamental privilege of formulating a meaning which 
would (for that reader) be the quintessence of the poem‟s significance. The poem, in and of itself, is of 
little consequence other than as a cipher for this practice to occur. The words and images of a poem 
should be looked upon as devices that enable readers to recall their own experiences, reflect present 
circumstances, and anticipate future desires. Each word should have the potential to enable the reader to 
derive personal significance from it. By doing this, the reader becomes, in effect, the composer of the 
poem, and the definer of its limits. It is of minor importance whether the commonly received meaning 
of the poem is discerned by the reader or not, as the ultimate aim of such a personal response is to 
enhance the enjoyment value of the work for that reader alone. What the poem is “meant” to mean from 
an authorial standpoint should not be of paramount concern for readers wishing to gain satisfaction and 
enjoyment from the work. Such an approach to reading poetry, if widely understood and accepted, could 
possibly restore poetry to its status as a significant art form.   
In summary, then, this chapter has attempted to show how the influence of  Wordsworthian 
empiricism has evidenced itself in twentieth-century poetry and, consequently, limited the 
hermeneutical value of such poetry. It has also been indicated that Empirical Identifiers, because of the 
ways in which they encourage exegetical closure through their functioning as referents to phenomena, 
are a legacy of Wordsworth‟s poetic theories and, therefore, appropriate for discussion in an 
examination of  Wordsworth‟s influence on twentieth-century poetry.  
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